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terça-feira, 31 de março de 2009

The United States, Germany and Beyond

The United States, Germany and Beyond

 

March 30, 2009

By George Friedman

·          

Three major meetings will take place in Europe over the next nine days: a meeting of the G-20, a NATO summit and a meeting of the European Union with U.S. President Barack Obama. The week will define the relationship between the United States and Europe and reveal some intra-European relationships. If not a defining moment, the week will certainly be a critical moment in dealing with economic, political and military questions. To be more precise, the meeting will be about U.S.-German relations. Not only is Germany the engine of continental Europe, its policies diverge the most sharply from those of the United States. In some ways, U.S.-German relations have been the core of the U.S.-European relationship, so this marathon of summits will focus on the United States and Germany.

Although the meetings deal with a range of issues — the economy and Afghanistan chief among them — the core question on the table will be the relationship between Europe and the United States following the departure of George W. Bush and the arrival of Barack Obama. This is not a trivial question. The European Union and the United States together account for more than half of global gross domestic product. How the two interact and cooperate is thus a matter of global significance. Of particular importance will be the U.S. relationship with Germany, since the German economy drives the Continental dynamic. This will be the first significant opportunity to measure the state of that relationship along the entire range of issues requiring cooperation.

Relations under Bush between the United States and the two major European countries, Germany and France, were unpleasant to say the least. There was tremendous enthusiasm throughout most of Europe surrounding Obama’s election. Obama ran a campaign partly based on the assertion that one of Bush’s greatest mistakes was his failure to align the United States more closely with its European allies, and he said he would change the dynamic of that relationship.

There is no question that Obama and the major European powers want to have a closer relationship. But there is a serious question about expectations. From the European point of view, the problem with Bush was that he did not consult them enough and demanded too much from them. They are looking forward to a relationship with Obama that contains more consultation and fewer demands. But while Obama wants more consultation with the Europeans, this does not mean he will demand less. In fact, one of his campaign themes was that with greater consultation with Europe, the Europeans would be prepared to provide more assistance to the United States. Europe and Obama loved each other, but for very different reasons. The Europeans thought that the United States under Obama would ask less, while Obama thought the Europeans would give more.

The G-20 and Divergent Economic Expectations

Begin with the G-20 summit of 20 of the world’s largest economies, which, along with the Americans and Europeans, include the Russians, Chinese and Japanese. The issue is, of course, the handling of the international financial crisis. In contrast to the G-20 meetings held in November 2008, the economic situation has clarified itself substantially — itself an improvement — and there are the first faint signs in the United States of what might be the beginning of recovery. There is still tremendous economic pain, but not nearly the panic seen in October.

There is, however, still discord. The most important disagreement is between the United States and United Kingdom on one side and France and Germany on the other. Both the United States and the United Kingdom have selected a strategy that calls for strong economic stimulus at home. The Anglo-American side wants Europe to match it (though the United Kingdom has begun tempering its demands). It fears that the heavily export-oriented Germans in particular will use the demand created by U.S. and British stimulus on their economies to surge German exports into these countries as demand rises. Germany and France would thus get the benefit of the stimulus without footing the bill, enjoying a free ride as the United States builds domestic debt. We must focus here on Germany and the United States because Germany is the center of gravity of the European economy just as the United States is of the Anglo-American bloc. Others are involved, but in the end this comes down to a U.S.-German showdown.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel argued that Germany could not afford the kind of stimulus promoted by the Anglo-Americans because German demographic problems are such that the proposed stimulus would impose long-term debt on a shrinking population, an untenable situation. Germany and France’s position makes perfect sense, whether it is viewed as Merkel has framed it, or more cynically, as Germany taking advantage of actions Obama already has taken. Either way, the fact remains that German and U.S. national interest are not at all the same. As Merkel put it in an interview with The New York Times, “International policy is, for all the friendship and commonality, always also about representing the interests of one’s own country.”

Paralleling this is the issue of how to deal with the Central European financial crisis. Toxic U.S. assets did not create this problem, internal European practices did. Western European banks took dominant positions in Eastern Europe in the past decade. They began to offer mortgages and other loans at low interest rates denominated in euros, Swiss francs and yen. This was an outstanding deal unless the Polish zloty and the Hungarian forint were to plunge in value, which they have over the past six months. Loan payments soared, massive defaults happened, and Italian, Austrian and Swedish banks were left holding the bag.

The United States viewed this as an internal EU matter, leaving it to European countries to save their own banks. Meanwhile, the Germans — who had somewhat less exposure than other countries — helped block a European bailout, arguing that the Central European countries should be dealt with through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was being configured to solve such problems in second-tier countries. From the German point of view, the IMF was simply going to be used for the purpose for which it was created. But Washington saw this as the Germans trying to secure U.S. (and Chinese and Japanese) money to deal with a European problem.

Add to this the complexity of Opel, a German carmaker owned by GM, which Germany wants the United States to bailout but which the United States wants nothing to do with, and the fundamental problem is clear: While both Germany and the United States have a common interest in moving past the crisis, Germany and the United States have very different approaches to the problem. Embedded in this is the hard fact that the United States is much larger than any other national economy, and it will be the U.S. recovery (when it comes) pulling the rest of the world — particularly the export-oriented economies — out of the ditch. Given that nothing can change this, the Germans see no reason to put themselves in a more difficult position than they are already in.

The Germans will not yield on the stimulus issue and Obama will not press, since this is not an issue that will resonate politically. But what could be perceived as a massive U.S. donation to the IMF would resonate politically in the United States. The American political system has become increasingly sensitive to the size of the debt being incurred by the Obama administration. A loan at this time to bail out other countries would not sit well, especially when critics would point out that some of the money will be going to bail out European banks in Central Europe.

European Fragmentation

Obama will need something in return from the Europeans, and the two-day NATO summit will be the place to get it. The Obama administration laid out the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan last Friday in preparation for this trip. Having given on the economic issue, Obama might hope that the Europeans would be forthcoming in increasing their commitment to Afghanistan by sending troops.

But there is almost no chance of Germany or France sending more troops, as public opinion in those countries is set against it and they have vastly limited military resources. During the U.S. presidential debates, Obama emphasized that he would be looking to the Europeans to increase aid in Afghanistan (the “good” war) while Iraq (the “bad” war) ends. The Germans will make some symbolic gestures — aid to Pakistan, reconstruction workers — but they will not be sending troops.

This will put Obama in a difficult position. If he donates money to the IMF, some of it earmarked for Europe, while the Europeans not only refuse to join the United States in a stimulus package but refuse to send troops to Afghanistan, the entire foundation of Obama’s foreign policy will start becoming a public issue. Obama argued that he would be more effective in building cooperation with European allies than Bush was or U.S. Sen. John McCain would have been. If he comes home empty-handed, which is likely, the status of that claim becomes uncertain.

