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quarta-feira, 16 de julho de 2008
Velas Sudamerica 2010
sábado, 12 de julho de 2008
The World’s First Attack Sub
The Forgotten British R-1 Submarine: The World’s First Attack Sub
June 13th, 2008by: Raul Colon
When the Great War commenced in August 1914, it was the British Royal Navy, not Germany, who possess the strongest submarine force. But as the war progressed, advances in German submarine design and enemy engagement tactics promptly shifted the balance of power underneath the sea. By the late 1916, it was Germany who controlled the type and pace of the submarine warfare. By the early 1917, the new German U-boats were wreaking havoc with the Allies’ merchant shipping. A new strategy and weapons were needed. By the summer of 1917 the British took an unorthodox approach to the U-boat problem. The Admiralty proposed the development of new type of submarine: a sub hunter boat. The R-1 was the forerunner of the modern fast attack submarine. The lead boat hull’s, the class would include ten units, was laid in February 1917. It measured 163’-9” in length with a height of 15’-0” and a conning tower height of 11’-6”. Total surface displacement was 410 tons while underwater the R-1 would displace 503 tons. The highly streamline and clean hull structure, an innovation for those times, would provide the boat with added underwater speed. The R-1 did not mount any deck gun and its ballast tanks were placed internally. A single screw alignment was powered a one 1200hp diesel and one electrical engines. The engines gave the R-1 a top surface speed of 15 knots. Undersea speed was just under ten (9.5) knots. Maximum operational range, at an eight knot clip, was an impressive 2,048 nautical miles. Being a sub hunter-killer, the R-1 had six 18” torpedo tubes.
The R-1 was launched on April 1918 and became operational in October of that year. She was manned by a crew compliment of 36 men. Beside the “new” nature of the boat mission profile, the R-1 class would incorporate some of Great Britain’s most advance technologies. Chief among them was the newly re-developed hydrophones. The R-1 was fitted with four powerful hydrophones with bearing mechanism in its bow section. The R-1 became operational too late to serve the Royal Navy in World War I. She would operate as a costal patrol boat for several years before it became useless for its role. The lead boat was decommissioned in January 1923 and scrapped to pieces the following year.@
Raul Colone-mail:rcolonfrias@yahoo.com
sexta-feira, 11 de julho de 2008
MB Força não pode estar presente onde precisa!
''O País está vulnerabile''
Julio de Moura Neto: comandante da Marinha; almirante diz que Força não pode estar presente onde precisa e que, para isso, espera liberação de verba contingenciada
Tânia Monteiro, BRASÍLIA
O almirante defendeu a duplicação da frota de navios-patrulha, passando dos atuais 27 para 54. Segundo ele, a Marinha também está empenhada na construção de submarinos e no prosseguimento de seu programa nuclear, outras de suas prioridades. "Pode dizer que o País está vulnerável, porque não tem a quantidade de meios suficientes para se fazer presente em toda a área de responsabilidade, principalmente nas proximidades de todos os campos de petróleo", afirmou ele ao Estado, depois de tentar minimizar a preocupação com a reativação da quarta frota norte-americana, para patrulhar as águas do Atlântico. Mas avisou que o Brasil não aceitará, "em hipótese alguma", interferência em assuntos internos.
Houve mudança no plano de reequipamento da Marinha para poder proteger os novos campos de petróleo?
Tenho defendido a importância de a Marinha ter seus navios e estar equipada para tomar conta das nossas águas jurisdicionais que têm petróleo, gás, muita pesca, uma quantidade enorme de interesses, além do tráfico marítimo. Essas descobertas na camada pré-sal só reforçam a necessidade de a Marinha ter navios em número suficiente para se fazer presente................
Os recursos prometidos estão assegurados?
Os R$ 130milhões (para o programa nuclear) que o presidente prometeu estão inseridos no orçamento da Marinha, que é de R$ 1,976 bilhão, este ano. Houve um contingenciamento de R$ 400 milhões e temos muitas esperanças de que tudo será liberado a curto prazo. Mas estamos querendo ainda uma verba extra-orçamentária de R$ 330 milhões para outras necessidades da Força. Queremos ter de volta o que estava previsto na lei orçamentária, R$ 2,177 bilhões, e foi retirado por causa da perda da CPMF. Com esse total esperamos cumprir exatamente o que planejamos.
E o dinheiro dos royalties?
