Femmes à bord

Femmes à bord

Par PH Jeanne d'Arc le samedi, mars 29 2008, 16:05 - Équipage - Lien permanent

Il y a encore trente ans, aucune femme n’était admise à bord d’un bâtiment de la marine nationale. Aujourd’hui les choses ont bien évolué et le taux du personnel féminin dans la marine avoisine les 12%. La Jeanne d’Arc n’est cependant pas un bâtiment féminisé, c’est-à-dire que contrairement au Georges Leygues qui compte une femme sur dix dans ses rangs, elle n’a pas été aménagée pour en embarquer un pourcentage aussi important. Le porte-hélicoptères accueille néanmoins vingt-deux femmes à bord dont treize officiers élèves et neuf officiers.

Logées bien entendu à la même enseigne que leurs confrères mais dans des postes différents, les officiers élèves féminins travaillent en journée dans les postes de leurs camarades masculins et partagent leurs activités, que ce soit en quart ou durant les exercices d’infanterie organisés par l’école en escale. Même constat chez les officiers, où les femmes occupent des fonctions diverses : le lieutenant de vaisseau Karine Foll et l’aspirant Tiphaine de Nazelle sont respectivement chef et adjointe de cabinet, les aspirants Delphine Jeanroy et Gwenola Kermorvant sont en charge de l’enseignement de l’anglais et l’aspirant Julia Beaufils est responsable du renseignement au bureau opérations. Du côté de la flottille de la 22S, le lieutenant de vaisseau Marine Bayer et l’aspirant Sylvie Poulain sont pilotes d’Alouette, et le bateau embarque depuis l’escale du Cap le lieutenant Séverine Champenois, responsable mécanique des Gazelle aux côtés du reste du personnel de l’ALAT. Enfin, la dentiste Magalie Brochard sévit quotidiennement en coursive infirmerie aux côtés de ses confrères du corps médical.

Là encore, aucune différence avec le personnel masculin, si ce n’est la coupe de cheveux (non détachés et tirés vers l’arrière) et le fameux tricorne porté avec la tenue de cérémonie, en lieu et place de la casquette affichée par les officiers masculins…

Equal Alliance, Unequal Roles

By ROBERT D. KAPLAN

Stockbridge, Mass.

WITH NATO set to hold its annual summit next week in Bucharest, there is concern that the failure of Germany and other members to carry a larger share of the burden in Afghanistan is threatening the alliance’s future. Critics complain that it has become an unequal, two-tiered alliance, with the troops of the United States, Britain, Canada and Holland taking the combat role while Germany, Italy, Spain and other members take refuge in the safe areas, refusing to put their soldiers in danger.

It certainly isn’t fair. Yet predictions of NATO’s decline hold it to an impossible cold war standard. Then, a direct mortal threat to Central Europe in the form of Red Army divisions led to an all-for-one and one-for-all mentality. Now that the threat is more subtle and diverse, NATO’s mandate, structure and personality need to change accordingly.

NATO, two-tiers or not, potentially holds as much value to the United States in the multipolar future as it did in the cold war past. Indeed, as we look at the possibility of a “Pacific Century” featuring the rise of China as a great power, combined with a resurgent Russia across Eurasia, we should see that an American-European alliance is imperative.

Let’s face it, the threat of a Taliban comeback in Afghanistan is not of the same order as the threat Germany faced from the Soviet Union, so is it any wonder that Germany’s attitude has changed? Rather than bully the Germans into doing what they’re not very good at — counterinsurgency — in the violent south of Afghanistan, we should be grateful that they’re doing something they are good at — nation-building — in the relatively peaceful north.

The same holds for countries like Italy and Spain, whose troops are also restricted to northern Afghanistan. In the post-cold-war world, individual NATO members can’t be expected to automatically take part in missions outside the alliance’s traditional European sphere. Participation will be contingent on specific circumstances. And that will lead to an increasingly stratified alliance.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO’s mandate has been a work in progress: from a sole focus on the defense of the European homeland to a three-dimensional engagement in global issues like terrorism, human rights abuses, military partnerships with fledgling democracies, energy security, nuclear proliferation and outbreaks of chaos.

This changing focus has necessitated a shift in structure, toward mobile rapid-reaction forces as opposed to cumbersome, conventional infantry units. Unfortunately, the future of the NATO Response Force, proposed in 2002 by then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to serve just these needs, is now in some doubt because of the twin burdens of NATO deployments in Afghanistan and Kosovo and the inability of most alliance members to spend at least two percent of their gross domestic products on their militaries.

In these circumstances, countries like the United States and Britain will simply have to carry a heavier burden than others. But what of it? NATO has always operated as a multi-tiered organization. During the cold war, northern countries essentially ran the show while the southern ones went meekly along (except for Greece, which often protested loudly). France, in a fit of Gaullist pique, pulled out of NATO’s unified military structure in 1966, although it remains part of the alliance and took a place on the military committee in 1995.

Had there ever been a land war in Europe, American forces would have done the overwhelming amount of the fighting, so why should Afghanistan and future armed clashes be any different? NATO forces were never deployed in a war zone during the cold war, so the inequalities within the organization were masked. Now that its forces are taking the field, those inequalities are exposed. And especially as it expands to include smaller, weaker countries in Eastern and Central Europe, it is natural that NATO should be a multi-layered enterprise, to reflect the great differences in military capabilities and public opinion among its many members.

In fact, a two-tiered NATO has certain advantages for the United States. Eastward expansion acts as a bulwark against a neo-czarist Russia. Countries close to Russia like Poland and Romania feel NATO is every bit as vital as it was to Western Europe during the cold war, which is the real reason they’ve helped us in Iraq and Afghanistan. NATO membership represents a seal of good-product approval for former east bloc states seeking investment and stabilization.

The very fact that we’re even talking about Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO shows how dynamic the alliance still is on a political level. A two-tiered NATO still keeps a retrograde Serbia in a box; this reduces Russian interference in the Balkans to the level of a significant irritant rather than a strategic threat. NATO membership sets parameters for Turkey’s democratic experiment with Islamic rule, making it more likely to succeed in ways that the West can tolerate. NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, in which second-tier members like Germany participate, gives former Soviet republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia access to NATO training programs, which helps keep them from slipping closer into the Kremlin’s orbit.

The fact that NATO forces don’t fight nearly as impressively as the American military doesn’t make the alliance useless. Even without a legitimate rapid-reaction force, it is still by world standards a well-oiled, Western political-military machine with command and control protocols honed by six decades of existence. And it is certainly superior to anything the United Nations can muster.

In fact, through its ability to participate in out-of-area humanitarian emergencies, NATO still holds the key to a potential global constabulary force that could be led by the United States while at the same time relieving the American military of the burden of going it alone.

For now, however, we must also look to expand appropriate roles for NATO members not inclined toward combat. One option is sea power. Navies make port visits, they protect sea lanes, they allow for access during humanitarian emergencies. The French, Dutch, Norwegians, Germans and Spanish have all been making serious investments in new ships, especially frigates. With the United States Navy concentrating on competition from China in the Pacific, NATO could become the primary naval force to patrol the North Atlantic and Mediterranean.

NATO is never going to be a rubber stamp for American proposals like in the darkest days of the cold war. By getting bogged down in Iraq and consequently neglecting Afghanistan, the Bush administration has forced NATO members to bear a military responsibility that many in their heart of hearts do not feel is vital to their interests.

Embryonic European pacifism needs to be carefully managed, not just condemned. That is why we must push harder for the NATO Response Force. Europe’s aversion to conflict — and its tendency to reduce geopolitics to negotiations and regulatory disputes — has not prevented all 26 NATO members from taking part in some capacity in Afghanistan. Europe, merely because of its economic weight, is going to be a significant military power in the 21st century. Our goal should be for that military power to be expressed as much as possible through an American-led alliance.

The United States will have to forge plenty of other military alliances in the 21st century: area-specific ones for the Pacific and Indian oceans; and culturally specific ones, namely the core group of Anglo-Saxon nations that have borne the brunt of responsibility in Iraq and Afghanistan. But simply because NATO cannot be an alliance of equals does not mean that it won’t play a significant role in our grand strategy: to create a web of global arrangements and liberal institutions that will allow America to gradually retreat from its costly and risky position of overbearing dominance.

Robert D. Kaplan is a national correspondent for The Atlantic and a fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington.

THE NEW FRENCH STRATEGY

March 25, 2008

Related Special Topic Page

• Europe’s Return to Power Politics

By George Friedman

French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced the week of March 16 that France is cutting its nuclear arsenal to less than 300 warheads, which he said was less than half the number France had during the Cold War. Meanwhile, plans are under way in Paris to return to full membership in NATO; Sarkozy will travel to London the week of March 23 to discuss reintegration.

