ARGENTINA Plataforma continental: versiones sin fundamento

Plataforma continental: versiones sin fundamento

(FNM) La intensa circulación reciente de una confusa especie transmitida por correo electrónico, según la cual el proceso de presentación del trazado del límite exterior de la Plataforma Continental pone a la Argentina ante una “grave situación” de “entrega de territorio inminente”, fue motivo de profundo interés –no exento de cierta inquietud – en amplios sectores de la sociedad, en particular entre los más atentos a las cuestiones del mar.

A pesar de algunas declaraciones oficiales y artículos periodísticos aclaratorios, no terminan de despejarse las dudas generadas por el mencionado texto, que plantea escenarios basados en datos y especulaciones alejados de la realidad. En primer lugar, se afirma que ante un vencimiento próximo del plazo para presentar ante la ONU “la extensión de 200 a 350 millas de plataforma continental”, la Argentina no posee ni el 50% de los estudios hechos. Hay en esta frase un conjunto de simplificaciones inconvenientes, y de afirmaciones que no se ajustan a la verdad.

Por un lado, no es bueno insistir en la imagen de una plataforma “ampliada hasta las 350 millas”. No se trata de una “ampliación”, sino del trazado mismo de nuestra plataforma continental, que de acuerdo con lo definido por el texto de la Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Derecho del Mar, y en virtud de la particular geología de nuestro lecho y subsuelo, habrá de extenderse en muchos sectores, más allá de las 200 millas de la costa.

Pero – y esto es importante para no generar falsas expectativas – tampoco está garantizado que el trazado de la plataforma para la Argentina llegue hasta las 350 millas en toda su extensión. La determinación de este límite depende de las formas del lecho, de los espesores sedimentarios presentes en el subsuelo y de las distancias desde la costa. Como estas características son variables a lo largo del margen continental, es dable esperar que en ciertas zonas pueda sostenerse técnicamente la extensión hasta las 350 millas (incluso en ciertos casos, podría superar este valor), mientras que otras no se superarán las 200 millas, con toda la gama intermedia de posibilidades.

La obtención, procesamiento e interpretación de esta información constituye el objeto de un trabajo que la Comisión Nacional del Límite Exterior de la Plataforma Continental (COPLA) viene desarrollando, seria y empeńosamente, desde hace varios ańos. Los estudios ya ejecutados superan largamente el 50% de realización que menciona el correo de referencia y no existen dudas entre sus competentes cuadros profesionales y técnicos, respecto de la concreción en tiempo de los trabajos de presentación. Las tareas de prospección sísmica para la determinación de los espesores sedimentarios, que son claramente las más largas y trabajosas, ya han sido cumplidas.

Podrá argumentarse – con razón – que habría resultado deseable una más temprana terminación de todos los trabajos de campo. Dificultades de disponibilidad de los pocos y antiguos barcos de investigación disponibles han retrasado algunos tramos del trabajo. Hace tiempo ya que desde estas páginas hemos insistido sobre la necesidad de un urgente programa de reemplazo de dichos medios (Ver: La obsolescencia amenaza a la flota de buques públicos argentinos).

Con respecto a la disponibilidad de fondos, que podrían también haber retrasado los trabajos, los mayores problemas no parecen haber radicado durante los últimos ańos en la ausencia de asignaciones, sino en los engorrosos procedimientos administrativos instrumentados para hacer efectivo el gasto. Pero hay una larga distancia entre estos datos objetivos y la afirmación de que no se ha alcanzado a completar “ni la mitad” del trabajo. En segundo lugar, se afirma que Gran Bretańa ya ha hecho su presentación, y que en sus pretensiones incluye a la Isla de Los Estados… Ya ha sido claramente desmentido que Gran Bretańa haya hecho presentación alguna en el Atlántico Sur, lo que seguramente hará más adelante. Pero sugerir que en su presentación los británicos podrían pretender como propia a la Isla de los Estados es un completo absurdo. Nunca el derecho de un estado sobre partes del mar generadas a partir de una posición terrestre, puede dar lugar a un derecho sobre el territorio soberano de otro estado.

De esta forma, por más que Gran Bretańa declarara que el límite de la plataforma continental, generada a partir de su pretensión de soberanía en las Islas Malvinas, llegara hasta nuestro territorio (P. Ej. Isla de los Estados), esta porción de suelo argentino jamás puede ser sujeto de reclamo alguno. Con respecto al futuro de estas presentaciones que – de no mediar alguna postergación de los plazos por decisión de la misma comunidad internacional – serán efectuadas por Argentina y Gran Bretańa antes del vencimiento del plazo actualmente estipulado - que originalmente fue fijado para 2004 y luego postergado para 2009 a pedido de los estados contratantes - debe decirse que el panorama es mucho más previsible que lo que especies como las aquí comentadas proponen. Como casi todas las convenciones internacionales, la CONVEMAR, y las instituciones por ella creadas han generado numerosos mecanismos de solución de controversias, apuntados a evitar situaciones “sin salida”. Y lo que previsiblemente ocurrirá con casos como el que nos afecta (y de los cuales, vale recordar, hay otros varios en el mundo), es que la Comisión de Límites de la Plataforma Continental – que es precisamente uno de los organismo creado por la CONVEMAR – “congelará” el análisis de las presentaciones de los dos países, en aquellas zonas en donde se superpongan sus reclamos, hasta tanto se resuelva la “cuestión de fondo”.

La disputa de soberanía con Gran Bretańa en el Atlántico Sur presenta numerosas dificultades, que no parecen tener soluciones a la vista. Y es por cierto absolutamente legítimo criticar o adherir a las políticas desarrolladas por los distintos gobiernos en torno a esta cuestión. Pero insinuar que el proceso y los efectos de la presentación del trazado de los límites de la Plataforma Continental Argentina, configuran una “situación de entrega de territorio inminente” constituye, en opinión de NUESTROMAR, un decidido despropósito, sin fundamento alguno.

29/04/08
Fundación NUESTROMAR
www.nuestromar.org

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VISÕES DO ACORDO BRASIL-RUSSIA

1.

VISÕES DO ACORDO BRASIL-RUSSIA

Brazil, Russia Sign Agreement on :

Space Launch Vehicles


http://www.redorbit.com/news/space/1346614/brazil_russia_sign_agreement_on_fighter_jets_space_launch_vehicles/
http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2008Apr15/0,4670,BrazilRussia,00.html

Source: BBC Monitoring Americas

Brazil is going to participate in the programme to develop an advanced combat plane, the PAK-FA T-50, that will be built by the Russian Sukhoi firm. The aircraft, invisible to radar, promises to equal or exceed in performance the F-22 Raptor fighter produced in the United States (the most expensive in the world at a unit cost of 225m dollars) and should make its first flight within two years at most.

Construction of the new aircraft is only part of a wide-ranging memorandum of understanding negotiated in Moscow in February and signed yesterday by Minister of Strategic Affairs Mangabeira Unger and the secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Valentin Alekseevitch. The framework agreement marks the start of extensive cooperation between the two countries, including that on technologies considered sensitive. Called for in the space field is construction of a new launch vehicle for communication and remote sensing satellites. Use of he Alcantara Airspace Base by a new binational firm is also contemplated in the treaty.

While discussing the PAK-FA, Mangabeira emphasized that it would be "a fifth-generation fighter." Total cost is estimated at about 20bn dollars to be divided among Russia, Brazil, and India, which will also participate in the programme. The unit price, lower than that of fourth-generation European fighters, will be approximately 80m dollars.

In addition to being invisible to radar, the fifth-generation combat planes will be capable of reaching supersonic speed using half the engine's power, a capability that reduces fuel expense, increases range, and reduces enemy engagement time. Currently, only the Americans have aircraft with those characteristics - the F-22 Raptors - in operation. A cheaper model, the F-35 Lightning, which costs 135m dollars, is in the certification phase. Minister of Defence Nelson Jobim was able to watch a demonstration of that fighter during his visit to the United States, but the aircraft was ruled out because no technology transfer was offered with it.

"We are interested not in buying finished goods but in partnerships that can strengthen the technological capability of both," the minister said. Besides Russia, China and Japan are also working on fifth-generation aircraft, but the PAK-FA project, which began 10 years ago, is the one currently at the most advanced stage.

Satellite Launch Vehicle

Russia is already cooperating with Brazil in the space field. A group of experts is in Sao Jose dos Campos acting as advisers on the Satellite Launch Vehicle (VLS) programme. The Russians are participating in the design of a new first stage, using liquid rather than solid fuel, for the rocket, which has accumulated a series of failures since the first launch attempt in 1997. Our country also has technology transfer programmes with Ukraine in connection with the production of rockets and with France, which intends to produce medium-size helicopters in Minas Gerais and submarines in Rio de Janeiro.