Temos R$ 3,2 bilhões (atrasados a receber). São recursos que têm sido contingenciados. Este ano, a previsão de arrecadação é de R$ 1,7 bilhão e, desse total, cerca de R$ 1 bilhão já está no Orçamento. Se uma parte desse dinheiro fosse liberada, dava para construir todos os navios que nós precisamos. Queremos 27 navios-patrulha. E queremos mais R$ 100 milhões para iniciar o programa e, durante os anos seguintes, precisamos continuar recebendo o mesmo valor. Cada navio custa R$ 80 milhões. Eles vão atender não só às bacias do Rio de Janeiro, mas de Vitória, Campos, Santos, Sergipe, entre outras. Mas estamos certos de que, a exemplo do que houve no ano passado, teremos todo o dinheiro contingenciado liberado.
Quando esses navios podem ser adquiridos?
Em julho vamos abrir um processo licitatório para a construção de quatro navios-patrulha de 500 toneladas. Já é o primeiro passo para chegar ao número que necessitamos. Precisamos desses navios para estarmos permanentemente junto às plataformas de petróleo, que estão cada vez mais distantes. Todos serão construídos aqui e a média de tempo para um navio-patrulha ficar pronto é de dois anos e meio.
Com o poder naval de que dispõe, o Brasil tem condições de proteger seus campos de petróleo?
Mesmo para o caso da Bacia de Campos, que é mais próxima do litoral, nossos navios-patrulha não são suficientes. À medida que formos para bacias cada vez mais distantes, precisaremos de ter mais navios. É impossível com os meios que temos hoje estarmos presentes onde precisamos.
E o pessoal da Marinha está treinado para proteger as plataformas de petróleo?
Temos feito os treinamentos, inclusive de proteção às plataformas, de comum acordo com a Petrobrás. São exercícios de várias formas, de retomada e resgate de plataforma, usando tropas de fuzileiros navais ou mergulhadores de combate.
AÇÃO,AGINDO .......
quarta-feira, 9 de julho de 2008
"Cisne Branco" participa de Parada Internacional de Veleiros, em Kiel, Alemanha
"Cisne Branco" participa de Parada Internacional de Veleiros, em Kiel, Alemanha
O Navio-Veleiro "Cisne Branco", da Marinha do Brasil, participou no dia 28 de junho, na cidade de Kiel (Alemanha), da Parada de Navios-Veleiros, maior evento de esporte à vela do mundo, representando o nosso País em mais um evento náutico internacional.
O evento tornou-se único pelo fato do "Cisne Branco" ter assumido o posto 2 da formatura, seguindo o líder da parada, o Navio-Veleiro "Gorch Fock", da Marinha anfitriã. Aproximadamente 115 Veleiros participaram da Parada e 1.750 acompanharam o evento.
Antes, o navio brasileiro ficou aberto à visitação, recebendo diversas autoridades locais e população em geral, aumentando ainda mais a divulgação do Brasil no exterior.
Saiba mais sobre o NVe "Cisne Branco"
segunda-feira, 7 de julho de 2008
LCS- So why doesn’t USA clone Absalon?
Ok, this is a typical armchair warrior stats and concepts comparison. Different ships are built to different requirements and some people will defend their favorite with diehard zealotry regardless of what anyone else says – so to that end I am not trying to convert nor bash anyone’s sensitivities. Especially when I say that the USN’s LCS designs aren’t best in class.
Strictly unqualified amateur effort. Illustrations by me. Feedback on illustrations and analysis welcome.
What is a Littoral Combat Ship anyway?
Damn good question. The best answer is that it’s just the current US Navy jargon for an Expeditionary frigate. Sure the USN’s LCS specifications are specific to their perceived needs and so on, but it’s not like the US Navy is the first or only navy to be building warships to operate in same basic operating environment fulfilling the same basic role. In fact the USN’s specifications are actually quite narrow (ironic since they emphasize flexibility and interchangeable mission modules) compared to the scope of some other navy’s takes on the subject. My preferred definition of an Expeditionary frigate is:
A frigate sized warship designed to operate off foreign shores in a light-amphibious or power projection role with a focus on close-to-shore operations.
In fact the wider trend in “expeditionary warfare” seems to be amphibious warfare ships with dock capabilities ranging from 6000 tons up to about 20,000 tons. This generic category has been in existence for many years, but current designs are intended to be more modular, stealthy, mission-flexible and generally have much better aircraft capabilities, often with a through-deck configuration. Variations between LSD (Landing Ship Dock), LPH (Landing Platform helicopter) and glorified RORO (Roll-On, Roll-Off) ferries abound. Where the Littoral combat ships in this essay differ from this category is that they are smaller and more closely resemble the Frigate category, but with an expeditionary fighting focus. Where they differ from missile boats and patrol craft is that they are designed to transverse oceans to fight in other people’s back yards, not just your own.