Which brings us to the third meeting: the Obama-EU summit. We have been speaking of Germany as if it were Europe. In one sense, it is, as its economic weight drives the system. But politically and militarily, Europe is highly fragmented. Indeed, one of the consequences of German nationalism in dealing with Europe’s economy is that Europe’s economy is fragmented as well. Many smaller EU members, which had great expectations of what EU membership would mean, are disappointed and alienated from Germany and even the European Union itself largely due to the lack of German willingness to help them in their time of need.

More Fertile Ground for Obama

These are the waters Obama can go fishing in. Clearly, NATO is no longer functioning as it was a generation ago. Reality has shifted, and so have national interests. The international economic crisis has heightened — not reduced — nationalism as each nation looks out for itself. The weaker nations, particularly in Central Europe, have been left to fend for themselves.

The Central European countries have an additional concern: Russia. As Russia gets bolder, and as Germany remains unwilling to stand in Moscow’s way due to its energy dependence on Russia, countries on the EU periphery will be shopping for new relationships, particularly with the United States.

Obama’s strategy of coming closer to the Franco-German bloc appears to be ending in the same kind of train wreck in which Bush’s attempts ended. That is reasonable since these are not questions of atmospherics but of national interest on all sides. It therefore follows that the United States must consider new strategic relationships. The countries bordering Russia and Ukraine are certainly of interest to the United States, and share less interests with Germany and France than they thought they did. New bilateral relations — or even multilateral relations excluding some former partners like Germany — might be a topic to think about at the EU summit, even if it is too early to talk about it.

But let’s remember that Obama’s trip doesn’t end in Europe, it ends in Turkey. Turkey is a NATO member but has been effectively blocked from entry into the EU. It is doing relatively well in the economic crisis, and has a substantial military capability as well. The United States needs Turkey to extend its influence in Iraq to block Iranian ambitions, and north in the Caucasus to block Russian ambitions. Turkey is thus a prime candidate for an enhanced relationship with the United States. Excluded from Europe out of fears of Turkish immigration, economically able to stand on its own two feet, and able to use its military force in its own interest, it doesn’t take a contortionist to align U.S. and Turkish policies — they flow naturally.

However planned, Obama’s visit to Turkey will represent a warning to the Germans and others in its orbit that their relationship with the United States is based, as Merkel put it, on national interest, and that Germany’s interests and American interests are diverging somewhat. It also drives home that the United States has options in how to configure its alliance system, and that in many ways, Turkey is more important to the United States than Germany is.

Obama has made the case for multilateralism. Whatever that means, it does not have to mean continued alignment with all the traditional allies the United States had. There are potential new relationships and potential new arrangements. The inability of the Europeans to support key aspects of U.S. policy is understandable. But it will inevitably create a counter pressure on Obama to transfer the concept of multilateralism away from the post-World War II system of alliances toward a new system more appropriate to American national interests.

From our point of view, the talks in Europe are locked into place. A fine gloss will be put on the failure to collaborate. The talks in Turkey, on the other hand, have a very different sense about them.

 The Obama Administration and Europe

 

February 3, 2009 | 2341 GMT

ersion

Related Link

·         Part 1: The Obama Administration and East Asia

·         Part 3: The Obama                               Administration and Latin America

·         Part 4: The Obama Administration and Sub-Saharan Africa

·         Part 5: The Obama Administration and the Middle East

Related Special Topic Page

·         Special Series: Obama’s Foreign Policy Landscape

Editor’s Note: This is the second piece in a series that explores how key countries in various regions have interacted with the United States in the past, and how their relationships with Washington will likely be defined during the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama.

The United States and Europe are intertwined in a transatlantic alliance that for more than 50 years has secured peace in Europe. Since the end of World War II, the United States has looked to strengthen European unity, first through the Marshall Plan and later by nurturing nascent institutions that would become the European Union, like the European Coal and Steel Community.

The overarching U.S. geopolitical imperative, however, is to assure that the Eurasian landmass does not produce a continent-sized challenger capable of threatening American hegemony. Part of the motivation behind Washington’s support for EU enlargement is the desire to assure that the European Union never coalesces into a concrete political union. The more EU members, the less coherent the bloc, thus making it less likely that France or Germany will come to dominate the union. Assuring that no Eurasian challenger to the United States appears also means keeping Russia — the state at present most likely to dominate enough territory to threaten the United States — east of the Carpathian Mountains. The United States therefore walks the tightrope of encouraging sufficient European unity to hedge against Russia while preventing the unity that would allow a single European power to rise.

Enter the Obama administration, which brings with it the traditional Democratic foreign policy emphasis on Europe. Historically, the Democratic Party has been deeply enmeshed with the U.S. northeastern intellectual and business elite, who are culturally, socially, and most importantly, economically — both through capital and direct trade links — focused on Europe. This has little to do with party ideology and mostly to do with geography and trade routes. Obama therefore comes from a tradition of American leadership that has viewed Europe as a permanent interest and partner of the United States.

Below are five countries that STRATFOR feels will be crucial to U.S.-European relations in 2009, and possibly throughout the four years of Obama’s term. Along with the European heavyweights of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, we include Central Europe’s most powerful country, Poland. We also include the present holder of the EU presidency, the Czech Republic, a state that has risen in Washington’s estimation due to U.S. military plans to possibly field a radar installation there.

France

When strong, unified and not in revolt, France is traditionally the European hyperdynamic statesman, forced to seek alliances due to its geographical location. It is the only country on the Continent that shares a border with every single regional power: Spain, Italy, Germany and, via the English Channel, the United Kingdom. When it is powerful, France pushes for “European unity” with Paris in charge. To this end, it mobilizes its allies and spearheads giant unification campaigns. (Think Charlemagne, Napoleon, de Gaulle, etc.)

When it is weak, however, France seeks to build a coalition to constrain the European power of the day. France is now in the process of moving from a period of relative strength to relative weakness. With Germany’s return as a major player, French President Nicolas Sarkozy has been forced to move France away from its Gaullist tradition to a more defensive strategy. Paris now seeks to manage an alliance to contain (e.g., surround and subsume) Germany. Simply put, Paris instinctively understands that France cannot be globally important without first dominating Europe, and the latter is difficult when Germany has an opinion.

Sarkozy will have ample opportunity to become Europe’s liaison with the Americans, as under Obama, the United States will look to Europe for help in countering Russia and for assistance in the expanded campaign in Afghanistan. France’s changing needs mesh well with American plans in a way they did not under former U.S. President George W. Bush.