Sarkozy spoke while attending the launch of France’s newest nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine in Cherbourg. During his speech, he added that, at present, none of France’s nuclear weapons is aimed at anyone. During the same appearance he said, “All those who threaten to attack our vital interests expose themselves to a severe riposte by France.” This was said in the context of discussions of Iran, which he said was among those countries in the process of developing nuclear weapons. France is simultaneously calling attention to its nuclear capability and adopting an increasingly hostile posture toward Iran. While the media focus is on Sarkozy, it seems to us that this issue goes deeper than personalities. Processes are under way that are shifting French foreign policy.

The shift is not a dramatic one yet; there is more continuity than discontinuity in French foreign policy. Like all French leaders for the last half-century, Sarkozy is focusing on his country’s strategic independence, particularly on its nuclear capability. At the same time, France is aligning itself more closely with the U.S. view of Iran, and, to some extent, with the U.S. view of the Middle East. In doing so, France is creating stresses within the European Union and reshaping its relationship with Germany. These small changes have broad implications that need to be understood.

Foreign Policy Since 1871

Since 1871, France has had two foreign policies. The year 1871 saw German unification. Prior to 1871, the fragmentation of Germany into numerous ministates secured France’s eastern frontier; France concerned itself with the rest of Atlantic Europe, particularly Spain and England. German unification redefined French geopolitics by creating a major power to its east. This major power was insecure because it was caught between France, Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. German insecurity made it a threat to France. A united Germany had to deal with the causes of that insecurity, and France was one of those causes. German unification effectively coincided with the defeat of France by Prussia, and drove home the significance of a unified Germany.

From German unification and the Franco-Prussian war until 1945, the essence of French foreign policy consisted of managing Germany. That meant France had to change its relationship with its historic rival, the United Kingdom, and keep Russia aligned with the Anglo-French alliance. For more than 80 years, French foreign policy could be boiled down to containing Germany. The strategy proved successful, assuming one accepts the losses incurred in World War I and five years of occupation during World War II. In the end, France survived.

This set in place France’s second post-1871 strategy, which evolved over the 1950s until its institutionalization by Charles de Gaulle. This postwar strategy consisted of two parts. The first part involved embedding France into multinational institutions, particularly the European Economic Community (EEC) — which evolved into the European Union — and NATO. The second part involved using these institutions to preserve French sovereignty and independence. Put differently, France’s strategy was to participate in multinational structures while using them for its own ends, or at least defining a limited relationship with the structures.

France’s overriding concern was to avoid getting caught in a third world war after having been devastated by the first two world wars. Preventing this outcome meant exploiting German disunification, effectively ending France’s primordial fear of Germany. It did this in two ways. The first involved drawing close to West Germany economically, creating a system of relationships that would make Franco-German conflict impossible. The second involved blocking the Soviet threat by participating in NATO.

France’s problem was that the deeper that it went into European institutions and NATO, the more tenuous its sovereignty became. It needed the economic and military relationship with Germany, but it had to retain its room for maneuver. More precisely, it wanted to draw closer to Germany and take advantage of a collective security scheme, but not become a client state of the United States. It therefore belonged to NATO, but pulled out of the alliance’s integrated military command structure in 1966. NATO’s military structure made certain responses to a Soviet invasion automatic. France refused to allow its response to be automatic, but remained committed to collective defense.

France was concerned with maximizing its autonomy, but it had a deeper fear as well. The defense of Western Europe was predicated on U.S. intervention. The doctrine of massive response held that, in the event of a Soviet invasion that could not be contained conventionally, the United States would use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. The U.S. position was thus to initiate a nuclear war that would potentially see America’s cities decimated, all in order to protect Europe.

The French problem, however, was that Paris would not know whether Washington would honor this commitment until after the initiation of hostilities. From the French point of view, it would be irrational for the United States to invite its own devastation to protect Europe. Therefore, the American commitment was at best untestable. At worst, it was an implausible and transparent attempt to jeopardize Europe so as to deter a Soviet attack without the United States risking anything fundamental.

An Independent Deterrent

The need to protect French sovereignty intersected with what Paris saw as a genuine requirement to maintain a military capability outside the framework of NATO, all the while remaining part of NATO and the EEC. France wanted NATO to function. It wanted to be close to Germany. And it wanted a set of options outside the context of NATO that would guarantee that France would not be reoccupied, this time by the Soviets.

The decision to construct an independent French nuclear deterrent was based on this reasoning. As de Gaulle put it, France wanted to retain the ability to tear off an arm if the Soviets attacked France through Germany. It was unsure whether the United States would act to deter the Soviet Union, but even a small nuclear force in the hands of a power likely to suffer occupation — and thus a force very likely to be used — would deter the Soviets. Therefore, the French developed (and retain) the nuclear force that Sarkozy decided to cut but not eliminate.

This issue remained at the heart of U.S.-French tensions both during and after the Cold War. The American view was that the United States and all of Western Europe (plus some Mediterranean countries) had a vested interest in resisting the Soviets, and they could do so most effectively by joining in multilateral economic and military organizations allowing them to operate in concert. The Americans viewed the French reluctance to follow suit as France seeking a free ride. From the American point of view, the U.S. bore the brunt of the cost of defending Europe, as well as underwriting Europe’s economic recovery in the early years. France benefited from both, and would benefit as long as the United States defended Germany. Paris wanted the benefits of the American presence without committing itself to burden-sharing. Put another way, how could the Americans be certain that, in the event of war, France would protect Germany, Italy or Turkey? Perhaps Paris would remain alo of unless France were attacked.

The French mistrust of the credibility of U.S. commitment to Europe collided with American mistrust of French reasons for being part of NATO without committing itself to collaborate automatically in NATO’s response to the Soviets. France was comfortable with this ambiguity. It needed it. It needed to integrate economically with the Germans, to be part of NATO, but to retain its own options for national defense. If this meant increasing American distrust, and even a sense of betrayal, this was something France must tolerate to achieve its strategic goals.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, France entered a new strategic phase. The French responded to the Soviet collapse and to German reunification by maintaining and extending its core policy. It remained ambiguously part of NATO, participating as it saw fit. It really concentrated on transforming the European Union into a multinational federation, with its own integrated foreign policy and defense policy.

This position appears paradoxical. On the one hand, France wanted to maintain its national sovereignty and freedom of action. On the other, it wanted to be a counterbalance to the United States and to draw ever closer to Germany — permanently eliminating the historic danger from its eastern neighbor, however distant the German threat might appear under current circumstances. France could not resist the United States alone. It could do so only in the context of a European federation, which would of course include the critical French relationship with Germany.

Independence vs. Europe

France therefore had to choose between a wholly independent foreign policy and federation with Europe. It tried to have its cake and eat it too. It supported the principle of federation, and within this federation it sought a particularly close relationship with Germany. But its view of this new federation was that while, in a formal sense, France would abandon a degree of sovereignty, in practical terms — so long as France could be the senior partner to Germany — the French would dominate a European federation. In effect, federation would open the door to a Europe directed, if not dominated, by Paris.

This is why Central Europe revolted against French President Jacques Chirac on the eve of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The Central Europeans were not particularly enthusiastic about the war, but they were far less enthusiastic about Chirac’s actions. From their point of view, he was using the Iraq issue to create a European bloc, led by France in opposition to the United States. For a country such as Poland that had relied on French (and British) guarantees prior to World War II, the idea that France should lead a Europe in opposition to the United States was unacceptable. Chirac gave a famous press conference in which he condemned the Central European rejection of French opposition to the invasion as representing nations that were “not well brought up.” This was the moment in which French frustration welled over.

France was not going to get the federation it hoped for. Too many countries of Europe wanted to retain their freedom of action, this time from France. They were not opposed to economic union, but the creation of a federation with a joint foreign and defense policy was not enthusiastically greeted by smaller European countries (and some not-so-small countries such as Britain, Spain and Italy). As anti-federationism grew, it swept forward to include France as well, which rejected the European constitution in a plebiscite.

This moment was the existential crisis that created the Sarkozy presidency. Sarkozy has raised two questions that have been fundamental to France. The first is France’s relationship to Germany. France has been obsessed with Germany since 1871, at first hostile, later nearly married, but always obsessed. The second question relates to France’s relationship to the United States. Chirac represented postwar Gaullism’s view in its most extreme form: Convert European institutions into a French-dominated multinational force to balance U.S. power. This attempt collapsed, so Sarkozy had to define the relationship France might have with the United States if France could not counterbalance the United States.

The Mediterranean Union

The questions of Germany and of the United States were addressed in the French idea of a Mediterranean Union. Since German unification in 1871, France has obsessed about the north German plain. But France is also a Mediterranean power, with long-term interests in North Africa and the Middle East in such countries as Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon and Syria. Where Germany is entirely a northern European power, France is not. Therefore, Chirac proposed that, in addition to being a member of the European Union, France should create a separate and distinct Mediterranean Europe. The latter grouping would include the rest of th e Mediterranean basin, extending as far as Turkey and Israel. It would exclude non-Mediterranean powers such as Germany and Britain, however.