In all this the word “Littoral” is the greatest misnomer. It’s just a word the USN chose to use really, and reflects their doctrinal perspective and politically considered naming of a project. Littoral Combat Ships as Expeditionary frigates are inherently blue-water capable in order to get to someone else’s littoral back yard. Ok, enough of semantics, if you disagree with my classification of what is and isn’t a Littoral Combat Ship then stop reading now, the rest will be lost on you.
Ok, I’m not here to bash USN, but let’s let the cat out of the bag… after a very straightforward comparison of loosely equivalent designs, I suggest the following ranking of LCS vessels:
1. Absalon Class, Denmark
2. F-125 Class, Germany
3. LCS-2 Independence, USA
4. LCS-1 Freedom, USA
That is to say, all things being equal it’s better to have two Abaslon class vessels than two of any of the other types. So why doesn’t US just buy a load of Absalon Class boats? – We’ll come to that later.
Introducing the contenders
F-125 Frigate, Germany.. Yet to be built, these boats are designed primarily for support of light marine/SF forces and power projection in low/medium intensity situations like peacekeeping. They were originally emphasized shore bombardment/
F-125 Frigate
Absalon class, Denmark. The only contender actually in operational service, two of these serve in the Royal Danish Navy, with a follow-on class of four similar warships planned (although these will be more like GP Frigates than LCSs). These ships are about twice as heavy as the USN’s LCSs but are much more like a conventional frigate with logistics/special operations capability added. They don’t clearly out-do the others in every regard, but they are definitely the most versatile and survivable, and almost certainly the cheapest of the bunch. Very impressive boats, who’d have thought the Danes would have jumped ahead in Naval concepts for the first time since their heyday in the 1700s?
LCS-1 Freedom, USA. The Lockheed Martin LCS-1 design tends to get overshadowed by the comparatively futuristic LCS-2, but the design is in fact the best performer in some key areas. Having said that it is also the smallest, particularly in terms of logistics (“Mission specific”) volume.
LCS-2 Independence, USA.
The ones I forgot….
A few honorable mentions to other designs that sort of fit the bill. The first is the MEKO CLS (CLS = Combat Ship Littorals). This design is still on paper but is being actively marketed by Thyssen-Krupp, the same shipbuilders as the F-125. At 2800 tons and 108m length the CLS is approximately the same size as the LCS-1, and similarly armed. It also claims 45kt top speed and flexible mission modules.
MEKO CLS
Next up is the impressive but still paper-bound HSC N130 trimaran design from BGV in France. This design combines a high speed slender hull with impressive troop/logistics capabilities: 416 troops and/or mixes of up to 16 TEU units. Deck space and hanger for two medium helicopters.
HSC N130
The M-80 Stiletto, USA is a small multihull design with many conceptual similarities to the LCS designs. It is however experimental and lacks the global reach of a true LCS. An interesting design that could arguably be scaled up to meet an LCS type role. I’m not sure why the builder didn’t enter the LCS contest… or did they?
M-80 Stiletto
The FSC(X) Sea Fighter, USA is another USN experimental type, this time using a SWATH design which provides exceptional stability – but at the cost of comparatively deep draught.
Sea Fighter
And now the comparisons……
1. Defense against aerial threats
Operating close to an enemy shore invariably leaves you more accessible to their aircraft and missiles – as the Israeli and British navies can attest. Therefore the ability to intercept aerial threats including missiles is key to survivability.
Firstly all four designs have excellent quality of point air defense/CIWS, and countermeasures. But the clear advantage is with the Absalon class, with 36 medium ranged ESSM missiles. It’s a no-contest really.
1. Absalon Class
2. F-125 Class
3. Tie. LCS-1/LCS-2.
2. Offensive anti-surface warfare
The ability to engage medium/large surface targets other than self defense.
Another no-contest, with a whopping 16 Harpoon missiles, 36 ESSMs and a 127mm gun the Absalon out-guns all the others by some margin. The F-125 is also potent, but the LCS-1/2 designs are markedly impotent in their standard fit. All designs can carry helicopters which could be armed with anti-ship missiles. Again Absalon can carry larger helicopters (in sustained operation) which can generally carry longer ranged anti-ship missiles.
Both LCS craft can potentially mount up to 60 NETFIRE (aka NLOS-LS) missiles which have a modest anti-ship capability, similar in general regards the the ESSM's, a far short of the Harpoon's.
1. Absalon Class
2. F-125 Class
3. Tie. LCS-1/LCS-2
3. Defensive anti-surface warfare
A major threat to warships operating near an enemy coast is small craft (speed boats, jetskis etc) carrying mines which are laid immediately in front of the warship, ramming charges, small torpedoes or missiles. This is popularly called the asymmetric threat.