Germany

Germany is the proverbial man in the middle, surrounded by powers that alone are no match for it, but which collectively can destroy it. As such, Germany’s foreign policy is either nonexistent (when it has been defeated or split) or aggressive (when it is attempting to pick off its neighbors one at a time to prevent an alliance against it from forming.) Germany is currently segueing from the weakness of the post-World War II era to the strength of reunification. Because of this evolution, the balance of power in Europe is shifting. In 2009, an increasingly independent and assertive Berlin is looking to develop a foreign policy to match its ambitions.

But this cannot happen overnight; Germany is hardly prepared to blitzkrieg its way to Continental domination. So unless Berlin plans on going to war with Russia (and it does not), it needs to find a way to live with Russia, particularly as Germany is so dependent on Russian energy exports. And that means sharing influence with the Russians in the belt of states that separate the two. This will lead Berlin on a collision course not just with its eastern neighbors, but also with those neighbors’ security guarantor: the United States. The Obama administration will hope for German support in any future negotiations with Russia, but Berlin will see its separate accommodation with Russia as more important.

United Kingdom

As an island nation, the United Kingdom projects power globally more easily than it does on the European continent. The British imperative involves ensuring that no nation unifies (or conquers) Europe and mobilizes all its resources to invade Britain, as Germany came close to doing in 1940. This geopolitical imperative largely mirrors the U.S. imperative to keep the Eurasian landmass divided, giving the British and the Americans largely complementary interests. (In fact, the U.S. Eurasian strategy was essentially learned from the British.)

Nonetheless, Obama might face a cold shoulder from the United Kingdom in 2009 and 2010. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown is preoccupied with domestic issues (particularly Britain’s worsening economic crisis) and his eventual departure (either through electoral defeat in mid-2010, or even earlier should the Labour Party decide to replace him). Brown will thus be extremely careful not to commit to any grand U.S. campaigns without being certain the move would not hurt him domestically. A timid United Kingdom will not mesh well with Obama’s desire to see a Europe more involved with American foreign policy.

Poland

Poland’s neighbors often see it as a speed bump on the superhighway that is the North European Plain. Warsaw, however, sees the plain as a two-way street. After all, Poland was the strongest European power during much of the 16th and 17th centuries, using the plain to extend its domination of territory from the shores of the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, the Carpathians and the Dnieper River. Therefore, whichever political entity has ruled the land that today comprises Poland has had designs on large portions of the North European Plain, and has considered the Baltic states, most of Ukraine and Belarus as falling into its sphere of influence.

Since regaining its political independence after the Cold War, however, Poland has found itself adjacent to a reunified Germany and a resurgent Russia. It has therefore depended on outside allies — in this case the United States — to assure its independence. Poland thus has no interest in a possible U.S. rapprochement with Russia, or in any delay in placing the ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems.

Poland does want Washington to give it military technology and training so it can maintain its independence — and perhaps even return to the glory days of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which flourished in the 16th and 17th centuries. For now, a period of strained relations between Warsaw and Washington due to the change in administrations can be expected. In the long-term, the United States needs a strong Poland to counterbalance an independent Germany and a resurgent Russia, but in the short-term, it needs Russian compliance with American designs for a surge in Afghanistan.

Czech Republic

Enjoying some protection thanks to low mountains and hilly terrain, the Czech Republic is still connected with the rest of Europe by the major river valleys of the Elbe, Oder, Morava and Vltava, which effectively turn the country into a gateway between the North European Plain and Central Europe. As such, the Czech Republic has rarely been able to maintain its independence, increasing its tolerance for incorporation within the confines of larger, more powerful political systems (think Austro-Hungarian Empire and Soviet Union).

Prague is therefore going to wait and see which way the wind blows before it chooses what modern political system it wants to be part of this time around. Prague’s recent announcement that it intends to delay its vote on the Lisbon Treaty, a key charter intended to streamline decision-making in the European Union, is a clear signal that it plans to hold off on committing to the EU bloc until it is assured that the Americans are committed to European security. This highlights the Czech Republic’s pragmatic way of biding its time before making decisions it cannot easily reverse.

The Obama administration will not, however, appreciate being rushed into a decision on BMD radar facilities in the Czech Republic by Prague. Washington will hope that Prague, in its six-month role as EU president, will help spearhead the campaign to secure European assistance in Afghanistan and present a unified EU front to Russia. But Prague might not be up to these tasks, both due to its lack of clout among the rest of Europe and in a bid to avoid exposing itself to Kremlin wrath without firm U.S. guarantees.


Related Link

·         Part 1: The Obama Administration and East Asia

·         Part 3: The Obama Administration and Latin America

·         Part 4: The Obama Administration and Sub-Saharan Africa

·         Part 5: The Obama Administration and the Middle East

Related Special Topic Page

·         Special Series: Obama’s Foreign Policy Landscape

Editor’s Note: This is the second piece in a series that explores how key countries in various regions have interacted with the United States in the past, and how their relationships with Washington will likely be defined during the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama.

The United States and Europe are intertwined in a transatlantic alliance that for more than 50 years has secured peace in Europe. Since the end of World War II, the United States has looked to strengthen European unity, first through the Marshall Plan and later by nurturing nascent institutions that would become the European Union, like the European Coal and Steel Community.

The overarching U.S. geopolitical imperative, however, is to assure that the Eurasian landmass does not produce a continent-sized challenger capable of threatening American hegemony. Part of the motivation behind Washington’s support for EU enlargement is the desire to assure that the European Union never coalesces into a concrete political union. The more EU members, the less coherent the bloc, thus making it less likely that France or Germany will come to dominate the union. Assuring that no Eurasian challenger to the United States appears also means keeping Russia — the state at present most likely to dominate enough territory to threaten the United States — east of the Carpathian Mountains. The United States therefore walks the tightrope of encouraging sufficient European unity to hedge against Russia while preventing the unity that would allow a single European power to rise.

Enter the Obama administration, which brings with it the traditional Democratic foreign policy emphasis on Europe. Historically, the Democratic Party has been deeply enmeshed with the U.S. northeastern intellectual and business elite, who are culturally, socially, and most importantly, economically — both through capital and direct trade links — focused on Europe. This has little to do with party ideology and mostly to do with geography and trade routes. Obama therefore comes from a tradition of American leadership that has viewed Europe as a permanent interest and partner of the United States.

Below are five countries that STRATFOR feels will be crucial to U.S.-European relations in 2009, and possibly throughout the four years of Obama’s term. Along with the European heavyweights of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, we include Central Europe’s most powerful country, Poland. We also include the present holder of the EU presidency, the Czech Republic, a state that has risen in Washington’s estimation due to U.S. military plans to possibly field a radar installation there.

