noticiarionaval: The United States, Germany and Beyond

March 30, 2009

By George Friedman

Three major meetings will take place in Europe over the next nine days: a meeting of the G-20, a NATO summit and a meeting of the European Union with U.S. President Barack Obama. The week will define the relationship between the United States and Europe and reveal some intra-European relationships. If not a defining moment, the week will certainly be a critical moment in dealing with economic, political and military questions. To be more precise, the meeting will be about U.S.-German relations. Not only is Germany the engine of continental Europe, its policies diverge the most sharply from those of the United States. In some ways, U.S.-German relations have been the core of the U.S.-European relationship, so this marathon of summits will focus on the United States and Germany.

Although the meetings deal with a range of issues — the economy and Afghanistan chief among them — the core question on the table will be the relationship between Europe and the United States following the departure of George W. Bush and the arrival of Barack Obama. This is not a trivial question. The European Union and the United States together account for more than half of global gross domestic product. How the two interact and cooperate is thus a matter of global significance. Of particular importance will be the U.S. relationship with Germany, since the German economy drives the Continental dynamic. This will be the first significant opportunity to measure the state of that relationship along the entire range of issues requiring cooperation.

Relations under Bush between the United States and the two major European countries, Germany and France, were unpleasant to say the least. There was tremendous enthusiasm throughout most of Europe surrounding Obama’s election. Obama ran a campaign partly based on the assertion that one of Bush’s greatest mistakes was his failure to align the United States more closely with its European allies, and he said he would change the dynamic of that relationship.

There is no question that Obama and the major European powers want to have a closer relationship. But there is a serious question about expectations. From the European point of view, the problem with Bush was that he did not consult them enough and demanded too much from them. They are looking forward to a relationship with Obama that contains more consultation and fewer demands. But while Obama wants more consultation with the Europeans, this does not mean he will demand less. In fact, one of his campaign themes was that with greater consultation with Europe, the Europeans would be prepared to provide more assistance to the United States. Europe and Obama loved each other, but for very different reasons. The Europeans thought that the United States under Obama would ask less, while Obama thought the Europeans would give more.

The G-20 and Divergent Economic Expectations

Begin with the G-20 summit of 20 of the world’s largest economies, which, along with the Americans and Europeans, include the Russians, Chinese and Japanese. The issue is, of course, the handling of the international financial crisis. In contrast to the G-20 meetings held in November 2008, the economic situation has clarified itself substantially — itself an improvement — and there are the first faint signs in the United States of what might be the beginning of recovery. There is still tremendous economic pain, but not nearly the panic seen in October.

There is, however, still discord. The most important disagreement is between the United States and United Kingdom on one side and France and Germany on the other. Both the United States and the United Kingdom have selected a strategy that calls for strong economic stimulus at home. The Anglo-American side wants Europe to match it (though the United Kingdom has begun tempering its demands). It fears that the heavily export-oriented Germans in particular will use the demand created by U.S. and British stimulus on their economies to surge German exports into these countries as demand rises. Germany and France would thus get the benefit of the stimulus without footing the bill, enjoying a free ride as the United States builds domestic debt. We must focus here on Germany and the United States because Germany is the center of gravity of the European economy just as the United States is of the Anglo-American bloc. Others are involved, but in the end this comes down to a U.S.-German showdown.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel argued that Germany could not afford the kind of stimulus promoted by the Anglo-Americans because German demographic problems are such that the proposed stimulus would impose long-term debt on a shrinking population, an untenable situation. Germany and France’s position makes perfect sense, whether it is viewed as Merkel has framed it, or more cynically, as Germany taking advantage of actions Obama already has taken. Either way, the fact remains that German and U.S. national interest are not at all the same. As Merkel put it in an interview with The New York Times, “International policy is, for all the friendship and commonality, always also about representing the interests of one’s own country.”

Paralleling this is the issue of how to deal with the Central European financial crisis. Toxic U.S. assets did not create this problem, internal European practices did. Western European banks took dominant positions in Eastern Europe in the past decade. They began to offer mortgages and other loans at low interest rates denominated in euros, Swiss francs and yen. This was an outstanding deal unless the Polish zloty and the Hungarian forint were to plunge in value, which they have over the past six months. Loan payments soared, massive defaults happened, and Italian, Austrian and Swedish banks were left holding the bag.