Although all four designs carry a formidable array of defensive weapons to meet this threat (unlike many other warships!), the most heavily defended is clearly the F-125 which is bristling with remotely operated HMGs and autocannons. The 35mm guns on the Absalon and the 57mm guns on the LCS-1/2 plus the RAM missiles can all be used with great effect also. This one is close, frankly they are all well defended.
1. F-125 Class
2. Tie. LCS-1/LCS-2
4. Absalon Class
4. Shore bombardment/
This is where the design concepts vary. The F-125 was initially designed to play a major role in offensive strike with MRLS, a 155mm gun and land-attack RBS-15 missiles. Whereas the US specifications do not call for this capability at all! – hardly fair, but hey everyone agrees that operating close to an enemy shore, bombardment and strike are key roles. Excludes helicopters (in which all are generally equal).
The Absalon and F-125 both sport advance d 127mm main guns capable of firing extended range (100km+) high accuracy/guided rounds. None of the warships have a land-attack-
Something that I haven't shown in the above illustration is the planned inclusion of four NETFIRE (aka NLOS-LS) modules each with 15 lightweight PAM/LAM missiles on the LCS craft. It's not clear if these modules will ever be fitted to either LCS1 or 2 but they remain part of the program. The PAM has a range of 40km and LAM 70km plus 30 minutes loiter. These missiles are very potent but lack the range of the 127mm guns with extended range ammunition.
1. Tie. Absalon class, F-125 Class
3. Tie. LCS-1/LCS-2.
Anti-submarine warfare
This one is harder to gauge. All four designs can carry modern ASW helicopters and ASW orientated mission fits although the exact make-up of these is open to debate. However, the LCS-1/2 omit a bow/hull mounted sonar. What is more the Absalon can carry two EH-101 ASW helicopters, relative to the smaller helicopters on the other ships.
1. Tie. Absalon/F-125 (tough call)
3. Tie. LCS-1/LCS-2.
Sea keeping
Until we sail on any of these ships it’s hard to say, but sea-keeping is a key requirement to transverse oceans and maintaining station in storms. Some basic generalizations can be made: The Absalon and F-125 are large warships with deeper draught, they are likely to have good sea keeping. The LCS-2 design has a wave piecing bow and outriggers, apparently offering good sea-keeping. LCS-1 however is very shallow draught, light and not wave-piercing; it would have much poorer sea-keeping. My guess:
1. Tie. LCS-2, Absalon, F-125
4. LCS-1
Littoral agility/accessibili
This is a combination of sprint speed and shallowness of draught. Turning circle etc would also play a part but aside from LCS-1 having an incredibly tight turning circle we don’t have figures for that. In simple terms the faster a boat can go, and the less it is inhibited by shallowness of the water, the more capable it is in this regard. In this category it is easy to rank them:
1. LCS-1
2. LCS-2
3. F-125
4. Absalon
Helicopters (accommodation and landing)
All four designs are designed with airborne infiltration in mind. Also, Unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) are also likely to operate from all types, or at least equally potential for UAVs.
This is a tough one; LCS-2 has by far the best helipad, able to land two light/medium helicopters simultaneously, but Absalon has a much bigger hanger and can accommodate two large helicopters. I think the hanger is the winner, but in fairness I’m going to call it a draw.
1. Tie. LCS-2 and Absalon
3. F-125
4. LCS-1
Logistics support
The more troops and equipment an LCS can carry the better. The more equipment, landing craft (light) the better. The bigger hospital (sparse figures so excluded below), the more humanitarian aid…
Again LCS-2 and Absalon are in the running for the top spot. LCS-2 has slightly more space, but almost certainly fewer troops and only Absalon can embark MBTs. Given that I’d say Absalon is slightly more useful to have in the fleet from a logistics perspective:
1. Absalon
2. LCS-2
3. LCS-1
4. F-125
Missed…. Sensors, communication, control and ESM.... and mine warfare
Hard to say. These are vital areas and all four designs claim to do all well. The standard of equipment in each is excellent. Sorry, no real data for a comparison. Consider out-of-scope or draw.
Tallying the points:
Ok, if we award four points for a 1st place in any category, 2 for second etc… and then add them up this is what we get:
1. Absalon (30 points)
2. F-125 (27 points)
3. LCS-2 (25 points)
4. LCS-1 (19 points)
So why doesn’t USA clone Absalon?