Brazil and Russia to build jet fighter and satellite launch vehicles


By ASSOCIATED PRESS - Jerusalem Post

http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1208246577003&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

Brazilian and Russian officials said Tuesday that the two countries have signed an agreement to jointly develop jet fighters and satellite launch vehicles.

Brazil's Strategic Affairs Minister Roberto Mangabeira Unger says the agreement will lead to the development of a fifth-generation jet fighter, the most modern model now flying.

Tuesday's agreement includes the construction of rockets capable of hurling several kinds of satellites into space.



Russian-made Sukhoi fighter jets fly during a military parade

Russia to Make G5 Fighter in Tandem with Brazil

By kommersant

http://www.kommersant.com/p-12361/r_527/G5_Brazil/

Russia and Brazil have inked an agreement to jointly develop G5 fighter jets and boosters that will place into orbit different types of satellites.

Russia and Brazil intend to develop the G5 fighter jet, AP reported with reference to Brazil’s Minister for Strategic Affairs Roberto Mangabeira Unger. The agreement also spells out joint production of boosters capable of placing into orbit various types of satellites.

Of interest is that Russia and India concluded a similar agreement for G5 fighters past fall.

The G5 fighter will be created by 2009, Russia’s First Vice Premier Sergei Ivanov pledged earlier. Member of Sukhoi Aviation Holding, Chkalov Novosibirsk Aviation Production Association will manufacture the front section and auxiliaries for making the parts from glass and carbon composite. Other enterprises of Sukhoi will focus on remaining components.



5th++ generation fighter jet, concept

Russo-Brazilian fighter jets to reach for the sky


http://www.russiatoday.ru/news/news/23532

Russia and Brazil are to jointly develop a fifth-generation fighter jet. The two countries also plan to build space rocket vehicles.

An agreement was signed on Tuesday according to the Brazilian Minister of Strategic Affairs, Roberto Mangabeira Unger.

Currently only the U.S. produces similar military aircraft, although several other countries have the capabilities.

The maiden flight of Russia’s first fifth-generation fighter, developed by the Sukhoi design bureau, is expected to take place next year.


Brazil, Russia to build jet fighter


By MARCO SIBAJA

http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5hGPCxiqRRJLngsk8BuZpMfNlz7LwD902HJ2O3

BRASILIA, Brazil (AP - Associated Press ) — Brazil and Russia signed an agreement on Tuesday to jointly develop top-line jet fighters and satellite launch vehicles.

Brazil's Strategic Affairs Minister Roberto Mangabeira Unger told reporters the agreement will lead to the development of fifth-generation jet fighters that are built using sophisticated engineering, such as composite materials, stealth technology and advanced radar.

The agreement signed by Unger and the deputy secretary of Russia's Security Council, Valentin Sobolev, includes the construction of rockets capable of hurling several kinds of satellites into space.

Brazil builds its own small and medium-size rockets that are launched from the Alcantara base in the northeastern state of Maranhao.

The base is considered an excellent launch site because it is located just 2.3 degrees south of the equator, the line at which the Earth moves the fastest, helping propel rockets into space with less fuel.

Tuesday's agreement calls for advanced training in the field of cybernetics, which Mangabeira called "essential for the defense and the technological evolution of our industry." It also involves the transfer of technology, something Brazil has always insisted on.

Earlier this year, France aid it would transfer technology to the Brazil for construction of the Scorpene attack submarine, helicopters and the Rafale fighter plane.

The Scorpene is a conventional attack submarine, but Brazilian officials have said they want the diesel-powered vessel to serve as a model for the development of a nuclear submarine that would be the first in Latin America.

University of Brasilia political scientist David Fleischer said the agreement may not advance very far because Russia may limit the transfer of technology for the fighter jets.

"The problem is that the Russians have never been all that keen on technology transfer," Fleischer said. "But then again the Russians may want to beat out the French, so the deal could eventually go through."

"A deal with Russia, together with Venezuela's recent purchases of Russian weapons, could spark an arms race in South America," Fleischer added.

Venezuela recently bought 53 Russian-made attack helicopters, 100,000 assault rifles, 24 Sukhoi fighter jets, 12 military transport planes and 5,000 sniper rifles.




Moscow, New Delhi set to develop a fifth-generation fighter

http://www.air-attack.com/news/news_article/2847/Moscow-New-Delhi-set-to-develop-a-fifth-generation-fighter.html

MOSCOW. (Yury Zaitsev for RIA Novosti) - Although the Russian Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-29 Fulcrum air-superiority fighter with a vectored-thrust engine is currently stealing the limelight at the Dubai Air Show 2007, this warplane will become obsolete in the foreseeable future.

Fifth-generation fighters featuring entirely new engineering solutions will form the mainstay of national air forces in the 21st century.

On November 15, Russia's Sukhoi Military Aviation Complex and the Indian Defense Ministry launched a new round of talks on developing a fifth-generation fighter.

On October 18, Russian President Vladimir Putin told a televised news conference that Moscow would start developing such warplanes by 2015. Before that, First Deputy Prime Minister and former Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said a prototype fifth-generation fighter would perform its maiden flight in 2009, and that serial production would commence in early 2010. But most experts were not so optimistic and predicted that the first warplane in this category would not appear before 2012-2014, which is supported by President Putin's statement.

However, the world's first fifth-generation fighter, the prototype US F-22 Raptor fighter, first took off on September 7, 1997. Two weeks later, Russia's Sukhoi Su-37 Berkut, another prototype fifth-generation fighter, flew for the first time.

Production versions of the F-22 Raptor and the US-EU F-35 Joint Strike Fighter are currently available. The latter, which is referred to as a generation five-plus fighter, seems to out-perform the former.

Unfortunately, Russia has so far failed to master production of the purely experimental Su-37, built by Sukhoi at its own expense. Nevertheless, the plane's lay-out makes it possible to streamline various engineering solutions under the Advanced Tactical Aircraft (PAK FA) program.

The United States and Europe spent over $20 billion on the F-35 JSF program. Therefore, experts believe that Russia should team up with a foreign partner in order to develop a fifth-generation fighter. It will take $600-800 million to design the engine, the most expensive element, and another $1.5 billion to launch serial production.

Moscow considered China and India to be the best partners. However, Beijing prefers to develop its own aircraft engines, and India is more interested in state-of-the-art designing methods and does not want to manufacture "ready-made" planes.

Russia and India started negotiating on the joint fifth-generation fighter program in 2003. New Delhi insisted that the new plane be developed from scratch. Moscow was not very happy about this because it implied another highly expensive project.

Apart from outstanding achievements, bilateral military-technical co-operation has been marked by major setbacks and even conflicts. And this explains why it took India so long to get involved in the new fighter program.

Both countries have faced serious problems such as upgrading the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier. Under a bilateral contract, the Indian Navy was to have received the warship in 2008. However, the Admiral Gorshkov will only conduct its trial run from 2010 to 2012.

Moreover, Russian bureaucrats have failed to approve the preparatory documents of the Multi-Role Transport Aircraft (MTA) project during last two years and have nearly stopped it. New Delhi has already said that it could withdraw from the project and develop the MTA together with Brazil or the EU.

Tatyana Shaumyan, head of the Centre of Indian Research at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies, said Russian red tape, the inadequate fulfillment of contracts and delayed shipments had impaired many aspects of bilateral relations. This is why India is trying to protect itself from such negative developments.

For instance, the national air force floated a global tender for 126 combat jets worth $10 billion. Eighteen of the medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) will be purchased in flyaway condition and the remaining 108 manufactured in the country under a transfer of technology (TOT) agreement with the chosen supplier.

The 211-page request for proposal (RFP) has been sent to the manufacturers of six aircraft: the U.S. F-16 and F-18 Super Hornet, the Swedish Gripen, the French Rafale, the Russian MiG-35 and a European consortium's Eurofighter.

Indian engineers and technicians who know all about the Russian aircraft production process will quickly master the relevant technologies.

The Indian leadership seemed inclined to co-operate with the United States and to obtain F-35 JSF know-how. However, Washington, which refuses to share technologies even with its closest allies, offered some rather harsh terms to New Delhi.

This October, Russia and India agreed to jointly develop the fifth-generation fighter and to manufacture it at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and Sukhoi Military Aviation Complex plants.

India's Defense Minister A. K. Antony said the agreement heralded a new stage in bilateral co-operation aiming to develop new-generation weapons and military equipment. This will become one of the most ambitious Russian-Indian military programs.

The fifth-generation fighter must retain in-flight stability and control at 90-degree-plus angles of attack. The United States, which faced similar problems, eventually preferred Stealth characteristics and supersonic cruise speeds to super-agility.

The future Russian-Indian warplane would probably out-maneuver any other similar aircraft because the F-22's maneuverability is similar to that of the revamped Su-27 Flanker featuring vectored-thrust engines. This Russian plane features AL-37-FU engines with round rotatable nozzles and can attain supersonic cruise speeds. Its combat efficiency has been enhanced because the Su-27 can bank sharply at high angular speeds and along short trajectories in every plane.