The United States viewed this as an internal EU matter, leaving it to European countries to save their own banks. Meanwhile, the Germans — who had somewhat less exposure than other countries — helped block a European bailout, arguing that the Central European countries should be dealt with through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was being configured to solve such problems in second-tier countries. From the German point of view, the IMF was simply going to be used for the purpose for which it was created. But Washington saw this as the Germans trying to secure U.S. (and Chinese and Japanese) money to deal with a European problem.

Add to this the complexity of Opel, a German carmaker owned by GM, which Germany wants the United States to bailout but which the United States wants nothing to do with, and the fundamental problem is clear: While both Germany and the United States have a common interest in moving past the crisis, Germany and the United States have very different approaches to the problem. Embedded in this is the hard fact that the United States is much larger than any other national economy, and it will be the U.S. recovery (when it comes) pulling the rest of the world — particularly the export-oriented economies — out of the ditch. Given that nothing can change this, the Germans see no reason to put themselves in a more difficult position than they are already in.

The Germans will not yield on the stimulus issue and Obama will not press, since this is not an issue that will resonate politically. But what could be perceived as a massive U.S. donation to the IMF would resonate politically in the United States. The American political system has become increasingly sensitive to the size of the debt being incurred by the Obama administration. A loan at this time to bail out other countries would not sit well, especially when critics would point out that some of the money will be going to bail out European banks in Central Europe.

European Fragmentation

Obama will need something in return from the Europeans, and the two-day NATO summit will be the place to get it. The Obama administration laid out the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan last Friday in preparation for this trip. Having given on the economic issue, Obama might hope that the Europeans would be forthcoming in increasing their commitment to Afghanistan by sending troops.

But there is almost no chance of Germany or France sending more troops, as public opinion in those countries is set against it and they have vastly limited military resources. During the U.S. presidential debates, Obama emphasized that he would be looking to the Europeans to increase aid in Afghanistan (the “good” war) while Iraq (the “bad” war) ends. The Germans will make some symbolic gestures — aid to Pakistan, reconstruction workers — but they will not be sending troops.

This will put Obama in a difficult position. If he donates money to the IMF, some of it earmarked for Europe, while the Europeans not only refuse to join the United States in a stimulus package but refuse to send troops to Afghanistan, the entire foundation of Obama’s foreign policy will start becoming a public issue. Obama argued that he would be more effective in building cooperation with European allies than Bush was or U.S. Sen. John McCain would have been. If he comes home empty-handed, which is likely, the status of that claim becomes uncertain.

Which brings us to the third meeting: the Obama-EU summit. We have been speaking of Germany as if it were Europe. In one sense, it is, as its economic weight drives the system. But politically and militarily, Europe is highly fragmented. Indeed, one of the consequences of German nationalism in dealing with Europe’s economy is that Europe’s economy is fragmented as well. Many smaller EU members, which had great expectations of what EU membership would mean, are disappointed and alienated from Germany and even the European Union itself largely due to the lack of German willingness to help them in their time of need.

More Fertile Ground for Obama

These are the waters Obama can go fishing in. Clearly, NATO is no longer functioning as it was a generation ago. Reality has shifted, and so have national interests. The international economic crisis has heightened — not reduced — nationalism as each nation looks out for itself. The weaker nations, particularly in Central Europe, have been left to fend for themselves.

The Central European countries have an additional concern: Russia. As Russia gets bolder, and as Germany remains unwilling to stand in Moscow’s way due to its energy dependence on Russia, countries on the EU periphery will be shopping for new relationships, particularly with the United States.

Obama’s strategy of coming closer to the Franco-German bloc appears to be ending in the same kind of train wreck in which Bush’s attempts ended. That is reasonable since these are not questions of atmospherics but of national interest on all sides. It therefore follows that the United States must consider new strategic relationships. The countries bordering Russia and Ukraine are certainly of interest to the United States, and share less interests with Germany and France than they thought they did. New bilateral relations — or even multilateral relations excluding some former partners like Germany — might be a topic to think about at the EU summit, even if it is too early to talk about it.

But let’s remember that Obama’s trip doesn’t end in Europe, it ends in Turkey. Turkey is a NATO member but has been effectively blocked from entry into the EU. It is doing relatively well in the economic crisis, and has a substantial military capability as well. The United States needs Turkey to extend its influence in Iraq to block Iranian ambitions, and north in the Caucasus to block Russian ambitions. Turkey is thus a prime candidate for an enhanced relationship with the United States. Excluded from Europe out of fears of Turkish immigration, economically able to stand on its own two feet, and able to use its military force in its own interest, it doesn’t take a contortionist to align U.S. and Turkish policies — they flow naturally.