France had no intention of withdrawing from the European Union, but saw the Mediterranean Union as a supplemental relationship, and argued that it would allow EU expansion without actually admitting new EU members. The Germans saw this as a French attempt to become Europe’s strategic pivot, leading both unions and serving as the only member that was both a northern European and a Mediterranean power. The Germans did not like this scenario one bit. The French then backed off, but did not abandon the idea.

If the French are going to be a Mediterranean power, they must also be a Middle Eastern power. If they are playing in the Middle East, they must redefine their relationship with the United States. Sarkozy has done that by drawing systematically closer to American views on Iran, Syria and Lebanon. In other words, to pursue this new course, the French have drawn away from the Germans and closer to the Americans.

This is all very early in the game, and the moves so far are very small. But the French have slightly backed off from their German obsession and their fear of the United States. The collapse of European federationism has set off a reconsideration of France’s global role, a reconsideration that will — if continued — radically redefine France’s core relationships. What the French are doing is what they have done for years: They are looking for maximum freedom of action for France without undue risk. Though France has long pursued its interests with consistency, its current moves are different. It appears to be pulling away from Germany and seeking power in the Mediterranean. And that means working with the Americans.

The big loser in Latin America has been the USA

Reading the resolution of the Colombian conflict

Franklin W Knight Wednesday, March 19, 2008

Earlier this month the Colombian military conducted a secret unilateral military operation across its frontier with Ecuador. It attacked a camp of the decades-old Colombian guerrilla organisation, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia that goes by its Spanish acronym, FARC. The attack killed about 16 fighters including Luis Edgar Devia,
whose nom de guerre was Raúl Reyes, the important international FARC spokesman, and second in command of the terrorist organisation, and yielded a considerable amount of internal information from captured computers. The attack set off a small but intense verbal firestorm across northern South America and briefly threatened to break out into open international war.

Hugo Chávez used his regular presidential television broadcast to condemn the frontier invasion of a neighbouring state, to break diplomatic relations with Colombia, and to rush thousands of Venezuelan troops to his frontier with Colombia. Rafael Correa, the left-leaning present of Ecuador, responded by breaking diplomatic relations as well as preparing his army for possible retaliatory action. Daniel Ortega, former leftist firebrand and currently president of Nicaragua, recalled his ambassador from Bogotá in solidarity. Other Latin American heads of state deplored the act, but few were willing to speak openly or suggest the sort of drastic action taken by Nicaragua, Ecuador and Venezuela.

Despite the urgent gravity of the situation and the sensationalised international press reports, matters were never as close to war as they appeared. Chávez might have a lot of money and a mouth that attracts attention, but the regular Colombian army is larger and better supplied than the combined forces of Venezuela and Ecuador. And economically both countries need their big neighbour. The Venezuelan troop movement was more a dramatic military parade than serious preparation for war. By March 8 the crisis was over, amicably resolved at a regular meeting of the Rio Group Heads of State of Latin America and the Caribbean held in Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic.

The crisis and its resolution provide an interesting and informative window into the changing relations in the Americas over the past decades. Latin America and the Caribbean are producing some remarkably mature, responsible and competent political leaders. Little by little the region is turning to Brazil to shoulder the leadership and resolution of regional crises. As it did in Haiti after the overthrow of Aristide, Brazil again assumed the mantle in Santo Domingo.

Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, the president of Brazil, currently in his final term of office, remains among the most respected heads of state in the Western Hemisphere. Continuing the good policies of his predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Lula has overseen the gradual rise of Brazil as one of the leading economic countries in the world. His domestic social policies have reduced poverty by nearly one-half, and his independent foreign policy has won enormous international respect for Brazil as it comfortably moves into super-power status.

The big loser in Latin America has been the USA. It has been steadily losing influence and respect across the region since 1971 when it devalued its dollar. In the past decades it has not demonstrated mutual respect for its neighbours. It engineered the overthrow of the democratically elected president of Chile, Salvador Allende, in 1973. It intervened in several member states, including El Salvador, Nicaragua,
Panama, and Grenada. Between 2000 and 2005 under its Plan Colombia, the United States poured almost US5 billion in aid to Colombia, largely to eradicate narcotics trafficking, and it aggressively tried to use the Organisation of American States as an extension of US foreign policy. Indeed, the Rio Group was formed in 1986 precisely to counter this heavy-handed US approach to hemispheric affairs.

President Álvaro Uribe used some the US aid to bolster his national military, and the attack of March 1 was a manifest demonstration of this. But if the military situation improved against the FARC and its smaller rival, the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), national sovereignty remains almost as elusive as ever. Colombia is not a sovereign state.
Large swaths of the country remain outside the effective control of the central government, especially along the frontiers with Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and Brazil. Still, the national economy has been growing impressively. Colombia is a major consumer commodity supplier for Ecuador and Venezuela. Nevertheless, unemployment remains high and Colombia supplies the lion's share of cocaine and heroin sold on the streets in the United States.

FARC and the ELN were big losers after Santo Domingo. Neither group is as strong as it used to be militarily. Present estimates claim a military strength of less than 5,000 fighters in the ELN and less than 11,000 in FARC. That is less than half of what they were about 10 years ago. Then they were militant Marxist ideologues seeking to capture the central political apparatus of the Colombian state. Along the way, they diversified into extortion, kidnapping, and narco-trafficking. Neither guerrilla group has the ability to operate within Colombia with their previous impunity. Moreover, both FARC and the ELN failed to have their status upgraded from terrorist groups to legitimate insurgents in Santo Domingo.

Last week was an especially bad one for FARC. It lost two very important senior figures. The Colombian army killed Luis Devia. Manuel Jesús Muñoz, also known as Iván Ríos, was killed in an internal dispute. His supporters presented an amputated hand and his computer to the army, probably hoping to receive the US$5 million ransom for Muñoz.

The border incident did not provide Hugo Chávez with his finest hour. His attempt to use the incident as a major anti-American slogan fest largely fell on deaf ears. While it is well known that the USA has been providing military aid to Colombia, there was no evidence that this time the cross-border incursion was a proxy United States intervention.
Moreover, Chávez unsuccessfully attempted to enlist Lula against Colombia. He did, however, get Uribe to drop the threat of filing a complaint with the International Criminal Court that Chávez is a financial supporter of FARC.

The Santo Domingo meeting shows that Latin America and the Caribbean no longer depend on the United States to resolve regional problems. This represents a major step forward in intra-regional cooperation and indicates a commendable maturation of the Organisation of American States.

NEW SUBMARINE RESCUE SYSTEM

NEW SUBMARINE RESCUE SYSTEM The new submarine rescue system, seen here during trials off the coast of Norway, has already dived to a depth of 610 meters. (UK MoD photo) A new submarine rescue system, owned jointly by France, Norway and the UK, has successfully completed trials off the coast of Norway. The free-swimming rescue vehicle concluded a successful 'mate' with the Norwegian submarine Uredd at 87 metres in Husnes Fjord, just south of Bergen, last month. In the same trials the vehicle completed a deep dive to 610 metres to demonstrate its vast capability. While not all the deep water acceptance trials were completed in full, there were enough key events for the trials to be declared a success. Trials to include testing hatch operations at depth, angled 'mating' up to 60 degrees and the ability to recover the vehicle from rough seas will take place soon. When it comes into service it promises to offer a complete rescue package for trapped submariners, should the unthinkable happen on their submarine, anywhere in the world. "The NATO submarine rescue system is nearing the end of a complex period which has combined design, development,manufacture and demonstration," said Commander Dickie Burston, leader of Defence Equipment & Support's NATO Submarine Rescue System team. "It will now move forward and provide the nations with a world class capability." The system is jointly owned by France, Norway and the UK and will provide an effective rescue capability within a whole life cost of £157 million over 30 years. It will complement the new US Submarine Rescue Diving and Recompression System based in San Diego. Both are due in service this year, are capable of worldwide deployment and will be available to all submarine-operating nations. The system consists of a free-swimming rescue vehicle with an A-frame portable launch and recovery system, a transfer under pressure facility to safely decompress personnel from a pressurised submarine, and an intervention system for survey and rescue preparation. It is at the final stage of a three-year design and manufacture period under a ten-year contract with Rolls-Royce Power Engineering including support and operation. For the trials last month, the system was mobilised to the mother ship Harstad, a Norwegian coastguard vessel, which sailed from Glasgow on 26 January 2008. The system comfortably survived a rough passage to Cape Wrath which saw 74-knot winds, 10-metre seas and 30-degree pitching. All systems operated correctly on reaching Norway. Four full mating sequences were completed, with stores being passed through the hatches of the Norwegian submarine. Crew from the submarine, including the captain, clambered up into the vehicle for a look around. On its deepest dive the rescue vehicle, which has previously been pressure tested to depths of 840 metres, went down in 100m steps to just over 600m with full system checks at each depth. Cdr Burston said: "Tom Heron, the senior pilot and one of the most experienced submarine rescue operators in the world was delighted with the trial, commenting on the stability, manoeuvrability and power available and how solid she felt at 610m, with none of the usual creaks and groans heard at great depths." Further trials are planned over the next six months. Deployment next month from the MV Argonaute provided by the French Navy will include a two-day medical exercise to test the transfer under pressure facility and develop casualty handling and co-ordination of rescuees. Air portability trials, training and more exercises will continue in the summer and there may be full participation in NATO's exercise 'Bold Monarch' off Norway in late May and early June 2008. The project is managed by the MOD's Defence Equipment & Support team on behalf of the three nations. When in service it will be managed by In Service Submarines Integrated Project Team and the existing LR5 rescue submersible and Scorpio remotely operated vehicle will leave operational service. For Cdr Burston the tests have been a major milestone: "As a former submarine commander I do not expect submarines to sink," he said. "They are well designed, built and maintained, the crews are highly trained and the boats are well operated. "But it is not possible to guard against all eventualities and completely eradicate equipment failure, human error and just plain accidents. "Submarines still hit uncharted sea-bed pinnacles or have major fires on board and, while the crews manage to get them safely back to port on almost every occasion, if a submarine should sink and some of the crew remain alive on board, it is fundamental that the navies are able to effect rescue. "The submarine rescue system will give us and any other nation that wishes to be associated an outstanding cost-effective solution to the accident that we hope will never happen again." An extra challenge facing the team is to find a name for the rescue vehicle. "SRV1 sounds rather dull," said a team member. "An appropriate name is needed to reflect its role in saving life from great depths at sea." The system at a glance: -- the system will be based at Faslane on the Clyde -- it will be maintained at 12 hours' notice to mobilise by road and air to a mother ship -- it can rescue a crew from depths of 40 to 610m, at angles of up to 60 degrees and with internal pressures as high as 6 bar -- it will be fully air portable but will operate in sea state 6 (5m high waves) and remain on station in 10m seas -- size, weight, strength and flexibility have been balanced to ensure fast mobilisation and reliable commissioning to meet a time to first rescue target of 72 hours -- the vehicle is powered by advanced sodium nickel batteries with higher power-to-weight/space ratio than traditional lead acid batteries used in current rescue vehicles -- a fibre optic umbilical will provide video, communications and data link to the command team on the mother ship -- the vehicle, designed and built by Perry Slingsby System Ltd of Kirkbymoorside, will have a crew of two pilots and an attendant, can rescue 15 people at a time and will normally operate a four-hour cycle.