Well Denmark is a small country with international ambitions (mainly peace keeping, NATO commitments etc) with a modest navy. Deploying a force abroad, in a littoral environment, is not going to be a huge fleet so the ship needs to be capable of operating with minimal support. Denmark also only has two ships planned so each has to carry more than the USN’s planned fleets of LCS’ to deploy the same force. Also Denmark has a small fleet yet is strategically positioned at the mouth of the Baltic so secondary anti-surface warfare is also needed (hence the 16 SSMs). In short Denmark’s boats need to be more general purpose and more self-sufficient. Whereas America’s LCS program is designed to operate in the context of a much larger force with masses of land attack and under air superiority. So the USN’s LCS don’t need to be either as powerful or as self-sufficient. However, one-for-one the Absalon is still better, although not in every way (it’s big and slow).
[ BREST 2008] 2000 voiliers traditionnels attendus à Brest du 11 au 17 juillet
2000 voiliers traditionnels attendus à Brest du 11 au 17 juillet
 crédits : BREST 2008 |
__________________________________________________
- Accéder au programme sur le site de Brest 2008
(© : BREST 2008)
The Future of American Power
How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest
PARA os estudiosos , no site abaixo ,a integra do artigo.http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501facomment87303/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power.html
Summary: Despite some eerie parallels between the position of the United States today and that of the British Empire a century ago, there are key differences. Britain's decline was driven by bad economics. The United States, in contrast, has the strength and dynamism to continue shaping the world -- but only if it can overcome its political dysfunction and reorient U.S. policy for a world defined by the rise of other powers.
FAREED ZAKARIA is Editor of Newsweek International. This essay is adapted from his book The Post-American World (W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., © 2008 by Fareed Zakaria).
On June 22, 1897, about 400 million people around the world -- one-fourth of humanity -- got the day off. It was the 60th anniversary of Queen Victoria's ascension to the British throne. The Diamond Jubilee stretched over five days on land and sea, but its high point was the parade and thanksgiving service on June 22. The 11 premiers of Britain's self-governing colonies were in attendance, along with princes, dukes, ambassadors, and envoys from the rest of the world. A military procession of 50,000 soldiers included hussars from Canada, cavalrymen from New South Wales, carabineers from Naples, camel troops from Bikaner, and Gurkhas from Nepal. It was, as one historian wrote, "a Roman moment."
In London, eight-year-old Arnold Toynbee was perched on his uncle's shoulders, eagerly watching the parade. Toynbee, who grew up to become the most famous historian of his age, recalled that, watching the grandeur of the day, it felt as if the sun were "standing still in the midst of Heaven." "I remember the atmosphere," he wrote. "It was: 'Well, here we are on top of the world, and we have arrived at this peak to stay there forever. There is, of course, a thing called history, but history is something unpleasant that happens to other people. We are comfortably outside all of that I am sure.'"
But of course, history did happen to Britain. The question for the superpower of the current age is, Will history happen to the United States as well? Is it already happening? No analogy is exact, but the British Empire in its heyday is the closest any nation in the modern age has come to the United States' position today. In considering whether and how the forces of change will affect the United States, it is worth paying close attention to the experience of Britain.
There are many contemporary echoes. The United States' recent military interventions in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq all have parallels in British military interventions decades ago. The basic strategic dilemma of being the only truly global player on the world stage is strikingly similar. But there are also fundamental differences between Britain then and the United States now. For Britain, as it tried to maintain its superpower status, the largest challenge was economic rather than political. For the United States, it is the other way around.
Through shrewd strategic choices and some sophisticated diplomacy, Britain was able to maintain and even extend its influence for decades. In the end, however, it could not alter the fact that its power position -- its economic and technological dynamism -- was fast eroding. Britain declined gracefully -- but inexorably. The United States today faces a problem that is quite different. The U.S. economy (despite its current crisis) remains fundamentally vigorous when compared with others. American society is vibrant. It is the United States' political system that is dysfunctional, unable to make the relatively simple reforms that would place the country on extremely solid footing for the future. Washington seems largely unaware of the new world rising around it -- and shows few signs of being able to reorient U.S. policy for this new age.
BRITANNIA'S DEMISE
Today, it is difficult even to imagine the magnitude of the British Empire. At its height, it covered about a quarter of the earth's land surface and included a quarter of its population. London's network of colonies, territories, bases, and ports spanned the globe. The empire was protected by the Royal Navy, the greatest seafaring force in history, and linked by 170,000 nautical miles of ocean cables and 662,000 miles of aerial and buried cables. British ships had facilitated the development of the first global communications network, via the telegraph. Railways and canals (the Suez Canal most importantly) deepened the connectivity of the system. Through all of this, the British Empire created the first truly global market.