France

When strong, unified and not in revolt, France is traditionally the European hyperdynamic statesman, forced to seek alliances due to its geographical location. It is the only country on the Continent that shares a border with every single regional power: Spain, Italy, Germany and, via the English Channel, the United Kingdom. When it is powerful, France pushes for “European unity” with Paris in charge. To this end, it mobilizes its allies and spearheads giant unification campaigns. (Think Charlemagne, Napoleon, de Gaulle, etc.)

When it is weak, however, France seeks to build a coalition to constrain the European power of the day. France is now in the process of moving from a period of relative strength to relative weakness. With Germany’s return as a major player, French President Nicolas Sarkozy has been forced to move France away from its Gaullist tradition to a more defensive strategy. Paris now seeks to manage an alliance to contain (e.g., surround and subsume) Germany. Simply put, Paris instinctively understands that France cannot be globally important without first dominating Europe, and the latter is difficult when Germany has an opinion.

Sarkozy will have ample opportunity to become Europe’s liaison with the Americans, as under Obama, the United States will look to Europe for help in countering Russia and for assistance in the expanded campaign in Afghanistan. France’s changing needs mesh well with American plans in a way they did not under former U.S. President George W. Bush.

Germany

Germany is the proverbial man in the middle, surrounded by powers that alone are no match for it, but which collectively can destroy it. As such, Germany’s foreign policy is either nonexistent (when it has been defeated or split) or aggressive (when it is attempting to pick off its neighbors one at a time to prevent an alliance against it from forming.) Germany is currently segueing from the weakness of the post-World War II era to the strength of reunification. Because of this evolution, the balance of power in Europe is shifting. In 2009, an increasingly independent and assertive Berlin is looking to develop a foreign policy to match its ambitions.

But this cannot happen overnight; Germany is hardly prepared to blitzkrieg its way to Continental domination. So unless Berlin plans on going to war with Russia (and it does not), it needs to find a way to live with Russia, particularly as Germany is so dependent on Russian energy exports. And that means sharing influence with the Russians in the belt of states that separate the two. This will lead Berlin on a collision course not just with its eastern neighbors, but also with those neighbors’ security guarantor: the United States. The Obama administration will hope for German support in any future negotiations with Russia, but Berlin will see its separate accommodation with Russia as more important.

United Kingdom

As an island nation, the United Kingdom projects power globally more easily than it does on the European continent. The British imperative involves ensuring that no nation unifies (or conquers) Europe and mobilizes all its resources to invade Britain, as Germany came close to doing in 1940. This geopolitical imperative largely mirrors the U.S. imperative to keep the Eurasian landmass divided, giving the British and the Americans largely complementary interests. (In fact, the U.S. Eurasian strategy was essentially learned from the British.)

Nonetheless, Obama might face a cold shoulder from the United Kingdom in 2009 and 2010. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown is preoccupied with domestic issues (particularly Britain’s worsening economic crisis) and his eventual departure (either through electoral defeat in mid-2010, or even earlier should the Labour Party decide to replace him). Brown will thus be extremely careful not to commit to any grand U.S. campaigns without being certain the move would not hurt him domestically. A timid United Kingdom will not mesh well with Obama’s desire to see a Europe more involved with American foreign policy.

Poland

Poland’s neighbors often see it as a speed bump on the superhighway that is the North European Plain. Warsaw, however, sees the plain as a two-way street. After all, Poland was the strongest European power during much of the 16th and 17th centuries, using the plain to extend its domination of territory from the shores of the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, the Carpathians and the Dnieper River. Therefore, whichever political entity has ruled the land that today comprises Poland has had designs on large portions of the North European Plain, and has considered the Baltic states, most of Ukraine and Belarus as falling into its sphere of influence.

Since regaining its political independence after the Cold War, however, Poland has found itself adjacent to a reunified Germany and a resurgent Russia. It has therefore depended on outside allies — in this case the United States — to assure its independence. Poland thus has no interest in a possible U.S. rapprochement with Russia, or in any delay in placing the ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems.

Poland does want Washington to give it military technology and training so it can maintain its independence — and perhaps even return to the glory days of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which flourished in the 16th and 17th centuries. For now, a period of strained relations between Warsaw and Washington due to the change in administrations can be expected. In the long-term, the United States needs a strong Poland to counterbalance an independent Germany and a resurgent Russia, but in the short-term, it needs Russian compliance with American designs for a surge in Afghanistan.

Czech Republic

Enjoying some protection thanks to low mountains and hilly terrain, the Czech Republic is still connected with the rest of Europe by the major river valleys of the Elbe, Oder, Morava and Vltava, which effectively turn the country into a gateway between the North European Plain and Central Europe. As such, the Czech Republic has rarely been able to maintain its independence, increasing its tolerance for incorporation within the confines of larger, more powerful political systems (think Austro-Hungarian Empire and Soviet Union).

Prague is therefore going to wait and see which way the wind blows before it chooses what modern political system it wants to be part of this time around. Prague’s recent announcement that it intends to delay its vote on the Lisbon Treaty, a key charter intended to streamline decision-making in the European Union, is a clear signal that it plans to hold off on committing to the EU bloc until it is assured that the Americans are committed to European security. This highlights the Czech Republic’s pragmatic way of biding its time before making decisions it cannot easily reverse.

The Obama administration will not, however, appreciate being rushed into a decision on BMD radar facilities in the Czech Republic by Prague. Washington will hope that Prague, in its six-month role as EU president, will help spearhead the campaign to secure European assistance in Afghanistan and present a unified EU front to Russia. But Prague might not be up to these tasks, both due to its lack of clout among the rest of Europe and in a bid to avoid exposing itself to Kremlin wrath without firm U.S. guarantees.

 

Charles de Gaulle : Quand les expertises soulèvent de nouvelles hypothèses

Charles de Gaulle : Quand les expertises soulèvent de nouvelles hypothèses

Le Charles de Gaulle peu avant son retour à Toulon
crédits : MARINE NATIONALE


31/03/2009

Le porte-avions Charles de Gaulle est toujours immobilisé à quai, dans la base navale de Toulon. Le 13 mars, alors que la marine confirmait que le navire souffrait de problèmes sur son appareil propulsif, un délai de deux semaines était avancé pour connaître le résultat des expertises. Deux semaines plus tard, aucun résultat n'est encore communiqué. « Les pistes qui ont été étudiées n'amènent pas à des conclusions mais à de nouvelles hypothèses, pour lesquelles il faut faire de nouvelles analyses. Les équipes travaillent sur le navire et nous espérons avoir des précisions dans les jours qui viennent », indiquait-on, hier, de source militaire.
Le chef d'Etat-major de la marine a décidé de suspendre le programme d'activité à la mer du Charles de Gaulle suite à l'usure de deux pièces mécaniques d'entraînement des lignes d'arbres. Après avoir constaté des vibrations anormales dans les compartiments machines, l'examen de l'appareil propulsif avait révélé que deux pièces d'accouplement reliant deux des quatre turbines à leurs lignes d'arbres étaient anormalement usées.
Les réparations, qui seront entreprises après le résultat des expertises, devraient prendre plusieurs semaines, si ce n'est plusieurs mois.