In addition, the fifth-generation fighter will be fitted with advanced avionics, long-range weapons and other radio-electronic equipment for hitting any conceivable target. The Indian electronics industry will provide an invaluable contribution to developing automated electronic counter-measures (ECM) systems, secure data-exchange networks and fire-control systems for long-range tactical missions.

Yury Zaitsev is an academic adviser at the Russian Academy of Engineering Sciences.

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2.

Ajudando a entender2 - Resenha nacional do acordo Brasil Russia

Posted by: "vinicius morais" vinnauk@yahoo.co.uk vinnauk

Fri Apr 18, 2008 5:57 am (PDT)

Brasil e Rússia assinam acordo tecnológico

Cooperação militar está nos planos dos dois países

http://www.areamili tar.net/noticias /noticias. aspx?nrnot= 543

Segundo notícias publicadas na imprensa russa, O Brasil e a Rússia, assinaram um protocolo de cooperação tecnológica de âmbito muito alargado, que poderá chegar ao desenvolvimento conjunto de sistemas na área da defesa.

A notícia da cooperação militar terá tido origem no ministro brasileiro dos assuntos estratégicos Mangabeira Unger.

Segundo as mesmas fontes, o ministro brasileiro terá afirmado que a cooperação do Brasil com a Rússia se estenderá à tecnologia de ponta no campo aeroespacial, devendo Brasil e Rússia cooperar no desenvolvimento do veículo brasileiro de lançamento de satélites, especialmente nos sistemas de lançamentos (foguetes).

A divulgação deste acordo de cooperação estratégica, tem sido relacionada com a actual necessidade brasileira de reequipar as suas forças armadas, mas não foi por enquanto efectuada qualquer clarificação nesse campo.

O convénio também prevê a possibilidade de o Brasil vir a cooperar com a Rússia no co-financiamento e desenvolvimento tecnológico em campos que vão da cibernética ao desenvolvimento de sistemas de navegação por satélite.

A Rússia tem planos para desenvolver uma aeronave de quinta geração, conhecida como PAK-FA, capaz de competir com aeronaves norte-americanas como o F-22 ou o F-35 (o primeiro dos quais já está operacional nos Estados Unidos, tendo voado pela primeira vez há dez anos atrás).

O desenvolvimento da aeronave russa tem enfrentado vários problemas e a sua implementação já foi posta várias vezes em causa. Além da Rússia, também a Índia estará interessada no desenvolvimento de uma aeronave de quinta-geração.

Os planos do ministro Mangabeira Unger, no sentido de criar no Brasil industrias de tecnologia avançada que podem ter aplicações no campo militar, constituem uma aposta estratégica do Brasil, para a primeira metade do século.

A participação em projectos de alta tecnologia foi apontada pelo próprio ministro Mangabeira como uma necessidade estratégica do Brasil, mas em declarações relacionadas, o próprio ministro afirmou que o objectivo brasileiro era o de obter independência tecnológica que lhe permitisse desenvolver os seus próprios sistemas.

É no entanto importante frisar que nenhuma informação sobre qualquer escolha de aeronave foi revelada ou sequer sugerida por nenhuma entidade ligada ao ministério brasileiro da defesa ou à Força Aérea Brasileira, o que pode levar a crer que a notícia não está directamente ligada a qualquer decisão político-militar a curto ou médio prazo quanto a futuros sistemas de armamentos a incorporar pelas forças armadas brasileiras.

A divulgação das notícias por parte de um ministro não relacionado com a área militar, leva a considerar que o que estará no futuro em causa, é a possibilidade de o Brasil participar no desenvolvimento de tecnologias que serão aplicadas aos futuros caças russos, como o PAK-FA, mas que o interesse brasileiro estará nas tecnologias e não nas aeronaves russas propriamente ditas.

Esta possibilidade é condizente com os objectivos estratégicos divulgados pelo próprio ministro brasileiro.

Com apoio técnico russo, o Veículo Lançador de Satélites brasileiro deverá deixar de usar dois motores a combustível sólido, aumentando a capacidade de carga em 80% (foto: AEB)

VLS com combustível líquido

http://www.fapesp. br/agencia/ boletim_dentro. php?data% 5Bid_materia_ boletim%5D= 4532

Agência FAPESP - O Veículo Lançador de Satélites (VLS-1) deverá ganhar um novo motor a combustível líquido, que substituirá dois outros que operam com combustível sólido. Com a mudança, com apoio russo, o lançador brasileiro aumentará sua capacidade de carga.

A novidade foi anunciada na semana passada, em Moscou, durante encontro entre Sergio Gaudenzi, presidente da Agência Espacial Brasileira (AEB), e Anatoli Perminov, à frente da Agência Espacial Russa (Roscosmos).

Atualmente, o VLS-1 tem motores a combustível sólido divididos em quatro estágios. Acionados um após a queima do outro, oferecem, nas diferentes fases da trajetória do lançador, o impulso necessário à colocação do satélite no espaço. Segundo a AEB, o que se pretende, com a cooperação técnica russa, é modernizar o lançador com a troca dos dois últimos motores (terceiro e quarto estágios) por um de propulsão líquida.

Com a troca, o veículo poderá levar cerca de 700 quilos de carga útil, contra os 250 quilos atuais, o que corresponde a um aumento de 280%. “O uso de propulsão líquida também permitirá maior precisão na inserção do satélite em órbita”, assinala João Azevedo, diretor de transporte espacial e licenciamento da AEB, em comunicado da instituição.

Segundo Azevedo, a redução da quantidade de estágios simplificará o veículo, diminuindo as chances de falhas ligadas aos diversos eventos que ocorrem durante o lançamento. Além da parceria para o VLS, a Rússia também irá assessorar o desenvolvimento da torre de lançamento que está sendo reconstruída no Centro de Lançamento de Alcântara (CLA).

As negociações do projeto do novo motor, dos equipamentos necessários à sua manutenção e a realização de testes serão iniciadas em 2006 e farão parte de um contrato cuja execução caberá à AEB, Roscosmos e Centro Técnico Aeroespacial (CTA).

A agência brasileira espera que o conhecimento adquirido para o desenvolvimento da próxima versão do VLS origine uma “família de veículos lançadores com capacidade de levar satélites mais pesados a órbitas mais altas da Terra”.

F-X2 com Quinta Geração Russa? Realidades e Perspectivas Quinta-feira, 17 de Abril de 2008 - http://www.defesane t.com.br/ blog/

A matéria do Correio Braziliense de 16 Abril 2008, Sócios no Céu e em Órbita, é fruto da ação do lobby russo. A própria leitura da reportagem indica que a realidade está muito longe dos desejos do jornalista.

O poderoso lobby russo articulado em Brasília, que tenta cercar o presidente Luis Inácio, terá de superar muitos obstáculos para ter concretizado a intenção de ter o Brasil como parceiro do PAK-FA. Também caberá ao Ministro Mangabeira Unger ter a origem dos recursos a serem empregados no desenvolvimento do caça. Mesmo que o Brasil entre com um financiamento de 15 a 20 % do Programa PAK-FA, o valor será 3 a 4 Bilhões de dólares, só no desenvolvimento, mais o custo de aquisição das unidades. Acrescentar o custo da formação das equipes de técnicos e engenheiros. Sempre com a incerteza dos resultados de um novo desenvolvimento.

A história pregressa indica que recursos deste montante não sempre incertos no cenário da defesa do Brasil


Brasil faz acordo com Rússia para participar de super caça Ministro para assuntos estratégicos assina documento para Brasil se associar ao projeto do PAK-FA T-50 Hercules Araújo

de: http://airway. uol.com.br/ site/noticia/ not1657_69. asp


O Brasil vai participar do programa de desenvolvimento do caça de combate PAK-FA T-50, que será fabricado pela Sukhoi nos próximos anos. A aeronave, de conceito stealth, tem a finalidade de se igualar ou ser superior ao caça F-22 Raptor, fabricado pela Lockheed Martin, e que já tem seu primeiro vôo agendado para daqui há dois anos.

A construção da nova aeronave é apenas parte de um amplo memorando de entendimento, negociado em Moscou em fevereiro e assinado ontem pelo ministro de Assuntos Estratégicos, Mangabeira Unger, e pelo secretário do Conselho de Segurança da Federação Russa, Valentin Alekseevitch. O acordo-quadro lança uma ampla cooperação entre os dois países, inclusive de tecnologias consideradas sensíveis.

Ao falar do PAK-FA, Mangabeira destacou que “será um caça de quinta geração”. O custo total previsto é de cerca de US$ 20 bilhões, a ser dividido em cotas entre Rússia, Brasil e Índia, que também participa do programa. O preço unitário, mais baixo que o dos caças europeus de quarta geração, ficará em torno de US$ 80 milhões.