Americans often talk about the appeal of their culture and ideas, but "soft power" really began with Britain. The historian Claudio Véliz points out that in the seventeenth century, the two imperial powers of the day, Britain and Spain, both tried to export their ideas and practices to their western colonies. Spain wanted the Counter-Reformation to take hold in the New World; Britain wanted religious pluralism and capitalism to flourish. As it turned out, British ideas proved more universal. In fact, Britain has arguably been the most successful exporter of its culture in human history. Before the American dream, there was an "English way of life" -- one that was watched, admired, and copied throughout the world. And also thanks to the British Empire, English spread as a global language, spoken from the Caribbean to Cape Town to Calcutta.
Not all of this was recognized in June 1897, but much of it was. The British were hardly alone in making comparisons between their empire and Rome. Paris' Le Figaro declared that Rome itself had been "equaled, if not surpassed, by the Power which in Canada, Australia, India, in the China Seas, in Egypt, Central and Southern Africa, in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean rules the peoples and governs their interests." The Kreuz-Zeitung in Berlin described the empire as "practically unassailable." Across the Atlantic, The New York Times gushed, "We are a part, and a great part, of the Greater Britain which seems so plainly destined to dominate this planet."
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SNA AMETHYSTE operando com USS Roosevelt Battle Group
 | Posted by Robert Wall at 7/4/2008 2:57 AM CDT |
There’s been much focus on France sending Rafale fighters to the U.S. for the upcoming Red Flag drill, but less attention has been on the French submarine participation during JTFEX 08.
(credit: French navy)
France is deploying the nuclear attack submarine SNA L’Amethyste on a two month deployment to the U.S. east coast and Caribbean. It will operate there as part of the USS Roosevelt aircraft carrier battle group.
The L’Amethyste late last month made a port call at the Fort-de-France, Martinique naval base, in part to assess the facilities ability to support nuclear submarines.
It was not the first such visit by an attack submarine, but the first in more than two years.
The next port call comes July 16-20 at Norfolk, Va., for final preparations to integrate in the U.S. carrier battle group. The goal is to demonstrate the ability to integrate with allied forces.
But JTFEX also provides the submarines an ability to hone their skills in protecting aircraft carriers that currently is lacking in France, with the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier in port for a prolonged period for overhaul.
Think Small: Adding small combatant ships would beef up the Navy’s capabilities
Monday, July 7, 2008
Another Expert Calls For the Corvette
It is our favorite time of the month, that time when Milan Vego writes an article in the Armed Forces Journal that challenges the conventional wisdom of some naval topic, puts forth a historical view with a modern alternative, and discusses conditions and options. This time around Milan Vego advises it is time to Think Small: Adding small combatant ships would beef up the Navy’s capabilities and the article is top quality.
The article is the combination of advocacy for small combatants, an indictment of the Littoral Combat Ship, and a counterargument to the conventional wisdom bias against small combatants inside the blue Navy. We address those three points in reverse order, starting by countering the argument that small combatants are somehow expendable and irrelevant in the maritime domain.
Perhaps the Navy has felt that if such a force were needed, it could quickly create one. It did this in World War II when, within a short time, some 426 patrol torpedo boats were built, organized and deployed in the most distant war zones. Only 42 of these PT boats were lost to enemy action. Modern small surface combatants are technologically sophisticated and relatively expensive, however. They cannot be built quickly once the conflict at sea starts. There is also the unfounded belief that small surface combatants are of little use in the modern era. Although that might have been true in the past, it is not the case today. Modern multipurpose corvettes and missile combat craft carry weapons and sensors and are fully capable of conducting a wide range of combat and non-combat missions.The combination of "technologically sophisticated" and "relatively expensive" are two points we have been taking a hard look at lately. There is an idea out there that small surface combatants are going to 'inexpensive' thus able to build up rapidly. That hasn't been true of small surface combatants in any country for several decades. The value of modularity is key here, even if a payload swap consists solely of changing an 11 meter RHIB for a 11 meter Protector USV, the ability to interchange is important. This would allow a small combatant to quickly transition from a VBSS security operation to a ASW operation or armed unmanned vehicle force protection operation against small attack craft.
More to the point, while this capability could probably be achieved through a reproduction of something like the old Asheville class, the Navy would want a new Asheville class designed from the keep up, taking advantages of the evolution in technology in shipbuilding over the last 4 decades since the Asheville was originally designed. Furthermore introduction of a small combatant suitable to challenge the 21st century littoral threats requires a total strategic approach, including operational concept of operations with command and control, logistical support, and sustainment considerations. In other words, it needs to be better thought out than the existing Littoral Combat Ship concept.