(© MARINE NATIONALE)

sexta-feira, 27 de março de 2009

Hellenic Navy's difficulties in getting U-214 SSK into service can help DCNS to sell a Marlin SSK to PN

Thursday, March 26, 2009

Hellenic Navy's difficulties in getting U-214 SSK into service can help DCNS to sell a Marlin SSK to PN




DCNS is poised to open formal negotiations with Greece for the sale of up to six FREMM multimission frigates, said Alain Fougeron, the sales and marketing executive vice president at the French naval company. "We are preparing for negotiations, which have not yet started," for four or six ships, including options, he said March 24. "We hope to close the negotiations as soon as possible. That goes for both sides."


Fougeron gave no price details on the 6,000-metric-ton Frégate Européene Multimission (FREMM), co-developed by France and Italy. But the economic crisis has hit Greece hard, making it tougher for the government to pay for planned purchases of the new warships and combat aircraft. DCNS asked European missile maker MBDA to be part of the French warship offer, which beat proposals from other companies, including Italy's version of the FREMM, Fougeron said. The Italian FREMM has a different combat management system, he said. MBDA has Finmeccanica of Italy as a shareholder alongside EADS and BAE Systems. DCNS has a cooperation agreement with local partner Elefsis Shipyards. DCNS last year opened an office in Athens.


In January, Greek Defense Minister Vangelis Meimarakis said the authorities had authorized bilateral talks with France to buy six FREMM warships and 15 Super Puma search-and-rescue helicopters. The estimated price of a FREMM ship is about 500 million euros ($678 million). DCNS believes the Hellenic Navy's difficulties in getting a German-built U-214 conventional submarine into service could be helpful in efforts to sell a French boat to Pakistan. Meimarakis said that Greece is trying to renegotiate a contract for a German-built conventional submarine because of technical problems, Reuters reported Jan. 22. The German four-submarine contract is reported to be worth about four billion euros, with three other 214 boats under contract. The difficulties of the Greek submarine, the Papanikolis, has probably led Pakistan to reconsider a planned buy of the 214 from Howaldstwerke Deutsche-Werft (HDW), leaving the door open to DCNS' Marlin, an all-French derivative of the Franco-Spanish Scorpene. HDW is part of Germany's ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems.



"We are in the game in Pakistan," Fougeron said. The last of three Agosta 90 submarines built for Pakistan's Navy took to the sea in September, equipped with the Mesma air-independent propulsion (AIP) system, Fougeron said. The AIP system, which allows the submarine to operate for longer periods underwater, has been used heavily and is working well, he said. Two earlier Agosta 90 submarines have been retrofitted with the air-independent propulsion system.

Brésil : Après les sous-marins, des frégates ?

Brésil : Après les sous-marins, des frégates ?

Frégate du type FREMM
crédits : DCNS


27/03/2009

C'est en septembre prochain que la France et le Brésil devraient concrétiser les accords signés en décembre autour d'importants contrats d'armement. Le principal projet franco-brésilien est naval, avec la réalisation de quatre sous-marins conventionnels et l'aide technique française pour aider les Brésiliens à construire leur premier sous-marin nucléaire d'attaque. En outre, DCNS apportera son expertise dans le cadre de la conception et de l'édification d'une nouvelle base et d'un nouveau chantier naval (où seront réalisés les sous-marins). L'ensemble de ces contrats, qui sera porté par une société commune créée par DCNS et le groupe brésilien Odebrecht, représente quelques 7 milliards d'euros.
Après avoir imposé son offre en matière de sous-marins, qui a largement bénéficié du partenariat stratégique signé entre les présidents Sarkozy et Lula, DCNS espère, à la suite, se positionner sur le renouvellement de la flotte de surface brésilienne. Les frégates de premier rang de cette marine commencent, en effet, à prendre de l'âge. Le Brésil compte 6 frégates de 3800 tonnes du type britannique VT Mk 10, livrées entre 1976 et 1980. S'y ajoutent trois ex-Type 22 de la Royal Navy, des navires de 4400 tonnes, mises en service entre 1979 et 1982, avant d'être transférées en 1995, 1996 et 1997.

Des FREMM pour remplacer les frégates de premier rang

Assez rapidement, le Brésil va donc devoir envisager le remplacement de ces unités, âgées de 27 à 33 ans. Sur ce créneau, DCNS propose la Frégate Multi-Missions (FREMM). Commandée par la France et le Maroc, puis très probablement par la Grèce, cette frégate polyvalente de 6000 tonnes présente l'un des meilleurs (si ce n'est le meilleur) rapport qualité/prix du marché. Très automatisée, ce qui permet une réduction de son équipage, la FREMM a été conçue pour réduire les durées d'entretien et améliorer la disponibilité à la mer. Longue de 142 mètres, elle peut mettre en oeuvre toute une panoplie de missiles (Exocet, Scalp Naval, Aster 30, Aster 15, Mica VL...), des torpilles de nouvelle génération MU90 et des équipements de détection et de guerre électronique dernier cri.
Pour se donner une première idée de ce à quoi ressemblera FREMM, les Brésiliens ont, cette semaine, l'occasion de monter à bord de la frégate de défense aérienne Forbin (type Horizon). Dans le cadre de sa traversée de longue durée, la FDA est arrivée mercredi à Rio de Janeiro, une escale qui durera jusqu'à lundi et qui est notamment placée sous le signe du soutien à l'export.

segunda-feira, 23 de março de 2009

FREMM: L'Italie maintient la version action vers la terre

FREMM italienne
crédits : FINCANTIERI


20/03/2009

Contrairement à la Marine nationale, qui l'a abandonné, la marine italienne maintient la version polyvalente des Frégates Européennes Multi-Missions (FREMM). C'est ce que nous a confirmé le groupe italien Fincantieri, qui réalise ces navires aux chantiers de Riva Trigoso. Pour l'heure, six frégates lui ont été commandées, soit quatre en version anti-sous-marines et deux en version polyvalente (équivalent des ex-Action vers la Terre - AVT françaises). La construction de la tête de série, le Carlo Bergamini, a débuté en février 2008 pour une livraison en 2012.
Longues de 140 mètres pour un déplacement de 6000 tonnes, les FREMM italiennes destinées à la lutte ASM disposent de 4 missiles Milas, 4 tubes pour torpilles MU90, 16 missiles Aster 15, 4 missiles Otomat, deux canons de 76 mm, deux canons de 25 mm et deux hélicoptères. Les équipements comprennent notamment un radar EMPAR, un sonar d'étrave 4110 CL et un sonar remorqué CAPTAS 4249.
Dans leur version polyvalente, les frégates de la Marina militare disposeront de 16 missiles Aster 15, 8 missiles Otomat, une tourelle de 127 mm, un canon de 76 mm, deux canons de 25 mm, deux tubes lance-torpilles et deux hélicoptères. Le sonar remorqué est remplacé par un petit radier pouvant abriter une embarcation rapide.