Un nouveau sous-marin géant sort des chantiers de Cherbourg

DCNS : Un nouveau sous-marin géant sort des chantiers de Cherbourg

Le SNLE Le Terrible sort de son hall de construction sur des marcheurs crédits : DCNS

21/03/2008

Caché depuis de longs mois dans son hall de construction de DCNS, à Cherbourg, Le Terrible est désormais à l'air libre. La cérémonie de transfert du sous-marin nucléaire lanceur d'engins se déroulera aujourd'hui, en présence du président de la République. Vitrine technologique pour l'industrie française, le nouveau bâtiment viendra compléter, en 2010, les effectifs de la force océanique stratégique, qui alignera alors quatre SNLE de seconde génération. Les trois premiers sous-marins du type Le Triomphant, mis en service en 1997, 1999 et 2004, seront toutefois modernisés, reprenant les évolutions intégrées sur le Terrible. Le quatrième sous-marin de nouvelle génération tient, en effet, plus du prototype que du navire de série. Il bénéficiera notamment d'un nouveau système de combat, le SYCOBS, dont il partagera le noyau avec les six futurs sous-marins nucléaires d'attaque du type Barracuda. Doté d'une nouvelle suite sonar, le Terrible sera également le premier SNLE français à mettre en oeuvre le missile balistique M51, qui remplacera le M45 actuellement en service. La portée du futur engin, qui sera embarqué à raison de 16 unités par SNLE, sera supérieure à 9000 kilomètres et variera suivant le nombre de têtes nucléaires embarquées.
Long de 138 mètres pour un déplacement prévu d'environ 14.000 tonnes en plongée, le Terrible doit effectuer début 2009 sa première sortie en mer. Il remplacera l'Inflexible, dernier SNLE du type Le Redoutable, qui a rejoint Cherbourg en janvier, afin que son coeur nucléaire soit démantelé.

Navio de Assistência Hospitalar para oPantanal

Marinha do Brasil adquire mais um Navio de Assistência Hospitalar

Com a finalidade de intensificar as Ações de Assistência Cívico-Social (ACISO) e Assistência Hospitalar (ASSHOP) para atendimento às populações ribeirinhas, principalmente nos municípios de Corumbá, Porto Murtinho, Ladário e Cáceres, todas localizadas em Mato Grosso do Sul, a Marinha do Brasil adquiriu mais um Navio de Assistência Hospitalar (NAsH). Atualmente, já existe NAsH na região amazônica, num total de três unidades.

O propósito deste tipo de navio é prover assistência médico-hospitalar, odontológica e sanitária às populações ribeirinhas; conduzir campanhas de medicina preventiva com ênfase nas imunizações contra as viroses infantis, patologias endêmicas e controle de doenças transmissíveis; e coletar material para pesquisas de doenças tropicais ao longo das comissões.

As comissões são programadas de forma a atender cada pólo de saúde pelo menos duas vezes a cada ano. A programação é condicionada pelo regime de cheia dos rios. Outra importante tarefa é a realização de campanhas educativas sobre segurança do tráfego aquaviário.

A presença de um NAsH na região do Comando do 6° Distrito Naval (Com6ºDN), com sede na cidade de Ladário/MS, atenderá também às necessidades de apoio logístico durante os deslocamentos das tropas e dos navios, por ocasião das Operações na faixa de fronteira.

Além disso, esse navio poderá ser empregado em apoio à Defesa Civil dos Governos do Mato Grosso e Mato Grosso do Sul, bem como no auxílio às Prefeituras das cidades circunvizinhas aos principais rios do Pantanal, por ocasião de calamidades públicas ou quaisquer outras atividades que requeiram um navio com a capacidade de levar atendimento médico-odontolológico aos menos assistidos.

A maior concentração de ribeirinhos encontra-se no município de Corumbá, onde existem aproximadamente 30 localidades povoadas com total de mais de 300 famílias.

Em algumas localidades a presença dos nossos navios constitui-se no único atendimento médico e odontológico regular de que os ribeirinhos dispõem ao longo do ano.

Sonar S-Cube pour équiper les deux sous-marins équatoriens

Thales vend ses sonars pour moderniser les sous-marins équatoriens

Un sous-marin du type 209 (Illustration) crédits : DR

17/03/2008

Le groupe français fournira une suite sonar S-Cube pour équiper les deux sous-marins équatoriens du type 209. Thales a décroché le contrat dans le cadre du programme de refonte des bâtiments, confié au groupe chilien Asmar. « Prouvé à la mer, le système S-Cube présente l'avantage de risques maîtrisés à un prix très compétitif, pour satisfaire les besoins exprimés par la Marine équatorienne. Cette solution s'appuie sur la même technologie que celle installée par Thales sur les sous-marins français et britanniques. Elle sera adaptée à un environnement plus compact », souligne l'électronicien. Ce dernier estime que la solution retenue par son client « offre des performances exceptionnelles, notamment grâce à son antenne de flanc et son algorithmie de pointe, en particulier son traitement adaptatif en service auprès de nombreuses marines ». Grâce à ce contrat, Thales pénètre le marché de remise à niveau des équipements sonar à bord de sous-marins d'origine allemande.
Ce positionnement est également valable pour DCNS, qui va assurer la fourniture du nouveau système de combat (SDC) des bâtiments équatoriens. Le groupe naval de défense, détenu à 25% par Thales, avait déjà assuré la modernisation des SDC des types 209 chiliens et vénézuéliens.

La longue marche du SNLE Le Terrible

Cherbourg : La longue marche du SNLE Le Terrible a commencé

Le SNLE Le Téméraire a été admis au service actif en 1999 crédits : DELEGATION GENERALE POUR L'ARMEMENT

17/03/2008

Le transfert du sous-marin nucléaire lanceur d'engins Le Terrible vers son dispositif de mise à flot a débuté vendredi. Jusqu'à la fin de la semaine, le SNLE est déplacé de quelques centimètres chaque heure par une quarantaine de robots mobiles. Cette longue marche sera achevée vendredi, date à laquelle une cérémonie aura lieu à DCNS pour marquer cette étape importante dans la construction du sous-marin, qui sera par la suite mis à l'eau. Au terme d'une période d'achèvement, le Terrible fera sa première sortie en mer début 2009 en vue d'être livré un an plus tard. Quatrième SNLE du type Le Triomphant, Le Terrible, s'il reprend la coque de ses trois aînés, tient plus du prototype que du navire de série. Il sera, en effet, le premier à être doté du missile balistique M51, qui remplacera le M45 actuellement en service. Le bâtiment disposera également d'un nouveau système de combat, le SYCOBS, développé pour équiper également les six sous-marins nucléaires d'attaque du type Barracuda, dont Cherbourg débutera la livraison en 2017.
Les Triomphant, Téméraire et Vigilant bénéficieront de ces évolutions après refonte. Le Vigilant, mis en service en 2004, sera le premier à être modernisé à l'horizon 2010/2011. Les travaux seront menés par DCNS à Brest.
Long de 138 mètres pour un déplacement d'environ 14.000 tonnes en plongée, le Terrible sera doté de 16 missiles M51 et d'un panachage de torpilles (F17 puis FTL) et de missiles antinavire Exocet SM39.
Le coût du SNLE n°4 est évalué à 2.4 milliards d'euros, hors coûts de développement et de fabrication des nouveaux missiles.