Speaking of the Littoral Combat Ship, Milan Vego represents our own position very well with these comments. As we have stated many times, often to a bit of criticism, build a few, but recognize the platform isn't perfect, represents a blue water platform for a green water mission profile, and is clearly not the solution.
The LCS is not really a littoral vessel but, rather, an ocean-going platform. Its draft of 20 feet is too large for maneuverability in the confined waters of a typical narrow sea such as the Persian Gulf. Its sprint speed is generally of little use around islands/islets and in shallow water. It is highly doubtful that a ship of 3,500 tons, no matter how well-armed and -equipped, could match the agility of hostile small boats, and suicide boats in particular. Another shortcoming of the LCS is that it has to move outside the littoral for refueling and rearming.
That last point is a bit confusing without consideration. Without a dedicated tender capable of operating in the littoral itself, the suggestion intended is that the MSC ships that will be required to refuel and rearm will be out in blue water. This is exactly where our concept of a mothership for smaller platforms comes into play, and why we see such a platform to be the flat bottom shallow draft existing LSDs with 21ft draft or new LPD-17s with its 23ft draft.The first point is important though. The Littoral Combat Ship really is an optimal platform for a blue water platform to move closer in shore within the framework of an existing Carrier Strike Group or Expeditionary Strike Group. The LCS doesn't have the firepower to operate independent, and indeed all the off board systems are intended to be unloaded into the littoral by the LCS while the ship moves back out to blue water, and uses unmanned systems as a relay to teh unmanned systems reporting inshore. This is blue water thinking about the littoral in its zenith, and will be reflected as such by historians.
Milan Vego goes on to recommend existing options, both foreign and domestic as alternatives. We only consider one of the foreign alternatives as realistic, and that platform gets a good writeup in this piece.
The Visby corvettes have a maximum speed of 35 knots on gas turbines and 15 knots on diesels. They are built of fiber-reinforced plastic in sandwich construction. The Visby was designed to drastically reduce optical and infrared signature, above water acoustic and hydroacoustic signature, underwater electrical potential, and magnetic signature. The Visby can be detected at the range of 7 nautical miles in rough seas and 12 nautical miles in a calm sea, without jamming. In a jammed environment, the Visby corvette will be detected at a range of 4.3 nautical miles in rough seas and 6 nautical miles in calm seas. They will carry SSMs. Other weapons include a 127mm rocket launcher, depth charges and three 400mm tubes for homing torpedoes, and a single 57mm general purpose gun plus mines.
The fiber-reinforced plastic construction is usually the turn off for this platform by many, to us it is the appeal. The materials for construction are much easier obtained and purchased in large quantities than that of aluminum or steel. We always refer back to this outstanding PDF when considering the options for the Visby class, highlighting they come in more than the existing size.We don't claim to have the right answer, and appreciate the approach of Milan Vego to highlight a range of alternatives. We maintain a firm belief that the way ahead for realignment of resources to the new maritime strategy is to cancel the DDG-1000 after two hulls, concentrate on the CG(X) and DDG(X) replacements, and fill out the rest of the force with a formidable amphibious force of at least 19 LPD-17s for the 9 ESGs, transition the existing LSDs to primarily Navy use, and build surface combatants between 500 and 1500 tons in large quantities.
However the challenge of small surface combatants isn't building them, it is sustaining them in forward theaters and keeping them relevant in the conditions of war and peace. It is also why we start with the high value unit, the mothership that bridges the sea with land and littoral in between, rather than the small combatant, because by embracing the high value unit mission profile all the possible mission profiles for small combatants become self evident.