FREMM italienne (© MER ET MARINE - V. GROIZELEAU)

Très différentes des frégates françaises

Bien que conçues en coopération avec DCNS, les FREMM italiennes ont une silhouette et des équipements différents par rapport à leurs cousines françaises. Le système de combat comme la veille infrarouge ne sont, par exemple, pas les mêmes. Alors que la Marine nationale a opté pour le radar Herakles, l'Italie poursuit avec l'EMPAR, qui équipe déjà les frégates du type Horizon. De même, les Italiens ont choisi de placer une tourelle de 76 mm sur le toit du hangar, ce qui n'est pas le cas de leurs partenaires. Les FREMM italiennes mettront en oeuvre le missile ASM Milas (système associant un missile Otomat et une torpille MU90). Cet engin, qui n'est pas sans rappeler l'ancien Malafon français, affiche une portée de 40 km. Pour l'heure, les navires réalisés chez Fincantieri ne sont en revanche pas dotés du missile de croisière Scalp Naval, ce qui sera le cas sur les 9 FREMM françaises à vocation ASM. L'Italie s'est néanmoins réservée la possibilité d'installer ultérieurement deux lanceurs Syler supplémentaires pour embarquer soit des missiles Aster 30, soit des missiles Scalp. La coopération autour de ce programme est donc nettement moins poussée qu'elle le fut avec Horizon. Français et Italiens se sont surtout contentés de réaliser des économies d'échelles grâce à l'achat commun de gros équipements, notamment sur la motorisation (identique) ou sur certaines armes.
Pour l'heure, la France a commandé 8 frégates ASM. Une neuvième doit être notifiée cette année, de même que deux bâtiments en version antiaérienne. Le site DCNS de Lorient poursuit l'achèvement de l'Aquitaine, qui doit être mise à flot début 2010. Du côté italien, après la commande des 4 ASM et 2 polyvalentes, la confirmation de 4 polyvalentes supplémentaires est attendue en 2012 et 2015.


FREMM italienne (© MARINA MILITARE)


FREMM conçue par DCNS (© DCNS)

quinta-feira, 19 de março de 2009

l'exercice interalliés et interarmées « Marara 2009

Polynésie : Le Batral chilien Rancagua en escale à Papeete

Le Batral chilien Rancagua
crédits : MARINE NATIONALE


19/03/2009

Le bâtiment de transport léger (Batral) Rancagua, de la marine chilienne, est arrivé à Papeete mardi. Il restera en Polynésie française jusqu'au 2 avril. Identique aux Batral du type Champlain, le Rancagua a été mis en service en 1983. Construit avec l'aide technique française aux chantiers ASMAR de Tulcahuno, il mesure 70 mètres pour un déplacement de 1330 tonnes en charge. Le Rancagua, qui compte un sistership, le Chacabuco, peut transporter 350 tonnes de matériel et 138 hommes de troupe, en plus de la cinquantaine de membres d'équipage. Le navire va participer à l'exercice interalliés et interarmées « Marara 2009 » aux côtés de son homologue français, le Batral Dumont d'Urville , des patrouilleurs La Railleuse et La Tapageuse , de la frégate de surveillance Prairial ainsi que du patrouilleur de Gendarmerie maritime Jasmin.

terça-feira, 17 de março de 2009


Le Charles de Gaulle immobilisé pour des problèmes de propulsion

Le porte-avions Charles de Gaulle
crédits : MARINE NATIONALE

13/03/2009

C'est un coup dur pour la Marine nationale et DCNS, qui a mené l'arrêt technique du Charles de Gaulle. Le porte-avions a été obligé de rentrer à Toulon, où il va rester immobilisé plusieurs semaines, voire plusieurs mois. Le chef d'Etat-major de la marine a décidé de suspendre le programme d'activité à la mer du bâtiment après le constat de l'usure anormale de deux pièces mécaniques d'entraînement des lignes d'arbres. « Durant les dernières sorties à la mer, des vibrations élevées ont été détectées dans le compartiment de propulsion. Après examen, deux pièces d'accouplement reliant deux des quatre turbines du Charles de Gaulle à leurs lignes d'arbres se sont révélées anormalement usées », explique la Marine nationale. Si l'on sait qu'une des deux pièces d'accouplement abîmée avait déjà connu une telle usure avant le grand carénage (IPER) du porte-avions, personne ne se risque encore à fournir une explication. Pour l'heure, la marine, DCNS et le Service de Soutien de la Flotte ne sont « pas en mesure d'apporter une conclusion fiable sur la cause (de l'avarie) et les délais (de réparation) », explique-t-on Rue Royale. L'état-major précise que DCNS et la marine vont « analyser les données techniques et réaliser des examens complémentaires. Il s'agit de déterminer les mesures à prendre et leurs conséquences sur le programme du bâtiment. La durée d'immobilisation pourrait durer entre plusieurs semaines et plusieurs mois ».

Conséquences opérationnelles

Cette suspension d'activité intervient juste après les phases d'entraînement et de préparation opérationnelle qui représentaient le coeur de la remontée en puissance du bâtiment et ont permis la qualification du groupe aérien embarqué.
Après une longue période d'entrainement, le navire avait atteint un niveau opérationnel lui permettant, en cas d'urgence, d'être envoyé en opérations. Il poursuivait néanmoins sa remontée en puissance afin d'atteindre, avant un prochain déploiement, un niveau « maximal » de maîtrise de l'outil aéronaval. De plus, au cours des prochaines semaines, la formation des jeunes pilotes, qui n'ont encore jamais été catapultés ou ont apponté sur le Charles de Gaulle, devait être mené à bien. Or, cette phase, cruciale pour l'avenir du groupe aérien embarqué, n'a pas encore débuté. En dehors du fait que la France n'est plus en mesure de déployer son unique porte-avions, l'aéronautique navale ne peut donc plus régénérer son potentiel au niveau des jeunes pilotes. Reste maintenant à savoir combien de temps cette situation délicate va durer.