USS San Antonio (LPD 17) a more capable first wave

USS San Antonio (LPD 17)

A number of people have called attention to the very good pictures recently added to the Navy Newsstand website of the USS San Antonio (LPD 17) well deck. These are excellent photos, I don't remember ever seeing pictures this good of well deck operations on amphibious ships in the past.

The dedicated space for the AAV platoon is going to give all kinds of options to future loading plans. The big change these pictures remind us of is that the AAV platoon has its own stowage on the LPD-17, where on the Austins they would usually sit on the well deck.

These pictures also appear to reveal the Iwo Jima ESG will include the USS Carter Hall (LSD 50). That got us to think about something.

USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
USS San Antonio (LPD 17)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)

Adding up those three ships amounts to around 62,800 vehicle square and 211,700 cargo square. That appears to be only about 3200 vehicle square short of what was reportedly taken by the 24th MEU recently forward deployed by the USNS Algol to Afghanistan. That must make Marines very happy. For comparison purposes, the three ships of the Tarawa ESG currently in the Persian Gulf has around 50,700 vehicle square and 149,300 cargo square.

In other words, the LPD-17 class not only adds tremendous vehicle and cargo square for the MEUs being deployed, but because they have stowage for the AAV platoon, they allow for more ship to shore connectors for the MEU. The effect is a more capable first wave, or what we think could potentially become a method ground forces are utilized in the long war for dealing with ungoverned regions, a quick assault. Basically the fast assault by air or sea of mobile specialized units against an enemy stronghold, but includes a rapid, complete extraction. That may sound strange, but there are dozens of places today that would be legitimate targets if the military wasn't engaged in Iraq, with at least 3 locations in Somalia.

When looking at the first wave of an MEU landing, consider the following. With 4 LCACs, and 2 LCUs a first wave can include:

1 AAV platoon with 1 Marine Rifle Company (self deploy)
1 M1A1 Platoon with 4 tanks, 2 per LCU
2 LAV Detachments, 16 total, 4 per LCAC

It is also noteworthy that a Whidbey Island class LSD would provide for 6 LCACs and 2 LCUs per ESG, and the option offered there is the ability to land a full LAR company (24 LAVs) in one wave with 6 LCACs.

That is before you factor in 12 MV-22s and 4 CH-53Es for the first wave.

Doha International Maritime Defence Exhibition,

	DCNS will exhibit at DIMDEX 2008, the Doha International Maritime Defence Exhibition, which will be held in Doha (Qatar), from 17 to 19 March 2008. DCNS is a major player on the European and world markets for value-added naval defence systems. As a naval prime contractor, shipbuilder and systems integrator, DCNS combines resources and expertise spanning the naval defence value chain and entire system lifecycles. DCNS delivers innovative solutions from integrated warships to strategic systems, equipment and services. The DCNS stand showcases: -- The FREMM multimission frigates programme combines the latest technologies developed by the DCNS group. These technological and engineering advances will make the FREMM frigates world leaders in their class. Out of 27 FREMM, France and Italy have already ordered a first batch of 10 (8 for France and 2 for Italy). -- The innovative Gowind family of corvettes for littoral defence, anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare, and maritime safety and security. Compared with its smaller sisters, the Gowind® 200 offers enhanced anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Bulgaria opted for theses corvettes to modernize their naval forces. -- DCNS will showcase its expertise in submarine design and construction, through the Scorpene medium-size submarines. Scorpene SSKs – already chosen by the Chilean Navy, the Malaysian Navy and the Indian Navy – feature state of the art developments derived directly from France’s nuclear submarines experience. They offer outstanding performance and cost effectiveness ratios. -- To emphasize its experience in strategic systems and equipment DCNS is also displaying the Mesma AIP system to extend submarine submerged endurance three to four fold and significantly improve operational performance, -- Through its proven capacity to design and deliver the CMS, DCNS’s new families of CMS products include the Setis, DCNS’s new-generation CMS for new-generation DCNS-designed surface combatants. Setis combines the performance that made the Senit range a success with the benefits of state-of-the-art information and communication technologies (ICT). Based on a modular architecture, Setis CMS systems can be readily integrated with a wide range of combat systems and their functional sophistication tailored to the ship’s missions (corvette, frigate, aircraft carrier, force projection vessel, etc.). -- To illustrate its experience in strategic systems and equipment, DCNS is also displaying the Sylver vertical launchers. These compact, lightweight modules can be tailored to suit a range of warship architectures and are easily installed. They offer high launch rates while guaranteeing the safety of ship and crew in the event of a missile malfunction. An inherently simple design ensures high reliability and ease of maintenance. DCNS also offers a full range of naval services, including through-life support (TLS), modernisations and training. DCNS is actively integrating e-maintenance into its guaranteed-availability TLS services. Internet technologies enable customer and service provider to share system status data and operating parameters in near-realtime. DCNS is also assessing the potential of state-of-the-art diagnostic and prognostic tools to further improve warship availability.

Continental Shelf Confusion Over Detritus Of The Deep

Continental Shelf Confusion Over Detritus Of The Deep

http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB120363436202384279.html


Board of Scientists Is Swamped By Claims For Rich Sea Floors


SCIENCE JOURNAL


By ROBERT LEE HOTZ


February 22, 2008; Page B1


Few people know of Alexandre Albuquerque. The 67-year-old retired Brazilian naval commander slips in and out of New York several times a year, unnoticed among dignitaries and tourists around the United Nations Plaza. There, in a windowless fourth-floor conference room, he works in secrecy to redraw the economic map of the oceans.


An expert in maritime boundaries, Mr. Albuquerque is brokering


[DOES THE TERM 'BROKERING' IN THIS CONTEXT MEAN 'MEDIATING'??? OR, DOES IT MEAN 'NEGOTIATING'??? IF THE GOAL IS TRULY THE SECURING OF POLITICAL CONSENSUS, AS NOTED BELOW, DOES THE TERM 'BROKERING' REALLY INVOLVE BOTH??? IF SO, THEN WHAT IS THE ACTUAL ROLE THAT SCIENCE SERVES?? ]


As international legal deadlines come due next year, economic ambitions in up to 60 countries ride on his technical acumen -- and limited time.


Mr. Albuquerque is the new chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, a part-time group of 21 geoscientists from around the world who serve as sole referee for coastal sea-floor claims brought under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.


Already, the commission has more than it can handle. It expects as many as 50 new sea-floor claims to be filed by the May 2009 submission deadline for many treaty signatories.


(The U.S. hasn't signed the Law of the Sea convention.) Those claims may take decades to settle, with trillions of dollars in untapped mineral resources held in abeyance.


The commission has pressed in vain for more funding to review so much new data. The delays are "not fair to the coastal states," says Mr. Albuquerque.


"We are part-timers; we have other jobs," adds commissioner Peter Croker, an Irish petroleum expert and former chairman who helped to prepare Ireland's Law of the Sea claim. "Are we up to the task? Not really, to be honest."


[THE WORLD'S GOVERNMENTS ARE DEPENDING ON THE EXPERTISE OF PART-TIMERS WHO ARE OVER-WORKED AND UNDER-PAID TO SECURE THEIR SOVEREIGN CLAIMS TO THE OCEANS' BOTTOM??? IS THIS WHAT THE U.S. NAVY IS HANGING ITS ADMIRAL'S HAT ON??]


At Mr. Albuquerque's conference table, science substitutes for gunboat diplomacy. Rising to greet a recent visitor, Mr. Albuquerque -- 6 feet, 2 inches tall with curly white hair -- smiles discreetly. It is a measure of his delicate position that, in granting a rare interview as chairman, Mr. Albuquerque has to be circumspect about his work. He is bound by the treaty that employs him to keep commission proceedings and details of claims confidential.


Mr. Albuquerque is by training a hydrographer. For 20 years, he helped map Brazil's continental shelf and still works for its directorate of hydrography and navigation. Since 1991, he has devoted his professional life to the 600 words of Article 76 of the Law of the Sea, which in archaic and elusive terms defines the borders of the ocean floor and any allowable claim to it.


Policing this scientific frontier, Mr. Albuquerque and his colleagues parse the technical nuances of sea slopes and sediments in the voluminous data submitted by countries seeking, or challenging, authority over bands of ocean floor up to 150 miles beyond the existing 200-mile limit.