domingo, 6 de julho de 2008
INDIA ADQUIRE AVIÕES AEW DA EMBRAER
| DRDO to Use Embraer Platform for Early Warning Systems | |
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| (Source: Press Information Bureau India; issued July 3, 2008) |
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|  Embraer and DRDO will develop a new airborne early warning aircraft for India by fitting an Indian-developed active array radar to three EMB-145 aircraft. (Embraer photo) The Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) System is being developed by the Bangalore-based CABS for the Indian Air Force. Under the deal, Brazil's Embraer aircraft manufacturer will modify its regional jet aircraft, EMB-145 to carry the Active Array Antenna Unit (AAAU), developed by the DRDO, on the aircraft's fuselage. Three modified EMB-145 aircraft will be developed under this agreement; the first one to be delivered in three years. The various sub-systems of the AEW&C Mission system will be integrated into the 'modified green' aircraft by DRDO and the full-fledged EMB-145 based AEW&C will be flight tested for mission system in India by DRDO along with IAF from 2012. The AEW&C system comprises many sub-systems like radar and communication links that are being designed and developed by DRDO. A few EMB-145 based AEW&C/AWACS versions are already in operation with Air Forces of Brazil, Mexico and Greece. (EDITOR’S NOTE: Indian press reports value the Embraer contract at $210 million. Separately, deliveries of the three Russian IL-76s fitted in Israel with IAI’s Phalcon radar and command and control system are scheduled for September, about a year late. These aircraft were ordered in 2004 under a $1.1 billion deal.) |
terça-feira, 1 de julho de 2008
Picking Out Periscopes
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The Navy just awarded Lockheed Martin a $141 million contract to develop a helicopter-borne radar that can automatically detect submarine periscopes. The Advanced Radar Periscope Detection and Discrimination System (ARPDDS) project is due to be completed in 2013, and will lead to the modification of the Telephonics APS-147 radar carried by the Sikorsky MH-60R (Romeo) shipboard anti-submarine helicopter. (Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor for the Romeo, but much of the work on this program will be carried out by Telephonics.) A Telephonics engineer remarked at the US Navy League show in Washington in March that the company had "all our genuises" working on ARPDDS. It is a capability that the Navy has been pursuing for at least 15 years, so far without final success. Some of the back-story can be found in this paper. Until recently, the Navy was trying to implement ARPDDS on its maritime patrol aircraft - issuing a contract to Raytheon in 2005 - but has now shifted its efforts to the helicopter radar. It's a challenging job. Submarine masts are small targets in the first place, designed and treated to reduce their radar signature, and have to be detected among a welter of sea clutter. Stealth design is evident in this photo of a Kollmorgen mast:  Moreover, masts are fleeting targets: with electro-optical sensors rather than direct optics, the mast pops up long enough to sweep the horizon once and then submerges again. The goal of ARPDDS is to detect and discriminate: that is, reliably find the periscope with a small false alarm rate. ARPDDS on the MH-60R is seen as an important tool to protect Navy ships against diesel-electric submarines, which are hard to spot by other means. "In one of the Unitas exercises [involving the USN and South American navies] a Colombian diesel-electric popped up in the middle of the battle group every day," one observer comments. (This may reflect a 2003 Navy story describing how P-3Cs and helicopters were tasked to catch the Colombian sub Tayrona - with results that the Navy called "very interesting.") Telephonics engineers say that mechanically scanned radars like the APS-147 are actually better platforms for ARPDDS than active electronically scanned array (AESA), because they have weaker sidelobes and are less sensitive to clutter Posted by Bill Sweetman at 6/30/2008 6:45 AM CDT |
The Navy just awarded Lockheed Martin a $141 million contract to develop a helicopter-borne radar that can automatically detect submarine periscopes. The Advanced Radar Periscope Detection and Discrimination System (ARPDDS) project is due to be completed in 2013, and will lead to the modification of the Telephonics APS-147 radar carried by the Sikorsky MH-60R (Romeo) shipboard anti-submarine helicopter. (Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor for the Romeo, but much of the work on this program will be carried out by Telephonics.)
A Telephonics engineer remarked at the US Navy League show in Washington in March that the company had "all our genuises" working on ARPDDS. It is a capability that the Navy has been pursuing for at least 15 years, so far without final success. Some of the back-story can be found in this paper. Until recently, the Navy was trying to implement ARPDDS on its maritime patrol aircraft - issuing a contract to Raytheon in 2005 - but has now shifted its efforts to the helicopter radar.
It's a challenging job. Submarine masts are small targets in the first place, designed and treated to reduce their radar signature, and have to be detected among a welter of sea clutter. Stealth design is evident in this photo of a Kollmorgen mast:
Moreover, masts are fleeting targets: with electro-optical sensors rather than direct optics, the mast pops up long enough to sweep the horizon once and then submerges again. The goal of ARPDDS is to detect and discriminate: that is, reliably find the periscope with a small false alarm rate.
ARPDDS on the MH-60R is seen as an important tool to protect Navy ships against diesel-electric submarines, which are hard to spot by other means. "In one of the Unitas exercises [involving the USN and South American navies] a Colombian diesel-electric popped up in the middle of the battle group every day," one observer comments. (This may reflect a 2003 Navy story describing how P-3Cs and helicopters were tasked to catch the Colombian sub Tayrona - with results that the Navy called "very interesting.")
Telephonics engineers say that mechanically scanned radars like the APS-147 are actually better platforms for ARPDDS than active electronically scanned array (AESA), because they have weaker sidelobes and are less sensitive to clutter