segunda-feira, 9 de março de 2009

The Future of Chinese Deterrence Strategy

The Future of Chinese Deterrence Strategy


By: Michael S. Chase, Andrew Erickson, Christopher Yeaw

The development of China’s nuclear and conventional missile power has been among the most impressive and most closely watched aspects of Chinese military modernization over the past two decades. During the past 20 years, the Second Artillery Corps (SAC) has been transformed from a small and exclusively nuclear force to a much larger and more powerful force with a variety of roles for a growing and increasingly sophisticated arsenal of nuclear and conventional missiles. The deployment of the road-mobile DF-31 and DF-31A intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) is enhancing the striking power and survivability of China’s nuclear forces [1]. Moreover, the deployment of more than 1,000 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) since the SAC was given a conventional role in the 1990s gives China many options for striking targets in the region. The development of an anti-ship ballistic missile capability could deter or otherwise complicate U.S. intervention in the event of a regional crisis or conflict. In addition to these developments, the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) contribution to China’s nuclear deterrence posture is also changing with the transition from the PRC’s first-generation nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), which was armed with the relatively short-range JL-1 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and never conducted a deterrent patrol, to perhaps as many as five Jin-class SSBNs, each of which will be armed with 12 JL-2 SLBMs. This will diversify China’s nuclear deterrent and may further enhance its survivability [2]. Chinese analysts assess that the deployment of SSBNs and land-based mobile missiles will “fundamentally ensure the reliability and credibility of China’s nuclear force” [3]. The SAC's growing conventional ballistic missile capabilities, particularly the anti-ship ballistic missile, also suggest a growing deterrence role for these conventional forces.


Recently published Chinese sources that include previously unavailable information on nuclear and conventional missile strategy and campaigns are shedding new light on China’s evolving approach toward deterrence and Chinese views on the problems of deterrence and nuclear strategy. By drawing on some of these sources, which include a variety of Chinese language books, academic and technical journal articles, military media reports, newspapers and periodicals, and key sources from the secondary literature on the SAC, it is possible to trace the evolution of China’s deterrence strategy toward an approach that some have called “effective deterrence.”


The Evolution of China’s Nuclear Strategy


In the years following the detonation of China’s first atomic bomb in 1964, China’s nuclear strategy and doctrine were relatively immature due to the constraints imposed by Mao Zedong’s adherence to his military theories, the domestic tumult of the Cultural Revolution, and the limitations of Chinese nuclear warhead and ballistic missile technology. Mao’s dogmatic approach made it all but impossible to develop innovative ideas about nuclear strategy and doctrine. The chaos of the Cultural Revolution further inhibited consideration of key issues related to nuclear strategy and doctrine. Finally, according to some analysts, technological developments influenced China’s approach to nuclear strategy, rather than strategy driving technological requirements and program decisions [4].


By the mid-1990s, however, Chinese strategists were engaging in debates about nuclear strategy and doctrine along with arms control issues. Some of these discussions centered on a potential shift from the traditional posture of “minimum deterrence” to a doctrine of “limited deterrence,” which would require corresponding changes in force modernization if adopted [5]. Chinese nuclear strategists argued that such a shift would require “sufficient counter-force and counter-value tactical, theater, and strategic nuclear forces to deter the escalation of conventional or nuclear war,” but China did not have “the operational capabilities to implement this vision of limited deterrence” [6].


By the late 1990s, China was attempting to fill this gap in its operational capabilities at the strategic level and develop its conventional missile forces with an eye toward theater war fighting missions. Indeed, it was not long before China appeared to be on the verge of reconciling the significant divergence between the SAC's once largely ambitious doctrine and its actual capabilities. Whereas Chinese strategists were once severely constrained by technological limitations, but by around 2000, they appeared to have an increasing number of choices regarding the development, deployment and use of PLA missiles. At the time, China was developing an increasingly lethal war-fighting capability for the SAC's short-range conventional ballistic missile forces; a more robust and diversified nuclear and conventional medium-range ballistic missile force at the theater level; and a more formidable and survivable intercontinental force capable of providing China with “credible minimum deterrence” at the strategic nuclear level [7].


The Transition to “Effective Deterrence”


Chinese analysts recognized that a more survivable posture was required to make deterrence credible and effective in the face of growing challenges posed by improvements in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), missile defense, and conventional precision-strike capabilities. Leaders in Beijing also calculated that more robust nuclear weapons capabilities were required to support China’s global political and diplomatic status. According to an article co-authored by General Jing Zhiyuan, the commander of the SAC and General Peng Xiaofeng, the political commissar of the SAC, China has recognized the need to develop “an elite and effective nuclear missile force that is on par with China's position as a major power" [8]. The SAC has clearly recognized that meeting this objective requires not only new hardware, but also improvements in training, institutional reforms that will provide the force with highly capable personnel, and advances in strategic and doctrinal concepts.


Chinese military media reports suggest that SAC training is also growing in realism and complexity. In particular, as part of the PLA’s broader program of training reforms, the SAC is making progress in areas such as training under more realistic combat conditions, incorporating “blue forces,” electronic warfare, nighttime training, air defense and counter-ISR tactics and more rigorous training evaluations. Building talent has been another key priority. The senior leadership of the SAC has consistently highlighted the importance of cultivating high quality officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and technical personnel as the cornerstones of missile force modernization. One measure of its success is that 78.2 percent of cadres now hold a bachelor’s degree or above [9].


Newly available materials have also revealed some of the SAC's key operational principles and the contemporary doctrinal concepts behind the accompanying transition to “effective deterrence.” Among the key doctrinal concepts are the strategic-level emphasis on “gaining mastery by striking after the enemy has struck,” and the campaign-level concepts of “self-protection,” “key-point counterstrikes,” and “counter nuclear deterrence.” Overall, Chinese nuclear doctrine is increasingly focused on “sufficiency and effectiveness,” meaning that China places a high priority on ensuring its forces are capable of fulfilling deterrence and counter-coercion missions. China’s nuclear missile forces are “trying to catch up rapidly with an increasingly explicit strategy and doctrine premised on using nuclear weapons to deter nuclear aggression and to preclude nuclear coercion” [10].


Newly available Chinese language publications also appear to reflect ongoing debates about strategic and doctrinal issues. For example, recent articles in Chinese military journals have discussed the requirements associated with a wide variety of possible nuclear deterrence strategies [11]. Newly published Chinese books that focus on missile force and deterrence issues also raise the issue of Chinese views on signaling and escalation control. In his recent and extensive treatment of the subject, Zhao Xijun, SAC commander from 1996 to 2003, states that the goal of China’s deterrent missile force is to “shake the enemy psychologically, make the enemy’s war volition waver, weaken the enemy commander’s operational determination, disturb the enemy psyche and public psyche, and achieve [the objective of] 'conquering without fighting'” [12]. Additionally, however, Zhao states, “the goal of wartime deterrence is to prevent conventional war from escalating into nuclear war, and to prevent low-intensity nuclear war from further escalating” [13]. Thus conceived, deterrence imposes stringent requirements on the Chinese nuclear posture, including an adequate force size and composition, survivability, and highly reliable nuclear command and control. Moreover, Zhao states that a “flexible application” of deterrence across all levels of war, from the strategic down to the tactical, is “indispensable [for] effective and credible deterrence” [14].