Os aviões de combate de quinta geração, além de stealth, também serão capazes de atingir velocidades supersônicas sem usar a capacidade de vôo com motores ligados em modo pós-combustão, o que reduz o gasto de combustível, amplia o raio de ação e diminui o tempo de engajamento ao inimigo. Atualmente, apenas os norte-americanos possuem aparelhos com essas características em operação, no caso o F-22 Raptor.

O ministro da Defesa, Nelson Jobim, chegou a ver uma demonstração do caça em sua visita aos EUA, mas o aparelho foi descartado por não oferecer transferência de tecnologia.

“Não estamos interessados em comprar bens acabados, mas em parcerias que possam fortalecer a capacidade tecnológica de ambos”, destacou o ministro. Além da Rússia, China e Japão também trabalham em aviões de quinta geração, mas o projeto PAK-FA, que começou há 10 anos, é o que se encontra em estágio mais avançado.

Brasil e Rússia
assinam acordo para construção de foguetes e aviões

da Efe, em Brasília

http://www1. folha.uol. com.br/folha/ brasil/ult96u392 530.shtml

Os governos do Brasil e da Rússia assinaram nesta terça-feira (15), em Brasília, um acordo de cooperação para o lançamento de satélites e a construção de foguetes e aviões.

O ministro extraordinário de Assuntos Estratégicos, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, que assinou o documento com o vice-presidente russo do Conselho de Segurança, Valentín Sobolev, disse a jornalistas que a associação, graças a uma sofisticada engenharia, permitirá o desenvolvimento de aviões militares de "quinta geração".

O acordo contempla um "treinamento avançado" na área de cibernética, "essencial para a defesa e a evolução da tecnologia brasileira", destacou Mangabeira.

O convênio também é similar ao assinado com a França para a transferência de tecnologias que permitirão a construção do submarino de defesa "Scorpene", que seria movido a energia nuclear, além de helicópteros e de aviões caça.

Sobolev frisou que, com o acordo, os dois países poderão iniciar "consultas sobre um amplo espectro de questões de segurança" e elevar "o nível das relações" entre as duas nações em relação aos desafios na área de segurança.
Para Sobolev, o Brasil é um país-chave na América Latina. Ainda segundo ele, outra das idéias do acordo de cooperação será a busca de uma alternativa ao GPS (sistema de posicionamento global), controlado pelos Estados Unidos.

EXCLUSIVO: Conhecendo o programa do PAK-FA

(Piotr Butowski)

http://www.revistaa sas.com.br/ index.php? ASA=show_ news&id=492&LE=atual

O assunto já virou a principal pauta dos maiores veículos de comunicação de temas militares e estratégicos. O Brasil assinou na tarde desta terça-feira, junto com o governo da Rússia, um memorando de entendimento que prevê o desenvolvimento conjunto de um caça supersônico multifuncional de 5ª geração, e também de veículos lançadores de satélites (foguetes). Visando esclarecer os detalhes que envolvem o Programa PAK-FA, ASAS mostra aqui detalhes desse projeto, um dos mais comentados e mais secretos da atualidade.

O T-50 (também conhecido como I-21, Istrebitel 21, do russo “caça do século 21”) está sendo projetado dentro do ambicioso Programa PAK FA (Perspektivnyi Aviatsionnyi Kompleks Frontovoi Aviatsii, Futuro Complexo Industrial de Aviação Tática). Em 26 de abril de 2002, a proposta da Sukhoi foi escolhida pelo Comitê do Governo, na concorrência feita pelo PAK FA; e em outubro de 2004, a Sukhoi apresentou para a Força Aérea da Rússia o design preliminar do caça T-50, o qual foi aprovado apenas dois meses depois.

As autoridades russas vêem no PAK FA um caça que terá a performance do Lockheed/Boeing F-22A, pesando um pouco mais que o Lockheed F-35. Embora o jato mostrado ao lado tenha semelhanças com o Raptor, tem claros sinais de um design da Sukhoi, destacando-se o grande cone de cauda central (mais "achatado", mas tão proeminente quanto o dos Su-34) e as asas (de um formato de "delta duplo", com mudança de ângulo de enflechamento no bordo de ataque; diferentes das asas trapezoidais do F-22).

As linhas gerais do projeto buscam uma aeronave de superioridade aérea multifuncional, ou seja, também capaz de ataques contra alvos de superfície. Nos relatórios oficiais do Sukhoi Desing Bureau, são destacados os principais requerimentos solicitados para o PAK-FA - entre eles, a condição de realizar missões de defesa aérea, de ataques contra alvos em terra e mar, em quaisquer condições meteorológicas; supermanobrabilidad e em situações de baixa velocidade e vôos com elevados ângulos de ataque; baixa “assinatura” para os radares hostis e difícil detecção por sensores eletro-ópticos e infravermelhos; e por fim, capacidade de operar em pistas curtas que, segundo informações não-oficiais, não seriam maiores que 400m de comprimento. O peso máximo de decolagem do futuro caça deverá ser um pouco inferior ao da família Su-30MK (dando, assim, uma idéia de algo em torno de 25 a 30 toneladas). Segundo a Sukhoi e a NPO Saturn, as novas turbinas permitirão ao T-50 ter velocidade
supersônica de cruzeiro, sem uso de pós-combustão (chamada de "supercruise" , hoje só existindo o F-22 com tal performance) .

Os componentes do T-50, como turbinas, aviônicos e sistemas de armas estão sendo feitos por estágios. Primeiramente, a Sukhoi está modernizando os sistemas existentes no mercado, para posteriormente dar início ao desenvolvimento de novos componentes realmente necessários. Deste modo, os protótipos e o primeiro T-50 de produção serão bem parecidos com o caça Sukhoi Su-35 (ou T-10BM), que está em desenvolvimento. Os controles de vôo, aviônicos e cockpit do primeiro T-50 serão os mesmos do Su-35. Assim como as turbinas do Su-35 e dos primeiros T-50 serão as AL-41F1 (117S) de 14.162kfg de potência, versão modernizada da AL-31F, que equipa o Su-27.

Segundo fontes não-oficiais ouvidas por ASAS, é previsto que o T-50 vá fazer seu primeiro vôo em 2009, entrando em serviço em 2015; e recentemente este “cronograma” foi confirmado pelo próprio Mikhail Pogosyan, CEO da Sukhoi, que declarou que o protótipo não deverá voar antes de 2009. Por outro lado, 2012 foi considerado o "prazo máximo" para o primeiro vôo do PAK-FA, estipulado pelo comandante da força aérea russa, general Aleksander Zelin.

A Sukhoi é a principal responsável pelo T-50, sendo que a produção em série deverá ser feita na fábrica da KNAAPO; com outra fábrica, a NAPO, atuando como subcontratada. Segundo o diretor desta última, Fiodor Zhdanov, a NAPO poderá produzir a seção frontal da fuselagem, e o T-50 terá um extenso uso de "plástico de carbono" em sua estrutura.

Programa russo PAK-FA/T-50
Origem do texto: Wikipédia, a enciclopédia livre.
http://pt.wikipedia .org/wiki/ Programa_ russo_Pak- fa_T-50


O Programa PAK-FA T-50, conhecido também como "Complexo Aéreo para as Forças Aéreas Tácticas" em russo, visa construir um caça de quinta geração, para equipar a força aérea russa e talvez uma versão para exportação.
O projeto PAK-FA é a iniciativa russa de construir um caça de Quinta Geração que envolve as três maiores fabricantes russas: Mikoyan, Yakovlev e Sukhoi. “PAK” significa “Perspektivnyi Aviatsionnyi Kompleks Frontovoi Aviatsyi“, ou seja “Futuro Complexo Aéreo para as Forças Aéreas Tácticas”.

O PAK FA deverá substituir os aparelhos MiG-29 e Su-27 ainda em serviço em grandes números na Força Aérea Russa e deverá ter o seu primeiro vôo em finais de 2009, entrando em serviço algures entre 2012 e 2015.

O projeto iniciou-se ainda no final da década de 80, ainda durante a existência da União Soviética e ao desafio do Governo responderam as fábricas Sukhoi com o Su-47 e a Mikoyan com o Project 1.44. Em 2002, o Governo Russo decidiu que a Sukhoi seria a empresa lider que conduziria o projeto e que que definiria a concepção final do aparelho. Foi acertado também que a aeronave a ser desenvolvida deveria incluir tecnologia das duas propostas.

Pouco se sabe do projeto PAK FA, mas é quase certo que deverá incluir tecnologia furtiva, ser muito rápido e capaz de voos "super cruise", deverá ser capaz de operar os mísseis ar-ar, ar-terra e ar-mar mais sofisticados, assim como incluir um radar AESA. A propulsão estará a cargo de um motor AL-41F ou de uma sua variante mais avançada.