CLAIMING THE DEEP


It's been called the last drawing of the boundaries on our planet and it is up to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf3 to ensure that national claims to coastal sea-floor territories are scientifically sound, under the terms of Article 764 of the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of The Sea.


GNS Science5, a New Zealand government-owned research organization, offers a primer6 on Article 76 and its formal definitions of land mass, continental shelf, and deep ocean floor.


New Zealand's Continental Shelf Project Team7 wrote a booklet8 on the challenges they encountered in applying Article 76 to the real-world submarine morphology and geology of the Southwest Pacific.


Last October, the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing9 on the Law of The Sea, which the U.S. has not signed. The staff of U.S. Sen. Richard G. Lugar, the committee's ranking Republican, assembled a FAQ10 on the U.S. and the UN convention.


In the meantime, an extensive sea-floor mapping effort has been underway at The University of New Hampshire's Law of The Sea Mapping Project11. Since 2003, researchers have been collecting multi-beam bathymetry and acoustic backscatter data that can be used to support claims by the U.S. and other countries to the extended continental shelf in the Pacific, the Arctic and the Atlantic.


What is at stake? "Money. Money, of course," Mr. Albuquerque says. Contested areas of the Arctic, for example, may contain 25% of the world's oil and gas. "The commission is important to allow countries to make agreements among themselves in a peaceful way, instead of struggling for resources."


Countries must justify any expansion of their underwater territory with sonar surveys, seismic readings, gravity maps, depth charts and geomagnetic tracings. All must pass muster with Mr. Albuquerque and his board.


The commission doesn't have the authority to settle any maritime disputes between countries. Instead, it works toward consensus on the scientific details of each sea-floor claim. "The commission is not entitled to tell the coastal states what to do and how to do it. Our work is to verify, check, examine," Mr. Albuquerque says. "Of course, we have doubts, and then we have questions. We cannot say we accept or reject. We examine the submission and make recommendations."


[IF THE COMMISSION DOESN'T HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO SETTLE DISPUTES AND IS UNABLE TO ENFORCE ITS DETERMINATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS, THEN WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE SUBMITTING COUNTRY DISAGREES?? WHEN OTHER COUNTRIES DISAGREE?? COUNTRIES ARE NOT BOUND TO ACCEPT THE COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS. THEN WHAT?? MORE APPEALS??]


Once a coastal country accepts the commission's recommendations, however, the maritime borders are "final and binding," by the terms of the 1982 convention. There are NO provisions for appeal, and the jurisdiction of any international court has not been tested.


The 11-year-old commission has been working on the nine claims submitted since it began accepting cases in 2001. They have yet to finalize most rulings, requesting more precise data.


the largest peacetime expansion of national territories in modern memory, encompassing millions of square miles of potentially rich reserves of oil, gas and minerals on unclaimed coastal sea floor.[NONE OF WHICH HAVE COME TO RESOLUTION - A VERY EFFICIENT PROCESS!]


It's expensive to open a case. New Zealand reportedly budgeted $40 million to prepare its submission. New Zealand and Australia each are said to seek half a million square miles or more of sea floor. Russia wants the North Pole. It also seeks portions of the surrounding Arctic sea floor; so do Canada, Denmark and Norway. A hard copy of data from the Russian Federation could fill the conference room from floor to ceiling.


No one outside the proceedings knows all the technical details of the territory at stake; the commission makes public only a summary of each submission.


Should it ratify the treaty, the U.S. is poised to claim areas in the Arctic, the Pacific and the Atlantic that encompass an area the size of California, with resources valued at an estimated $1.3 trillion. The Bush administration sought Senate approval of the treaty this year but that now appears unlikely, a senior U.S. State Department official said. Opponents fear U.N. interference in U.S. sovereign affairs.



Hyperlinks in this Article:
(1) http://forums.wsj.com/viewtopic.php? t=1491
(2) http://forums.wsj.com/viewtopic.php? t=1491
(3) http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm
(4) http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part6.htm
(5) http://www.gns.cri.nz/
(6) http://www.unclosnz.org.nz/prolongation.html
(7) http://www.linz.govt.nz/docs/hydrography/currentprojects/continentalshelf/newsletter-apr06.pdf
(8) http://www.unclosnz.org.nz/booklet.html
(9) http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/hearings/2007/hrg071004a.html
(10) http://lugar.senate.gov/sfrc/questions.html
(11) http://ccom.unh.edu/index.php? page=image_gallery/photos.php&p=26273134353946475152799495&page=law_of_the_sea.php (12) mailto:sciencejournal@wsj.com
(13) http://forums.wsj.com/viewtopic.php? t=1491

La frégate saoudienne Makkah enfin remise à l'eau

La frégate saoudienne Makkah enfin remise à l'eau
13/03/2008





Livrée par DCNS en avril 2004, la frégate Makkah a été, selon nos informations, remise à flot à Djeddah. Le 3 décembre 2004, le navire, alors flambant neuf, avait été gravement endommagé après avoir abordé à pleine vitesse un récif, suite à une erreur de navigation. L'accident a provoqué des dégâts très importants, la coque étant notamment déchirée sur plusieurs dizaines de mètres. Après un long passage en cale sèche, le navire est donc de nouveau à flot. Il n'est, pour autant, pas encore opérationnel. Les différents équipements, dont une partie a été endommagé, doivent être progressivement remis en service après plus de trois ans d'inactivité.




Dépassant 4800 tonnes à pleine charge, les frégates F 3000 (Al Riyadh, Makkah et Al Damman) ont été assemblées à Lorient. Dérivées des La Fayette françaises, leur armement comprend 8 missiles antinavires Exocet MM40, un système SAAM (16 missiles Aster 15), une tourelle de 76 mm et quatre tubes lance-torpilles. Côté senseurs, elles disposent d'un radar multifonctions Arabel (pour le guidage des Aster) et un radar de veille Jupiter.
Les trois bâtiments font partie du programme Sawari II.

Herakles : Le radar qui tourne... vraiment très vite

Herakles : Le radar qui tourne... vraiment très vite

Voir le diaporama crédits : JEAN-LOUIS VENNE

07/03/2008

La présence de la frégate singapourienne Intrepid à Toulon est l'occasion d'observer le fonctionnement du nouveau radar Herakles, conçu par Thales. Ce radar multifonctions tridimensionnel, conçu pour la veille aérienne et la conduite de tir, tourne sur lui-même en moins d'une seconde, comme en témoigne la vidéo prise en début de semaine, à Toulon, par notre correspondant. Radar à balayage électronique en bande S, l'Herakles, d'une portée de 200 kilomètres, équipera les futures frégates françaises de la classe Aquitaine (FREMM), ainsi que le nouveau porte-avions prévu pour être livré en 2014 à la Marine nationale.
Par rapport à la version initiale du RSS Formidable, première frégate du type Delta, livrée par Lorient en 2005, on notera une légère modification du mât soutenant l'Herakles sur l'Intrepid. Une « jupe » a été ajoutée à la base du radar. Une protection contre les ondes pour les veilleurs en passerelle supérieure ?

Les futurs pétroliers-ravitailleurs de la Royal Navy construits en Corée ?

Les futurs pétroliers-ravitailleurs de la Royal Navy construits en Corée ?

Vue de l'Aegir 18 crédits : BMT DEFENSE SERVICES

12/03/2008

Le projet des futurs pétroliers-ravitailleurs britanniques, auquel pourrait se joindre la Marine nationale, vient de connaître une nouvelle avancée. BAE Systems et BMT Defence Services, en compétition pour décrocher ce contrat, se sont alliés au constructeur coréen Daewoo en vue de réaliser les navires du programme Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS). Au moins six bâtiments pour un montant d'environ 1 milliard d'euros sont souhaités pour remplacer les unités de la Royal Fleet Auxiliary.
Présenté par BAE et BMT, le design Aegir 18 porte sur un ravitailleur de 175 mètres de long et 25 mètres de large. D'un déplacement d'environ 18.000 tonnes, il pourrait embarquer 16.000 tonnes de combustible et 650 m3 d'eau douce. Un espace cargo, sur la plage avant, est prévu pour le stockage de conteneurs, dont la manutention est réalisée au moyen d'une grue. Doté de quatre postes de ravitaillement et d'installations pour la mise en oeuvre d'un hélicoptère de la classe 10 tonnes, l'Aegir 18 pourrait accueillir 57 personnes en plus de son équipage de 80 marins. La propulsion, diesel-électrique, doit assurer une vitesse maximale de 18 noeuds, alors que l'autonomie du bâtiment est donnée à 10.000 milles à 16 noeuds.


Vue de l'Aegir 18 (Photo BMT DEFENSE SYSTEMS)

Les concepteurs ont prévu des versions dérivées, notamment une unité plus longue, de 196 mètres et 26.000 tonnes (Aegir 26), ainsi qu'un ravitailleur polyvalent aux dimensions voisines de l'Aegir 18.
Le lancement du programme MARS est attendu en 2009 pour une mise en service du premier tanker en 2012.
La France a laissé entendre qu'elle pourrait se joindre à ce programme. Le ministère de la Défense doit en effet envisager le remplacement des ravitailleurs du type Durance, dont 4 sont encore en service.