However planned, Obama’s visit to Turkey will represent a warning to the Germans and others in its orbit that their relationship with the United States is based, as Merkel put it, on national interest, and that Germany’s interests and American interests are diverging somewhat. It also drives home that the United States has options in how to configure its alliance system, and that in many ways, Turkey is more important to the United States than Germany is.

Obama has made the case for multilateralism. Whatever that means, it does not have to mean continued alignment with all the traditional allies the United States had. There are potential new relationships and potential new arrangements. The inability of the Europeans to support key aspects of U.S. policy is understandable. But it will inevitably create a counter pressure on Obama to transfer the concept of multilateralism away from the post-World War II system of alliances toward a new system more appropriate to American national interests.

From our point of view, the talks in Europe are locked into place. A fine gloss will be put on the failure to collaborate. The talks in Turkey, on the other hand, have a very different sense about them.

The Obama Administration and Europe

February 3, 2009 | 2341 GMT

ersion

Related Special Topic Page

· Special Series: Obama’s Foreign Policy Landscape

Editor’s Note: This is the second piece in a series that explores how key countries in various regions have interacted with the United States in the past, and how their relationships with Washington will likely be defined during the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama.

The United States and Europe are intertwined in a transatlantic alliance that for more than 50 years has secured peace in Europe. Since the end of World War II, the United States has looked to strengthen European unity, first through the Marshall Plan and later by nurturing nascent institutions that would become the European Union, like the European Coal and Steel Community.

The overarching U.S. geopolitical imperative, however, is to assure that the Eurasian landmass does not produce a continent-sized challenger capable of threatening American hegemony. Part of the motivation behind Washington’s support for EU enlargement is the desire to assure that the European Union never coalesces into a concrete political union. The more EU members, the less coherent the bloc, thus making it less likely that France or Germany will come to dominate the union. Assuring that no Eurasian challenger to the United States appears also means keeping Russia — the state at present most likely to dominate enough territory to threaten the United States — east of the Carpathian Mountains. The United States therefore walks the tightrope of encouraging sufficient European unity to hedge against Russia while preventing the unity that would allow a single European power to rise.

Enter the Obama administration, which brings with it the traditional Democratic foreign policy emphasis on Europe. Historically, the Democratic Party has been deeply enmeshed with the U.S. northeastern intellectual and business elite, who are culturally, socially, and most importantly, economically — both through capital and direct trade links — focused on Europe. This has little to do with party ideology and mostly to do with geography and trade routes. Obama therefore comes from a tradition of American leadership that has viewed Europe as a permanent interest and partner of the United States.

Below are five countries that STRATFOR feels will be crucial to U.S.-European relations in 2009, and possibly throughout the four years of Obama’s term. Along with the European heavyweights of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, we include Central Europe’s most powerful country, Poland. We also include the present holder of the EU presidency, the Czech Republic, a state that has risen in Washington’s estimation due to U.S. military plans to possibly field a radar installation there.

France

When strong, unified and not in revolt, France is traditionally the European hyperdynamic statesman, forced to seek alliances due to its geographical location. It is the only country on the Continent that shares a border with every single regional power: Spain, Italy, Germany and, via the English Channel, the United Kingdom. When it is powerful, France pushes for “European unity” with Paris in charge. To this end, it mobilizes its allies and spearheads giant unification campaigns. (Think Charlemagne, Napoleon, de Gaulle, etc.)

When it is weak, however, France seeks to build a coalition to constrain the European power of the day. France is now in the process of moving from a period of relative strength to relative weakness. With Germany’s return as a major player, French President Nicolas Sarkozy has been forced to move France away from its Gaullist tradition to a more defensive strategy. Paris now seeks to manage an alliance to contain (e.g., surround and subsume) Germany. Simply put, Paris instinctively understands that France cannot be globally important without first dominating Europe, and the latter is difficult when Germany has an opinion.

Sarkozy will have ample opportunity to become Europe’s liaison with the Americans, as under Obama, the United States will look to Europe for help in countering Russia and for assistance in the expanded campaign in Afghanistan. France’s changing needs mesh well with American plans in a way they did not under former U.S. President George W. Bush.