A Índia em 17 de outubro de 2007 assinou um protocolo com a Rússia, tornando-se a primeira parceira internacional do programa conforme anunciou O veículo de comunicação russo. [1].

Em 12 de dezembro de 2007, a revista ASAS[2] publicou noticiou que a Rússia teria oferecido ao Brasil a possibilidade de tornar-se parceiro do Programa PAK-FA. No dia 15 de Abril de 2008 foi noticiado que o Brasil assinaria acordo de cooperação multua com a Rússia para desenvolvimento em conjunto de um caça de 5ª geração[3], que possivelmente será o PAK-FA, ou uma versão avançada do SU-27 Flanker com desenho de redução de RCS e maior envergadura com mais trilhos (hardpoints) sob as asas para carregar mais misseis de combates aéreos. Uma noticia nos jornais e no site da Folha de São Paulo[4], mostrou que essa é uma informação verídica e que para meados de 2010 o primeiro protótipo deverá voar nos céus Brasileiros.

[5] [6]

Características gerais (estimada)

* Tripulação: 1 (piloto)

* Comprimento: 22.0 m (72 ft 2 dentro)

* Wingspan: 14.2 m (46 ft 7 dentro)

* Altura: 6.05 m (19 ft 10 dentro)

* Área da asa: m² 78.8 (ft² 848)

* Peso vazio: 18.500 quilogramas (40.786 libras)

* Peso carregado: 26.000 quilogramas (57.320 libras)

* Carga útil: 7.500 quilogramas (16.535 libras)

* Peso de decolagem máximo: 37.000 quilogramas (81.571 libras)

* Powerplant: 2× Saturno-Lyulka AL-41F turbofan

o Seque a pressão: kgf 9.800 (21.605 lbf) cada um

o Pressão com afterburner: kgf 15.500 (34.172 lbf) cada um

Desempenho

* Velocidade máxima: Mach 2.5 na altura (2.527 km/h, 1.586 mph)

* limites de carga G: +10 a +11 ft/s² de m/s² de g (+98.1 a +107.9, +321.7 a +353.9)

* Velocidade do cruzeiro: 1.300 km/h (807.8 mph)

* Alcance: 4.000 a 5.500 quilômetros (2.485 a 3.418 milhas)

* Teto de serviço: 20.000 m (65.617 ft)

* Taxa da subida: 350 m/s (68.898 ft/min)

* Carregamento da asa: 470 kg/m² (96.3 lb/ft²)

* Thrust/weight: 0.84 (ser afterburner)

* Mínimo thrust/weight: Com afterburner: 1.19

* Exigência do comprimento da pista de decolagem: 350 m (1.148 ft)

* Resistência: 3.3 horas (198 minutos)

Armamento

* 2× canhões internos de 30 milímetros e 8 pontos duros sob as asas (sendo 4 em cada lado do avião).

Avionicos

* Radar: Radar de N050(?)BRLSAESA/ PESA (realce de IRBIS-E) em SU-35

o Freqüência: 3 milímetros (0.118 dentro)

o Diâmetro: 0.7 m (2 ft 4 dentro)

o Alvos: 32 seguiram, 8 acoplados

o Escala: 400 quilômetros (248 milhas)

+ Epr: m² 3 (ft² 32.3) em 160 quilômetros (99.4 milhas)

+ RCS: 0.01 m² em 90 quilômetros (55 milhas)

+ Azimuth: +/-70°, +90/-50°

o Potencia: 4.000 W

o Peso: 65 a 80 quilogramas (143 a 176 libras)

United States: The U.S. Navy and Africa

United States: The U.S. Navy and Africa

Stratfor Today

Summary

The USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) is concluding the first Africa Partnership Station deployment, which is emblematic of both a new U.S. maritime strategy and the U.S. Africa Command’s theoretical operational practices. But it remains to be seen just how much priority Washington will ultimately give these efforts — especially when other missions compete for resources.

Analysis

The amphibious dock landing ship USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) has spent the last six months deployed along the Western and Central African coast training with African naval forces, providing humanitarian assistance and promoting maritime security. The deployment, which will wrap up in Dakar, Senegal, later in April was the first for the Africa Partnership Station (APS) program, which is representative of both the new U.S. maritime strategy and U.S. military operations in Africa in the years to come.

Just last year, the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard released a joint maritime strategy that emphasized cooperation across branches and sought to increase deployments like this one, where Washington’s maritime services would work hand-in-hand not just with their foreign counterparts, but with other governmental and non-governmental organizations in small, distributed and cooperative efforts. The APS deployment is a good example of doing more with less by fostering maritime security through cooperation with local forces. (Also, the deployment has demonstrated that a large U.S. warship can sustain itself — with some replenishment support — on a lengthy deployment in an area with minimal infrastructure and no permanent U.S. military facilities.) Though this deployment was under the aegis of the U.S. 6th Fleet, it is just the sort of thing the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) will foster as well.

Intended to more coherently address Africa’s emerging strategic importance, AFRICOM will consolidate all of Africa except Egypt under one geographic combatant command (it is currently divided among three). AFRICOM aims to have an operational headquarters in Africa by October 2008 (AFRICOM activities are currently conducted out of U.S. Europe Command bases in Stuttgart, Germany). Washington’s principal strategic concerns at this time are:

* fostering maritime security and stability in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea region, where Nigeria exercises considerable influence;

* combating piracy off the coast of the Horn of Africa (U.S. Naval warships have long conducted counter-piracy operations in this area);

* denying sanctuary to international terrorist organizations; and

* undermining the spread of radical Islam in the Horn of Africa and across North Africa.

The United States already has a robust array of amphibious forces with immense sealift capacity and the ability to deliver troops, vehicles and cargo ashore. APS has just demonstrated what the U.S. Navy can do with what it already has. But the United States still faces challenges in less-permissive threat environments in littoral areas, such as the area in which the Fort McHenry has been operating. This gap is to be filled by the littoral combat ship, whose development has experienced massive cost overruns and is behind schedule. This means that one of the platforms most congruent with the new maritime strategy and further APS cooperation will be unavailable in the near term.

The ability to operate and respond effectively given Africa’s size (4,500 miles from east to west and 4,500 miles from north to south) will present military planners with another tactical challenge. This challenge likely will drive AFRICOM planners to seek at the very least provisional “lily pad” logistical hubs in each of Africa’s sub-regions: West Africa (Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe are possible leading candidates), Southern Africa (South Africa’s Simonstown naval base and the Seychelles are strategic locations), East Africa (Kenya’s port of Lamu has been a tried and tested staging location for joint U.S.-Kenyan military training exercises, and Djibouti hosts the U.S. Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa Command) and North Africa (Morocco has hosted joint training exercises with the United States).

Meanwhile, the Navy has yet to make more than a token move toward these new strategies and missions; Africa remains (somewhat justifiably) a tertiary priority for the Pentagon. In a time of extremely tight budgets and a high deployment tempo, the Navy still has many choices to make. There will be U.S. Naval support for AFRICOM, no doubt. But the degree to which that support will be provided when convenient, and the degree to which it will be prioritized, remain to be seen.

GARCIA D'AVILA A CAMINHO

NDCC G29 GARCIA D'ÁVILA

O novo Transporte da Marinha do Brasil GARCIA D'ÁVILA (G29), largando de Lisboa na tarde de 14 de Abril de 2008 na viagem de entrega rumo ao Brasil.
O GARCIA D´ÁVILA foi adquirido em Inglaterra em 2007 e integrado na Armada do Brasil a 4-12-2007. O navio saiu de Portsmouth a 31-03 e esteve em Lisboa de 11 a 14-04.
Anteriormente integrava o Royal Fleet Auxiliary Service da Marinha Britanica com o nome RFA SIR GALAHAD. Está classificado como navio de desembarque de carros de combate.


Texto e imagens /Text and images copyright L.M.Correia. For other posts and images, check our archive at the right column of the main page. Click on the photos to see them enlarged. Thanks for your visit and comments. Luís Miguel Correia

Fragata URUGUAY NAVEGANDO NO TEJO

Wednesday, April 16, 2008

FRAGATA URUGUAY em Lisboa

Fragata URUGUAY ex COMANDANTE JOÃO BELO (ROU 01) fotografada a navegar no Tejo a 15 de Abril último.
Fotografias tiradas com alguma emoção. Uma emoção contida pelo facto de ser preferível ver as nossas belas ainda que antigas fragatas renascerem ao serviço de outra Marinha, do que vê-las seguir para Alhos Vedros.
Alhos Vedros, cujo sucateiro espera pela sobrevivente da classe, já desarmada na Base Naval de Lisboa...