Le bâtiment de commandement et de ravitaillement Somme (Photo MARINE NATIONALE)


Le Wave Knight, de la RFA (Photo BAE SYSTEMS)

Necessitamos de modernização econômica e adensamento demográfico,

5/mar/08 (AER) – O recente episódio que instigou os governos do Equador e da Venezuela contra a Colômbia manifestou de forma cabal a urgente necessidade de o Brasil promover uma imediata e ampla guinada da sua política para a Amazônia, até agora dominada pelo aparato ambientalista-indigenista internacional e sua agenda orientada a promover um vácuo populacional que garantiria a sua condição de "reserva estratégica".

De início, se impõem duas providências imediatas: uma retomada em profundidade do Programa Calha Norte e a revogação da delimitação em área contínua da reserva indígena Raposa/Serra do Sol, em Roraima, como sinal de uma mudança paradigmática da política brasileira. Na mesma linha de raciocínio, todas as reservas indígenas e/ou ambientais localizadas na fronteira que vai do Amapá a Rondônia devem ser criteriosamente reavaliadas.

O Calha Norte, originalmente idealizado em meados da década de 1980, precisamente, com o intuito de criar núcleos de povoamento da fronteira em torno de instalações militares, foi alvo imediato do aparato ambientalista-indigenista, que não lhe poupou ataques, rotulando-o de "etnogenocida", "anti-índios" e outras sandices do gênero. Devido a uma combinação dessas pressões, as crescentes restrições orçamentárias impostas às Forças Armadas e a falta de contrapartidas dos órgãos civis do Governo Federal, o programa nunca atingiu as dimensões pretendidas - descaso que tem custado caro ao País.

Seja como for, nas presentes circunstâncias, a exclusão de atividades econômicas responsáveis pelo adensamento demográfico de uma área altamente sensível é, no mínimo, temerária - para não dizer uma afronta aos interesses da nação brasileira.

Como um corolário da mudança da política para a Amazônia é preciso suplantar de vez as ingerências abusivas do aparato ambientalista-indigenista na definição das políticas de desenvolvimento e, em especial, dos projetos de infra-estrutura física imprescindíveis à ocupação e modernização econômica da região. Ao lograrem obstaculizar durante anos ou, mesmo, definitivamente, projetos de usinas hidrelétricas, hidrovias, pavimentação rodoviária e outros, os operativos do aparato, atuando em suas bem financiadas organizações não-governamentais (ONGs), funcionam na prática como elementos de guerra irregular (ou "guerra de quarta geração") muito mais efetivos do que unidades militares tradicionais, com o agravante de não poderem ser confrontados por meios militares clássicos.

Sem modernização econômica e adensamento demográfico, não será possível exercer uma soberania efetiva sobre a Amazônia, deixando a região vulnerável a todo tipo de ameaças externas, inclusive, desdobramentos imprevisíveis de atritos na vizinhança.

What Mine Sweepers Do

What Mine Sweepers Do: USS Scout

The USS Scout (MCM 8) is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship, so its main mission is to find mines and get rid of them.

Mines are like the sea’s version of Improvised Explosive Devices. Instead of blowing up a truck or part of a convoy, they are designed to sink ships.

Historically speaking, they have been pretty good at doing that for a long time, so the Scout’s mission is extremely important.

Around the Gulf, the Navy likes to have four of these ships working at any one time, so Scout is joined by USS Gladiator (MCM 11), USS Dextrous (MCM 13), and USS Ardent (MCM 12). Ships from other countries often supplement the 4, and the US has a total of 14 of this class of vessels:

USS Avenger (MCM 1), Ingleside, TX
USS Defender (MCM 2), Ingleside, TX
USS Sentry (MCM 3), Ingleside, TX
USS Champion (MCM 4), Ingleside, TX
USS Guardian (MCM 5), Sasebo, Japan
USS Devastator (MCM 6), Ingleside, TX
USS Patriot (MCM 7), Sasebo, Japan
USS Scout (MCM 8), Manama, Bahrain
USS Pioneer (MCM 9), Ingleside, TX
USS Warrior (MCM 10), Ingleside, TX
USS Gladiator (MCM 11), Manama, Bahrain
USS Ardent (MCM 12), Ingleside, TX
USS Dextrous (MCM 13), Manama, Bahrain
USS Chief (MCM 14), Ingleside, TX

You might notice that the home ports largely correspond to areas with oil platforms, namely, Texas and the Persian Gulf, but the ships will be deployed to any area threatened by mines.

The Gulf Coast of the US is threatened by hurricanes. The ships can help keep the oil flowing even when Mother Nature is the threat. For example, after Hurricane Katrina, Scout and its sister ships used their sophisticated sonar to search under water for debris that oil tankers might hit, like buses, houses and other large items washed out to sea. In the Persian Gulf, they’ll be looking for floating mines that might hit oil platforms. Much of Iraq’s income is derived from its oil exports, and if one of its few, key oil platforms, where big ships belly up to be loaded, is damaged, it is going to hurt Iraq’s cash flow.

How does the ship do its job? It has sonar, and it has underwater video systems. If it finds a mine, it can snip the cable that attaches it to the sea floor, or it can send a remote explosive to detonate the mine. If you know someone on these ships, they might have a role in locating the mines or in detonating them. The ship also has remotely operated reconnaissance vehicles, like miniature submarines that search for mines. Interestingly, in spite of the high tech, the ships have wooden hulls covered in fiberglass. That is because some mines are magnetic. The wooden hull protects the ship because it won’t attract such mines. The ships have some machine guns but rely on other vessels for most of their protection.

There are not always mines in an area, so the ships have other duties, too. As the Navy says, "seaborne mine countermeasure ships contribute to MSO by conducting waterborne security missions and protecting oil platforms . . . escort duties, direct liaison and joint operations with coalition patrol forces and combatants." MSO means Maritime Security Operations.

The Scout is 1,300 tons and 224 feet long. By Navy standards, that is not a gigantic ship. USS Gladiator, when it came to the Gulf, was actually floated over a submersible German ship designed to go up and down in the water. The once the German ship went down, Gladiator was floated over it, and then the German ship was raised up to carry the Gladiator, piggy-back, on the long trip. Just a few of Gladiator’s crew were there to help. This means that the smaller ship arrives in perfect condition, without the wear and tear of a long sea trip. The rest of the crew is flown over, so they too don’t have the fatigue that might result from the long trip. The Army does the same thing on a smaller scale with tanks. You don’t want to drive a tracked vehicle thousands of miles cross country if you don’t have to, so they are driven onto trucks for long journeys.

This article shows just part of what it's like on a mine coutnermeasures ship.

DCNS veut s'implanter en Grèce...

DCNS veut s'implanter en Grèce...

Vue de la future FREMM crédits : DCN

05/03/2008

Le groupe naval de défense devrait annoncer, début avril, l'implantation d'une filiale en Grèce. Cette décision serait, en fait, le prolongement de l'accord de coopération conclu en octobre 2006 entre DCNS et les chantiers Elefsis, près d'Athènes. Ce memorundum of understanding a été signé en vue de concourir au projet de renouvellement des frégates de la marine grecque. Cette dernière souhaite, en effet, remplacer les 10 ex-frégates néerlandaises du type Kortenaer par une nouvelle série de bâtiments. La commande pourrait intervenir en fin d'année, alors que de nombreux industriels semblent se positionner. La Grèce souhaitant un navire polyvalent, doté de capacités antiaériennes, DCNS proposerait la Frégate de Défense Aérienne (FREDA), dérivée des Frégates Européenne Multi-Missions et étudiée pour remplacer les Cassard et Jean Bart de la Marine nationale. Si la proposition française est retenue, il faudra sans doute s'attendre à une participation active de l'industrie grecque, non seulement pour les bâtiments réalisés nationalement, mais également sur le programme FREMM. Dans le MOU du 25 octobre 2006, DCNS et Elefsis avaient, en effet, souligné que le chantier grec serait associé « comme partenaire stratégique tant sur les programmes français qu'à l'exportation, afin de créer les conditions d'une coopération à long terme bénéfique pour l'industrie grecque ». En clair, la réalisation de blocs pour les frégates françaises ne serait pas à exclure.
Avant d'en arriver là, DCNS et Elefsis devront, toutefois, remporter le marché, ce qui s'annonce difficile vu le nombre de prétendants. Face à l'offre franco-grecque, TKMS proposerait une version dérivée des frégates du type 124. Le groupe allemand s'appuie sur les chantiers Royal Hellenic Naval Shipyard de Skaramanga, où trois sous-marins du type 214 sont réalisés en transfert de technologie. Les difficultés rencontrées lors de la mise en service de la première unité, construite à Kiel, ne devraient toutefois pas avantager TKMS.
En dehors de l'Allemand, le Néerlandais Schelde proposerait le LCF, alors que l'Espagnol Navantia serait en lice avec le F100. Une tentative anglaise, avec une version réduite des destroyers du type 45, n'est pas impossible. Enfin, une candidature nettement plus surprenante serait dans les tuyaux. Nous y reviendrons demain, plus en détails.