Germany

Germany is the proverbial man in the middle, surrounded by powers that alone are no match for it, but which collectively can destroy it. As such, Germany’s foreign policy is either nonexistent (when it has been defeated or split) or aggressive (when it is attempting to pick off its neighbors one at a time to prevent an alliance against it from forming.) Germany is currently segueing from the weakness of the post-World War II era to the strength of reunification. Because of this evolution, the balance of power in Europe is shifting. In 2009, an increasingly independent and assertive Berlin is looking to develop a foreign policy to match its ambitions.

But this cannot happen overnight; Germany is hardly prepared to blitzkrieg its way to Continental domination. So unless Berlin plans on going to war with Russia (and it does not), it needs to find a way to live with Russia, particularly as Germany is so dependent on Russian energy exports. And that means sharing influence with the Russians in the belt of states that separate the two. This will lead Berlin on a collision course not just with its eastern neighbors, but also with those neighbors’ security guarantor: the United States. The Obama administration will hope for German support in any future negotiations with Russia, but Berlin will see its separate accommodation with Russia as more important.

United Kingdom

As an island nation, the United Kingdom projects power globally more easily than it does on the European continent. The British imperative involves ensuring that no nation unifies (or conquers) Europe and mobilizes all its resources to invade Britain, as Germany came close to doing in 1940. This geopolitical imperative largely mirrors the U.S. imperative to keep the Eurasian landmass divided, giving the British and the Americans largely complementary interests. (In fact, the U.S. Eurasian strategy was essentially learned from the British.)

Nonetheless, Obama might face a cold shoulder from the United Kingdom in 2009 and 2010. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown is preoccupied with domestic issues (particularly Britain’s worsening economic crisis) and his eventual departure (either through electoral defeat in mid-2010, or even earlier should the Labour Party decide to replace him). Brown will thus be extremely careful not to commit to any grand U.S. campaigns without being certain the move would not hurt him domestically. A timid United Kingdom will not mesh well with Obama’s desire to see a Europe more involved with American foreign policy.

Poland

Poland’s neighbors often see it as a speed bump on the superhighway that is the North European Plain. Warsaw, however, sees the plain as a two-way street. After all, Poland was the strongest European power during much of the 16th and 17th centuries, using the plain to extend its domination of territory from the shores of the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, the Carpathians and the Dnieper River. Therefore, whichever political entity has ruled the land that today comprises Poland has had designs on large portions of the North European Plain, and has considered the Baltic states, most of Ukraine and Belarus as falling into its sphere of influence.

Since regaining its political independence after the Cold War, however, Poland has found itself adjacent to a reunified Germany and a resurgent Russia. It has therefore depended on outside allies — in this case the United States — to assure its independence. Poland thus has no interest in a possible U.S. rapprochement with Russia, or in any delay in placing the ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems.

Poland does want Washington to give it military technology and training so it can maintain its independence — and perhaps even return to the glory days of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which flourished in the 16th and 17th centuries. For now, a period of strained relations between Warsaw and Washington due to the change in administrations can be expected. In the long-term, the United States needs a strong Poland to counterbalance an independent Germany and a resurgent Russia, but in the short-term, it needs Russian compliance with American designs for a surge in Afghanistan.

Czech Republic

Enjoying some protection thanks to low mountains and hilly terrain, the Czech Republic is still connected with the rest of Europe by the major river valleys of the Elbe, Oder, Morava and Vltava, which effectively turn the country into a gateway between the North European Plain and Central Europe. As such, the Czech Republic has rarely been able to maintain its independence, increasing its tolerance for incorporation within the confines of larger, more powerful political systems (think Austro-Hungarian Empire and Soviet Union).

Prague is therefore going to wait and see which way the wind blows before it chooses what modern political system it wants to be part of this time around. Prague’s recent announcement that it intends to delay its vote on the Lisbon Treaty, a key charter intended to streamline decision-making in the European Union, is a clear signal that it plans to hold off on committing to the EU bloc until it is assured that the Americans are committed to European security. This highlights the Czech Republic’s pragmatic way of biding its time before making decisions it cannot easily reverse.

The Obama administration will not, however, appreciate being rushed into a decision on BMD radar facilities in the Czech Republic by Prague. Washington will hope that Prague, in its six-month role as EU president, will help spearhead the campaign to secure European assistance in Afghanistan and present a unified EU front to Russia. But Prague might not be up to these tasks, both due to its lack of clout among the rest of Europe and in a bid to avoid exposing itself to Kremlin wrath without firm U.S. guarantees.

Translate

noticiarionaval

terça-feira, 31 de março de 2009

The United States, Germany and Beyond

Arquivo do blog