Texto e imagens /Text and images copyright L.M.Correia. For other posts and images, check our archive at the right column of the main page. Click on the photos to see them enlarged. Thanks for your visit and comments. Luís Miguel Correia

Fragata URUGUAY NAVEGANDO NO TEJO

Wednesday, April 16, 2008

FRAGATA URUGUAY em Lisboa

Fragata URUGUAY ex COMANDANTE JOÃO BELO (ROU 01) fotografada a navegar no Tejo a 15 de Abril último.
Fotografias tiradas com alguma emoção. Uma emoção contida pelo facto de ser preferível ver as nossas belas ainda que antigas fragatas renascerem ao serviço de outra Marinha, do que vê-las seguir para Alhos Vedros.
Alhos Vedros, cujo sucateiro espera pela sobrevivente da classe, já desarmada na Base Naval de Lisboa...

Texto e imagens /Text and images copyright L.M.Correia. For other posts and images, check our archive at the right column of the main page. Click on the photos to see them enlarged. Thanks for your visit and comments. Luís Miguel Correia

Could Israel use submarines against Iran?

Could Israel use submarines against Iran?

By Dan Williams
Reuters

Thursday, April 17, 2008

HAIFA, Israel: Anticipating a showdown with Iran, Israel decides secretly to deploy a submarine off its arch-foe's coast.

But how? The quickest route from Israel's Mediterranean coast is via the Suez Canal, which runs through Egypt and which the classified vessels shun. So the submarine is hidden in the belly of a commercial tanker, which delivers it to the Gulf.

Such is the plot of an Israeli thriller, "Undersea Diplomacy". Does it hold water? Perhaps not. Then again, the author, Shlomo Erell, is no mere novelist. He's an ex-admiral with experience in Israel's most sensitive military planning.

"It's pure fiction, but it's informed fiction," he said simply, when asked if his book reflects how the Israeli fleet of Dolphin-class submarines could be used against Iran, whose leadership has called for Israel to be "wiped off the map", stoking international concern over Tehran's nuclear programme.

Israel has three Dolphins, with two more on order from Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft, a German shipyard custom-building them at a steep discount as part of Berlin's bid to shore up a Jewish state founded in the wake of the Nazi Holocaust.

The submarines are a subject of deepest secrecy given speculation that they carry nuclear-tipped cruise missiles.

Many analysts believe the Dolphins are Israel's "second strike" weapons, referring to the Cold War theory that a country can deter foes from launching nuclear attacks by maintaining the ability to retaliate, even after its own territory has been laid waste. A nuclear "platform" out at sea is the best guarantee.

Iran denies seeking nuclear weapons, and independent experts say it is years away from any such capability. Some, in turn, think Israel's expanding submarine fleet may be part of preparations to foil the perceived future threat through force.

"There is nothing on the horizon to suggest Iran would have the capability to knock out Israel's nuclear delivery means," said Sam Gardiner, a retired U.S. air force colonel who stages Middle East war games for U.S. government and private clients.

The Dolphins, he said, may be part of "a conventional capability to deal with the number of targets Israel believes would need to be struck in a conventional preemptive attack".

DISTANCE NO OBJECT?

Israel sent jets to bomb Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981 and has hinted it could do the same against Iranian facilities if U.S.-led diplomatic pressure failed to rein in Tehran's plans.

But the Iraqi raid was on a single site, relatively close to Israel's borders. Targets in Iran might be too numerous and distant for Israel's air force, especially as intermediate Arab states or Turkey would likely refuse overflight rights.

Israel is assumed to have ballistic missiles, yet its small size may make surprise launches impossible: an unannounced missile test in January became news within minutes as the startled residents of nearby towns reported the roaring takeoff.

Submarines could bridge the gap, especially if positioned in Iranian waters. That possibility has given rise to speculation that Israel wants five Dolphins in order to allow for at least one to be at sea at all times while others are being serviced.

The question remains of how far they might travel.

Israeli navy sources say the Dolphins do not use the Suez -- to avoid being inspected by Egyptian harbourmasters. That means that, to reach the Gulf, Israel would either have to resort to fantastical ruses like the one in "Undersea Diplomacy", or send the submarines around Africa -- a month-long trip at least.

Jason Alderwick, a maritime analyst with the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, is sceptical.

"I don't buy the idea of a rotation. These submarines have not been purchased with a view to operating in the Gulf," he said. As Dolphins run on conventional rather than nuclear power so require regular refuelling and shore maintenance, he described them as better suited to close Mediterranean missions.

Israel also has access to the Red Sea through Eilat port. But navy sources said there was no plan to dock submarines there because the narrow Red Sea, which is shared with several Arab states, is vulnerable to blockades at the Straits of Tiran.

DETERRENTS NEVER USED

Restricted to the Mediterranean, analysts point out, the Israeli Dolphins could pose a "second-strike" threat to Iran only if they carried nuclear cruise missiles capable of hitting targets as far as 1,500 km (970 miles) away.

Lee Willett of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies noted that Dolphins lacked the vertical tubes used by much bigger Western and Soviet-era submarines to launch ballistic missiles.

Cold War tests showed nuclear warheads are too heavy to be delivered long distances on cruise missiles, so Israel could hit Iran only with conventional warheads if they were fired from the Mediterranean, he said.

A nuclear attack on Iran by a Dolphin, Willett argued, would have to be from the Gulf, which in turn would give away an unsupported submarine's position and probably doom it to being destroyed by surviving Iranian forces.

"The whole point of a deterrent is that it's never used," Willett said. "In designing the Dolphins as a second-strike platform, I imagine the Israelis were thinking 'it's not ideal, but it's the best we've got'."

Israel does not discuss its nuclear capabilities, under an "ambiguity" policy billed as warding off regional enemies while avoiding the kind of provocations that can trigger arms races.

Erell appeared to support such thinking. The message of his book -- which made a modest splash in Israel, and is currently available only in Hebrew -- was "how to use a submarine without resorting to war". "It's about affecting statecraft," he said.

(Editing by Andrew Roche and Sara Ledwith)

Du Scalp Naval pour le projet des FREMM grecques

Du Scalp Naval pour le projet des FREMM grecques

Vue de la FREMM proposée à la Grèce crédits : DCNS

15/04/2008

Le gouvernement français a donné son accord à la vente de missiles de croisière Scalp Naval à la Grèce, si celle-ci opte pour la FREMM dans le cadre du renouvellement de son parc de frégates. C'est ce qu'à indiqué hier Jean-Marie Poimboeuf. Le président de DCNS était à Athènes dans le cadre de l'ouverture d'un bureau permanent du groupe dans la capitale grecque. DCNS a également signé un nouvel accord avec le chantier Elefsis, qui réalisera les bâtiments si Athènes fait le choix de la frégate française. Ce nouvel accord, qui fait suite à celui signé fin 2006, précise les modalités de l'organisation industrielle entre les groupes français et grec pour mener à bien le programme, estimé à plusieurs milliards d'euros. « Notre volonté est de nous établir durablement en Grèce pour participer au renouvellement des frégates de la marine hellénique et au développement du programme FREMM. C'est un partenariat global à long terme et à haute valeur technologique pour l'industrie grecque, créateur d'un grand nombre d'emplois qualifiés », explique Jean-Marie Poimboeuf.
Le projet porte non seulement sur la construction des bâtiments localement, avec un important transfert de technologie, mais également sur l'intégration de la Grèce au programme européen FREMM, auquel l'Italie participe déjà. « Nous intègreront des équipements grecs aussi bien sur les frégates françaises que sur celles que nous vendrons à l'export ». Climatisation, informatique, électronique... S'il est encore trop tôt, selon le patron de DCNS, pour dire quels types d'équipements pourraient être embarqués, ce dernier précise que dans le cadre des appels d'offres lancés pour la réalisation des frégates, les entreprises grecques pourront proposer des solutions et saisir des opportunités.
Jugé prioritaire par les autorités grecques, le renouvellement des frégates est inscrit au budget quinquennal d'équipement du pays. Les Français semblent pour l'heure bien placés et le Scalp Naval constitue un nouvel argument de poids. Développé par MBDA, le premier missile de croisière européen est une arme très importante car peu de pays en disposeront. Tiré depuis la frégate, le missile pourra atteindre une cible terrestre à plus de 1000 kilomètres. Il s'agit donc d'un « gros plus » pour l'offre française, en compétition notamment avec les projets de l'Allemand TKMS, de l'Espagnol Navantia et du Néerlandais Schelde.
Nous reviendrons demain, plus en détails, sur ce projet, considéré comme « stratégique » par DCNS.

The New Maritime Strategy, The Rest of the Story

Monday, April 14, 2008 ARMCHAIR ADMIRAL

Observing "The New Maritime Strategy, The Rest of the Story"

I have never met Captain Robert C. Rubel, but I imagine he would be a fascinating person to talk about naval strategy with for several hours on end. In the Spring 2008 Naval War College Review (download here), he gives us "the rest of the story" behind 21st Century Seapower with his brilliant piece, The New Maritime Strategy, The Rest of the Story. I quote long parts of the article in this entry, and I won't apologize for it. The topic of maritime strategy is important, and we learn a lot about the way the Navy thinks with Captain Rubel's contribution. To skim on quotes is a disservice to his excellent work and would fail to educate, a primary intention of this blog. Reading this entry may take slow readers 10 minutes, I think its worth it.