Comandante da Marinha ressalta a importância da Marinha para a sociedade

A revista Proceedings, em sua edição nº 134, de março deste ano, consultou os chefes navais de vários países a respeito da importância da Marinha para a sociedade. O Comandante da Marinha do Brasil, Almirante-de-Esquadra Julio Soares de Moura Neto, declarou:

"A História do Brasil, desde a descoberta, em 1500, demonstra inequivocamente a relevância do mar para o nosso desenvolvimento. A cobiça despertada pelas riquezas do Brasil levou franceses e holandeses a invadirem o País pelo mar; também pelo mar ocorreram lutas que consolidaram nossa Independência e mantiveram nossa integridade territorial; houve participação de meios da Marinha do Brasil nas duas Guerras Mundiais, que permitiram a manutenção da segurança nas vias marítimas e fluviais de interesse do Brasil e dos aliados. Ademais, observando a posição geográfica do Brasil no Atlântico Sul, o tamanho do seu litoral e bacias hidrográficas, assim como a dependência em relação às linhas de comunicação marítimas e aos recursos encontrados nas águas jurisdicionais brasileiras, não é difícil concluir que o Brasil deve ser forte no mar.

Embora possamos considerar que, na atualidade, é baixa a probabilidade de ocorrência de um conflito militar tradicional envolvendo o Brasil, a realidade é que uma crise político-estratégica ou mesmo a concretização do que hoje se conhece como novas ameaças podem surgir inesperadamente. Portanto, devemos nos manter preparados, haja vista que a capacidade de defesa de um país, fundamental para sua sobrevivência, não surge de forma repentina. Por esta razão, é essencial que os meios do Poder Naval estejam perfeitamente dimensionados e aprestados, inspirando credibilidade que seja capaz de dissuadir qualquer ameaça.

Recentemente, com a finalidade de dar maior visibilidade à sociedade de suas tarefas, a Marinha do Brasil redefiniu a visão de futuro e missão, consciente de que as atividades executadas pelas Forças Navais se dão longe dos olhos dos cidadãos. Deste modo, enfatiza-se na interlocução com a sociedade, além das nossas obrigações atinentes às águas azuis, aquelas que a Marinha do Brasil exerce junto ao litoral. Complementarmente, descentralizaram-se atividades de comunicação social para os Comandos de Distritos Navais, destacando-se a importância de realizar entrevistas com os órgãos de imprensa, de proferir palestras em escolas, centros acadêmicos e institutos de pesquisa, de conscientizar os parlamentos federal e estaduais e de estabelecer parcerias com as indústrias de defesa e entidades de classes empresariais.

Por meio desses argumentos e ações, a Marinha do Brasil procura aproximar-se da sociedade brasileira e, conseqüentemente, conscientizá-la do mérito dos custos de possuir uma Marinha adequada aos interesses nacionais e apta a defender a soberania nacional no Atlântico Sul – área de atuação prioritária do Poder Naval brasileiro."

Leia a matéria publicada em: https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/story.asp?STORY_ID=1374

ALTE. FLORES- Retomada alvissareira?

Retomada alvissareira?

Mario Cesar Flores

Nos últimos meses a defesa nacional tem sido objeto de notícias alusivas a intenções do governo de retomar o há muito tempo negligenciado preparo militar brasileiro, por vezes associadas a programas militares em curso na América do Sul. Vale a pena comentar essa aparente e inusitada atenção.

A qualidade e a credibilidade do preparo militar de qualquer país dependem da lógica da concepção político-estratégica que inspira seu projeto. No Brasil essa concepção conceitual básica deve compatibilizar, realisticamente e sem devaneios ufanistas, o preparo militar com a posição relativa e a responsabilidade do Brasil, a que o credenciam suas circunstâncias geográficas, econômicas e demográficas regionais. Sem devaneios ufanistas, mas atenta ao fato de que nosso mundo hobbesiano não funciona condicionado apenas pelo jurisdicismo utópico, imune às injunções do poder: o peso relativo do Brasil terá influência inferior à sugerida por suas demais circunstâncias, se não contar com respaldo de poder militar compatível com elas.

Da concepção conceitual básica - talvez a ''''política'''' prometida para setembro de 2008 que, supõe-se, deva expor princípios e premissas conceituais, identificar preocupações e vulnerabilidades, formular objetivos e uma orientação geral - e do projeto de preparo militar por ela regulado deverão resultar medidas simples e imediatas, outras demoradas, a serem levadas a cabo com continuidade, sem tropeços como os da odisséia do programa da propulsão naval nuclear em curso. Algumas, importantes e complexas, estarão sujeitas a controvérsias motivadas por perspectivas e convicções culturais das Forças Armadas, organizações hierarquizadas e de formação homogênea que, receptivas às tecnologias novas, evoluem com menos desenvoltura nas suas concepções clássicas. Entre elas, as que ''''mexerão'''' em questões como a integração (estratégica, operacional, logística e de inteligência) e organização das Forças Armadas (estruturação, dimensões, meios e sistemas de armas), suas doutrinas, o serviço militar ante a tecnologia moderna e a distribuição territorial.

A despeito de eventuais controvérsias, os militares, tradicionalmente pautados pela conveniência nacional, vão superar suas dificuldades conceituais. Mas isso não é tudo: para que a ajustagem da defesa nacional ao século 21 seja bem-sucedida há que respaldá-la na reversão do descaso societário e político pelo tema. Sem essa reversão será difícil dirimir o processo vicioso que volta e meia enseja dúvidas sobre as finalidades do poder militar, prejudiciais à qualidade da concepção conceitual básica cuja formulação é responsabilidade militar e civil (política, diplomacia, instituições afins ao tema): a defesa externa, contra quais ameaças imagináveis? A garantia da lei, ordem e segurança pública? O apoio ao desenvolvimento e a populações marginalizadas, a presença territorial? A participação em intervenções sob mandato internacional? É comum a crítica, acadêmica e da mídia, à autonomia corporativa das Forças Armadas: não seria essa autonomia estimulada pela apatia alienante? Nas pesquisas de opinião, as Forças Armadas são bem situadas no quesito confiabilidade, mas a defesa está ausente dessa aferição: trata-se da confiabilidade relativa à ética, num universo público entendido como venal.

Essa questão estrutural está na agenda de muitos países. Precisamos resolvê-la identificando e avaliando nossas preocupações, vulnerabilidades e problemas verossímeis, definindo as prioridades de preparo que lhes correspondam - o que pode gerar polêmicas e ressentimentos - e procurando compatibilizá-las com o sufoco fiscal. Sufoco compreensível diante de outras demandas nacionais, errado é ele atuar menos por criteriosa opção racional indicadora de percepção do que justifica cuidados e dos riscos por não atendê-los e mais no ''''embalo'''' do desinteresse.

No desdobramento do projeto concreto do preparo militar um aspecto se enquadra com propriedade no momento presente do desenvolvimento brasileiro: a tecnologia e sua indústria correlata.

Dos 1930 aos 1970 os militares estimularam a implantação da indústria de base e de transformação, entendidas à época como necessárias à segurança nacional; hoje essa idéia se aplica com mais razão à alta tecnologia, essencial à capacidade militar moderna e autônoma. Mas a tecnologia militar moderna é cara e sujeita à rápida obsolescência. Essa dupla complicação, econômica e tecnológica, exige a associação do preparo militar ao desenvolvimento nacional de alta tecnologia, ao acervo tecnológico e industrial que já existe e ao que tenha potencial promissor. Em suma, às instituições de pesquisa e desenvolvimento e empresas de alta tecnologia, capazes de desenvolvimentos autóctones e/ou de absorver e praticar a alta tecnologia obtida do exterior - condição indispensável à credibilidade do uso soberano de meios importados, que deve referenciar a propalada aproximação estratégica França-Brasil.

O preparo parametrado pelo avanço tecnológico e a revisão das questões citadas acima (integração, estrutura, organização, meios, distribuição territorial, dimensões, serviço militar), de conformidade com a concepção básica, darão respaldo e respeito estratégico à tradição brasileira de buscar soluções negociadas para contenciosos internacionais. E darão credibilidade à candidatura ao Conselho de Segurança da ONU, que pressupõe condições de contribuir ponderavelmente para o controle de perturbações da estabilidade e da ordem, no mínimo na sua região geopolítica.

Os que se preocupam com o tema defesa nacional ''''torcem'''' para que a retomada do preparo militar, aparentemente objeto de alvissareira, embora de tardia atenção, não venha a ser uma frustração. ''''Torcem'''' para que ela se realize, com comedimento, mas atenta à conveniência de ser o ideal pacifista apoiado em capacidade estratégica coerente com o Brasil.

Mario Cesar Flores, Almirante-de-Esquadra (Reformado)