His piece is an eye opening view into the thought processes that went into the development of the Navy's maritime strategy, and offers us insights to the process that explain a number of the decisions. We start by looking at the Strategic Foundations Game which helped determine what type of strategy the Navy would develop.

The Strategic Foundations Game took about six weeks to play and involved the four U.S. teams, one for each potential policy future, and five “strategic entities,” countries and nonstate groups selected for detailed play. Teams were directed to develop grand strategies for the next twenty years that would maximize their security, aspirations, and interests. Non-U.S. teams were not required to demonstrate hostility to the United States unless that made sense in terms of their grand strategies. This represented a departure from normal gaming, in which worst-case scenarios are the rule. In the open adjudication sessions in which each team proclaimed its strategy, a compelling central thread emerged. Each state had an intrinsic interest in the effective functioning of the global system of trade, even such “rogue” actors as Iran and North Korea. Only al-Qa‘ida and associated groups had endemic hostility to the system. This insight produced the “big idea” that the protection of the existing global system of trade and security (as opposed to the process of globalization) provided both the context for the new strategy and the intellectual glue that tied together all regions of the world. Thus the notion of system security and defense figures prominently in the maritime strategy document, both “up front,” in its introduction, and in the description of the maritime strategic concept. It provided a basis for not only a maritime strategy but a national grand strategy not aimed against a particular country or threat but positive, without being aggressive. The strategic concept upon which the maritime strategy is based—defense of the global system of commerce and security—offers the opportunity for future administrations to adopt a clearly articulated grand strategic defensive posture,with all the political advantages that brings.As a defensive strategy, it makes global maritime cooperation much easier to attain.

The article goes into further detail regarding how the Strategic Foundations Game played out.

As it turned out, the Strategic Foundations Game and the several workshops did not produce the maritime strategy options in a straightforward way. Naval War College researchers were left with a considerable body of data, but the planned events produced no clear definition of options. Thus they set about trying to deduce strategy options from the four policy futures. This work produced five options. The first, called “Winning Combat Power Forward,” was derived from the Primacy policy future and called for strong, war-winning forces to be deployed in the northern Arabian Sea and in northeast Asia. The underpinning assumption was that since deterrence could not be relied upon and sufficient strategic depth in these areas was lacking, strong forces must be positioned where they would be needed. The second option was based on the Offshore Balancing policy future and called for U.S. naval forces to be forward deployed only in the Persian Gulf. The rest of the Navy would remain in home waters, in a “surge” status. Monetary savings of this posture would be used to increase force structure or to transform the Navy. The third option called for a focus on securing the global commons as a key element in the health of the global system. This option seemed to have relevance across most of the policy futures. The fourth option, one that came “over the transom” from outside the College, called for high-end forces to combat anti-access capabilities in northeast Asia and low-end forces for the Long War and engagement elsewhere. The final option, another one that came in from an outside source, was an outgrowth of the Selective Engagement policy future and called for raising war prevention to the same level of importance as war winning. Prevention was to be achieved through a combination of deterrence through strength and widespread engagement to reduce the causes of discontent, resource competition, and failed governance that could spawn wars. These five options were offered to the Executive Committee. These were quickly winnowed down to three: war-winning power forward, securing the global commons, and war prevention. These three were carried forward for staffing and, eventually, were all combined into a single strategy—the one that has been published.

I highlighted in bold the five games for my own sake, but this level of insight is very interesting in analysis of how the Navy developed its maritime strategy. The article has a ton of additional information regarding the potential policy futures, and is well worth the read in full for more information on that.

"The Navy will defend the global system" sounds a lot like “disconnectedness from globalization defines danger" to me. The theme of engagement further highlights that context, and as I've said on the blog time and time again, the ways and context of the Maritime Strategy appear to come directly from Thomas PM Barnett's The Pentagon's New Map.

The 5th game described is one I'd like to know more about, because as I read the Maritime Strategy I see the phrase "preventing war is as important as winning war" as a mission statement. It is the connection between preventing war and winning war that we describe maritime strategy in the 21st century as a yin yang representing warfighting and peacemaking as two opposing and, at the same time, complementary (completing) applications of seapower. We developed this model based on our strategic influences, and it was on the topic of strategic influences the article had me focused.

There are many who are frustrated that the new strategy makes no mention of force structure, but it does seem to provide an overarching logic from which future force structure could be deduced. At the very least, it is a consensus document that has to some degree knit the Navy together.

Basically the author is suggesting that it was decided the only way to develop a consensus document was to ignore Force Structure. There is some irony that the unpopularity, or lack of consensus for 21st Century Seapower, is mostly due to the lack of strategic discussions regarding fleet constitution. As we have done on this blog, you can discuss fleet constitution strategically without making specific recommendations, and I for one believe the Navy should have done exactly that. We find this part very interesting, and familiar, as Captain Rubel discussed fleet constitution strategically without making a recommendation. That is what strategy can do.

At this nexus of force structure and strategy, it is useful to interpret the strategy in light of the ideas of the two greatest maritime strategy theorists, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett. In a sense, the new strategy is very “Corbettian,” in that it requires that control of the seas—at least in the new sense of maritime security and maritime domain awareness—be exercised day in and day out. Corbett described two traditional concentration points for the Royal Navy, one near the French island of Ushant off Brittany to control the Channel, and the other in the Downs (a roadstead near Dover) to guard against invasion threats from the North Sea. These concentration points were established because Britain’s proximity to them afforded little geographic strategic depth. However, fleets concentrated there could disperse for “systemic” sea-control duties, being always ready to regroup if a major threat developed near home. Similarly, the new maritime strategy prescribes two concentration points, one in the Arabian Gulf and the other in northeast Asia, where important economic elements of the global system are near potentially aggressive states. Per current U.S. Navy practice, these “combat credible” forces will “starburst,” or disperse, for engagement purposes but can regroup quickly in case of need. Corbett said that commercial shipping elsewhere could be protected by cruisers and the “flotilla”— smaller ships that could deal with most threats short of first-class forces—types not normally encountered in the far-flung reaches of the empire. The analog today is the “thousand-ship navy, ”the loose network of navies cooperating for maritime security. The U.S. part of that flotilla will be those units assigned to Global Fleet Stations and other, more ad hoc deployments to catalyze greater levels of cooperation. The keyword is catalyze. We would not build a fleet of patrol craft to do other nations’ jobs for them. We would dispatch ships and other kinds of forces that would help other navies and coast guards adopt congruent strategies and provide them with the training and perhaps equipment to implement them. The exact types and numbers of forces required are not self-evident and need to be the subject of analysis and gaming.

The strategy has its Mahanian aspects too. One aspect of Mahan’s writing that is widely ignored or misunderstood is his focus on deterrence. Mahan’s world was characterized by the existence of great powers overseas that had navies capable of conducting operations in the Western Hemisphere. Mahan worried about the defense of the soon-to-be-opened Panama Canal and about other European adventurism in Latin America. His prescription for a strong battle fleet and its deployment was based as much on deterring outside intervention in the Americas as it was on protecting American interests overseas. This notion of deterring a range of major powers through a strong, high-end fleet is an intrinsic part of the new strategy. Moreover, Mahan’s prescription for a consortium of cooperating navies belonging to like-minded powers has a strong echo in the new strategy. In Mahan’s era, Britain was the preeminent naval power, but there were others on the rise, including Germany, Japan, and the United States. Mahan could see that even the Royal Navy might not be able to police the world in an era where capital ships were becoming ever more expensive and any single nation might not be able to keep the seas free around the world. Thus he proposed that the navies of several nations act in concert (not necessarily in alliance) to make sure regional powers could not close off large parts of the ocean to trade.6 Today, even though the United States enjoys a measure of naval relative advantage Mahan could not have dreamed of, the world is still too big for a single navy to act as sheriff of the seas. Therefore, the new maritime strategy advocates a consortium of navies and coast guards working together to assure maritime security, the new manifestation of sea control.

We have posed the question for discussion in the past "Where is the Cruiser Role", and we now have our answer. In modern American tradition, the US Navy outsourced it. We find it pretty incredible that the strategy authors would build a “Corbettian” strategy, with this author specifically citing Corbett's chapter on fleet constitution which emphasizes the the central aspect of fleet constitution to be the cruiser role, and the implementation of the maritime strategy outsources Corbett's centric component to making fleet strategy work? All I can say is "WHAT?"

Clearly we see this decision as a blunder in implementation of the strategy for fleet constitution that reminds me of the Army in its attempt to incorporate NCW prior to Iraq. The way we see it, the Navy is setting themselves up for a hard fall the same way the Army did.

I'm only a partial Clausewitz or Mahan thinker, which means I'm not in line with how the Navy presents its maritime strategy. For example, when I think of applying Clausewitz to Maritime Strategy, I think in terms of medical diplomacy being one method to take the offensive in peacetime. When I think in terms of Mahan, I think of AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense as a 21st century method of escalation control (thus a peacemaker principle), not as a method of deterrence, which I see as a war fighting principle that is often omitted but clearly present in Mahan's strategic thinking.

My views of maritime strategy are heavily influenced by Julian Corbett, and in that way let me explain how I see things.

I accept Uncommand of the Sea as the natural order in peacetime, thus I accept the competition that creates Uncommand of the Sea (or the perception of contested Command of the Sea by nations) as the natural state in peacetime. The absence of war allows nations to build up naval forces, this is historically accurate, the byproduct of longevity in peace. In that way I see managing the challenges of this natural order to prevent war as the object of peacetime maritime strategy.

I also accept Uncommand of the Sea as the natural order in wartime, thus I accept the competition for Command of the Sea (or the reality of contested Command of the Sea by nations) as the natural state in wartime. It is through the pursuit of Command of the Sea, whether through violence or the cost to implement violence, that naval forces are reduced. In that way I see both the management of resources for war AND the application of force to win war as the object of wartime maritime strategy.

In that way I see Command of the Sea, the historical object of maritime strategy, as an unnatural condition that only occurs due to the presence of maritime forces that lack competition in that place at that time. In that way I see presence as an important strategic principle in pursuit of both objects of maritime strategy. My perspectives of war and peace strategy for the maritime services are influenced in this way, thus my analysis of maritime strategy for the maritime services may not line up in the way the US Navy would explain it.

With presence as the central principle of 21st century maritime strategy, we find it ridiculous that we outsource the one type of combatant in our fleet constitution strategy that we would need the most for conducting the "cruiser role" of which presence was the central purpose. Presence gives us early warning, is the canary in the mine, and is the principle that links maintaining peace and winning war. The way we see it, the Navy has outsourced the primary fleet constitution platform requirement needed to successfully implement the new maritime strategy.

There is a truism that is being ignored by the Navy, virtual presence is in fact absolute absence. At the end of the day presence requires manpower to pursue the peacetime object, awareness might be enough to be destructive, but has never been enough to be constructive. Under the fleet constitution model being implemented, the model described as the 1000-ship Navy, we are outsourcing our presence. We can't say that gives us much hope for successful maritime strategy implementation.

Posted by Galrahn at 2:07 AM

Une force maritime internationale contre la piraterie

Une force maritime internationale contre la piraterie

Somalie : convoi sous protection militaire française crédits : MARINE NATIONALE

14/04/2008

L'affaire du Ponant a, enfin, mis en lumière le danger que représente la piraterie pour le trafic commercial international. En 10 ans, pas moins de 3200 marins ont été pris en otage par des pirates. Parmi eux, 500 ont été blessés et 160 tués. Loin de diminuer, le phénomène s'amplifie, au large de la corne d'Afrique comme dans le golfe de Guinée, en Afrique de l'ouest. Et en Asie, le détroit de Malacca, moins périlleux que jadis, est toujours le théâtre d'attaques. Le trafic générant les "trafics", l'explosion du commerce mondial, dont 90% passe par voie maritime, a vu l'essor d'une piraterie qui n'a rien à voir avec le petit brigandage. « Nous sommes confrontés à une vraie menace pour le trafic maritime. Le phénomène est en hausse avec des pirates de plus en plus équipés et organisés. Ils disposent de moyens de communication performants, de navires bases avec des vedettes rapides et d'informations sur les navires croisant dans les zones où ils opèrent », explique Jean-David Levitte, conseiller diplomatique du président de la République. Après avoir mené à bien le sauvetage des 30 marins du Ponant et, pour la première fois, avoir intercepté leurs ravisseurs, la France souhaite maintenant aller plus loin. « Nous allons prolonger cette opération par une initiative internationale et nous allons demander que sous mandat de l'ONU une force internationale, à laquelle naturellement la France est prête à participer, puisse oeuvrer à la sécurité du transit maritime », a indiqué ce week-end, depuis le Japon, François Fillon.


Un pétrolier sous protection de la marine dans le golfe d'Aden (© : MARINE NATIONALE)

Menace sur les grands noeuds de communication

L'initiative française se situe dans le prolongement de l'opération d'accompagnement militaire des convois du Programme Alimentaire Mondial vers la Somalie. Le 25 septembre dernier, Nicolas Sarkozy avait en effet proposé à l'ONU que la Marine nationale escorte les cargos, régulièrement attaqués par les pirates. De novembre à février, les avisos Commandant Ducuing et Premier Maître l'Her s'étaient relayés pour assurer la protection de six convois. Plus de 30.000 tonnes de vivres avaient été acheminés sans attaque, permettant de ravitailler un million de personnes. Le relais a, depuis, été pris par la marine danoise, qui devrait passer le témoin à la flotte néerlandaise. Mais la simple escorte des navires du PAM n'est pas suffisante, comme on l'a vu avec le Ponant, pour dissuader les pirates d'opérer au large de la Somalie. Ayant touché de fortes sommes d'argent de précédents détournements, ces bandes se sont « professionnalisées » et menacent directement l'un des principaux noeuds de communication mondial. C'est, en effet, par le nord de l'océan Indien que transitent à destination de l'Europe le pétrole venant du golfe Persique, mais aussi les millions de conteneurs importés depuis l'Asie, sans parler des autres marchandises. Et, avant même qu'un tanker ou un porte-conteneurs n'ait été attaqué, la piraterie pèse déjà économiquement. Ainsi, selon l'Elysée, concernant les assurances, le surcoût inhérent à la menace pirate serait déjà d'un milliard de dollars.


Les pirates sont notamment armés de lance-roquettes (© : US NAVY)

Des pirates aux moyens « de plus en plus puissants et de plus en plus dangereux »

Or, selon Jean-David Levitte : « De prise d'otages en prise d'otages, ils se dotent de moyens de plus en plus puissants et deviennent de plus en plus dangereux ». Dans la région du détroit de Malacca, des Etats comme Singapour, la Malaisie ou l'Indonésie on déjà mis en place des moyens importants pour endiguer la piraterie; les pays riverains de la corne d'Afrique et du golfe de Guinée n'ont pas les moyens de répondre efficacement à cette menace. « C'est pourquoi la communauté internationale doit s'organiser pour faire face à ce fléau qu'est la piraterie ». Et, à ce propos, la France va soumettre à l'Organisation des Nations Unies trois axes de travail. Le premier s'attache au cas des Etats n'ayant pas les moyens d'assurer la sécurité de leurs eaux territoriales. « Il serait souhaitable que tous les Etats qui n'ont pas les moyens de se protéger décident de renoncer volontairement à cette barrière symbolique des eaux territoriales; de façon à ce que les Etats qui seraient engagés dans une opération de récupération ne soient pas bloqués à la limite des eaux territoriales ». La seconde proposition vise à inciter les pays ayant des moyens suffisants à organiser des patrouilles maritimes internationales dans les eaux sensibles. A commencer par le golfe d'Aden, entre la Somalie et le Yémen, ainsi que le golfe de Guinée, où la piraterie s'est développée au large du Nigéria et de l'Angola.


Somalie : équipe de visite de la marine sur un cargo (© : MARINE NATIONALE)

Droit de poursuite dans les eaux territoriales

Enfin, Paris va soumettre une dernière idée. Les Etats qui, de temps à autres, sont confrontés à des actes de piraterie pourraient se déclarer volontaires, par avance, pour laisser s'opérer, dans leurs eaux, des actions de lutte contre la piraterie. « Le facteur temps est en effet très précieux et si il faut commencer à discuter avec un gouvernement, on risque de laisser les pirates disparaître à terre et, ensuite, il devient impossible de mettre la main dessus ». En dehors de l'ONU, où le représentant de la France au Conseil de sécurité devrait commencer à travailler avec ses 14 collègues, cette question sera au coeur de la réunion organisée cette semaine, en Tanzanie, par l'Organisation Maritime Internationale. La piraterie sera à l'ordre du jour de cette conférence réunissant une vingtaine de pays de l'océan Indien. « Il ne reste plus, à cet égard, à la conférence de l'OMI, qui se tient cette semaine à Dar-es-Salam que de confirmer ses intentions - spécifiquement sur le droit de poursuite des pirates opérant en haute mer dans les eaux territoriales des États riverains - pour que le système de lutte contre la piraterie devienne beaucoup plus dissuasif dès lors qu'il est combiné avec une présence affirmée de forces navales dans les zones concernées », souligne Francis Vallat, président de l'Institut Français de la Mer.