Among the other issues reportedly under discussion are the merits of continuing to adhere to the “no first use” (NFU) policy. Some Chinese strategists appear to view the NFU policy as an unnecessary self-imposed strategic constraint. At least some analysts who influence the debate have already considered at least three scenarios under which Beijing would discard the traditional NFU policy. The first is retaliation for conventional strikes on strategic and/or nuclear targets and facilities. According to Zhao, “In a conventional war, when the enemy threatens to implement conventional strikes against one’s major strategic targets, such as the nuclear facilities; in order to protect the nuclear facilities, prevent nuclear leakage, and to arrest the escalation of conventional war to nuclear war, one should employ nuclear weapons to initiate active nuclear deterrence against the enemy” [15].


The second possibility is a crisis-driven change in China’s declaratory nuclear policy. Specifically, Chinese authors have suggested that Beijing could lower the nuclear threshold to deter intervention in a Taiwan crisis or conflict. According to Zhang Peimin's article in Military Art, a Chinese military journal, “When we are under the pressure of circumstances to use military force to reunify the motherland’s territory, we may even lower the threshold of using nuclear weapons to deter intervention by external enemies” [16]. The third scenario is when Chinese leaders believe that territorial integrity is at stake. Some Chinese strategists seem to hint at the possibility of first use under particularly dire circumstances, such as a scenario in which the PLA is on the verge of suffering a politically catastrophic defeat in a conventional military conflict over Taiwan.


Conclusion


China’s nuclear modernization is focused on improving the ability of its forces to survive an adversary's first strike and making its nuclear deterrence posture more credible, tasks that have taken on increased urgency as a result of growing concerns regarding U.S. nuclear preeminence, missile defense plans and conventional precision strike capabilities [17]. China is moving toward a much more survivable and thus more credible, strategic nuclear posture with the development of the road-mobile DF-31 and DF-31A ICBMs and the JL-2 SLBM. Beijing is also expanding its conventional missile capabilities, to include not only an increasingly potent SRBM force but also medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) that could threaten U.S. aircraft carriers. According to General Jing Zhiyuan and General Peng Xiaofeng, Commander and Political Commissar of the SAC, the SAC has “achieved the great leap in development from a single core unit to a nuclear and conventional entity which gives equal attention to both” [18]. Further improvements are still required, according to General Jing and General Peng, but as a result of the advances that have already been made, China’s "strategic deterrence and actual combat capabilities have been vastly improved" [19].


Indeed, the introduction of road-mobile strategic missiles and SSBNs will allow China to achieve a posture of “effective deterrence.” The modernization of Chinese nuclear forces and the transition from silo-based to road-mobile nuclear missiles and SSBNs might thus enhance strategic deterrence stability. Indeed, deterrence theory suggests that a more secure second-strike capability should enhance stability by causing both the United States and China to behave much more cautiously.


There are a number of reasons, however, to be concerned that the transition to a more secure second strike capability will not necessarily translate immediately or automatically into greater strategic stability. Indeed, it is entirely possible that these developments could in fact decrease crisis stability under certain circumstances, particularly if China’s growing nuclear and missile capability tempts Beijing to behave more assertively or planners and decision-makers in either country fail to consider the potential implications of certain actions. Instability may also result if the undersea environment becomes a place of uncomfortably close approach between U.S. attack submarines and Chinese SSBNs, changes in force posture or technological developments result in heightened insecurity, or the alerting and de-alerting of strategic forces creates a temporary state of increased vulnerability.

Consequently, as China continues to modernize its nuclear and missile forces, problems of strategic stability appear poised to become much more important aspects of the U.S.-China security relationship in the coming years. Although China’s nuclear and missile force modernization may contribute to greater strategic stability in the long run, neither China nor the United States should assume that this outcome will result automatically from China’s deployment of a relatively secure second strike capability. Indeed, successfully managing what could become a potentially dangerous balancing act will require much of both parties. The United States will need to exercise considerable self-restraint given the asymmetries that will continue to characterize the U.S.-China nuclear balance despite China’s recent enhancement of its nuclear and conventional missile capabilities. Planners and decision-makers in the United States will also need to have an in-depth understanding of Chinese views on strategic signaling, crisis management and escalation control, particularly in the context of a conflict over Taiwan. In addition, Chinese planners and decision-makers will need to have a similarly realistic understanding of U.S. views and motivations.


This emerging dynamic underscores the need for greater U.S.-China dialogue and engagement on strategic issues, which in turn will require Beijing to deal with a dilemma in which continued lack of Chinese transparency of nuclear weapons and missile developments may complicate China’s own deterrence strategy. Indeed, as China continues to improve its conventional and nuclear missile capabilities, it will almost certainly need to become at least somewhat more transparent in order to help safeguard shared interests in regional security and strategic stability.

Notes

1. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2008).
2. “Seapower Questions on the Chinese Submarine Force,” U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, 20 December 2006, www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/ONI2006.pdf.
3. Wang Zhongchun, “Nuclear Challenges and China’s Choices,” China Security (Winter 2007), p. 62.
4. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988.
5. Alistair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security, vol. 20, no. 3, winter 1995/96.
6. Ibid., p. 6.
7. Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes, “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence,” in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation Army as Organization, Reference Volume v1.0 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002).
8. Jing Zhiyuan and Peng Xiaofeng, “Jianshe Zhongguo tese zhanlue daodan budui” (Building a Strategic Missile Force with Chinese Characteristics), Qiushi (Seeking Truth), no. 3, February 2009, www.qsjournal.com.cn/qs/20090201/GB/qs^496^0^19.htm.
9. Ibid.
10. Evan S. Medeiros, “‘Minding the Gap’: Assessing the Trajectory of the PLA’s Second Artillery,” in Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell, ed., Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007, pp. 143-190.
11. See, for example, Lieutenant Colonel Li Shaohui and Major Tao Yongqiang, “The Force Foundations and Strategic Space of Nuclear Deterrence,” Junshi Xueshu (Military Art), 2006, No. 6, pp. 55-57.
12. See, for example, Zhao Xijun, ed., Coercive Deterrence Warfare: A Comprehensive Discussion on Missile Deterrence (Beijing: National Defense University Press, May 2005), p. 47.
13. Ibid., p. 47.
14. Ibid., p. 78.
15. Ibid., p. 173.
16. Zhang Peimin, “How to Develop the Means of Strategic Deterrence,” Junshi Xueshu (Military Art), February 2004, p. 34.
17. Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” February 12, 2009, www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090212_testimony.pdf.
18. Jing and Peng, “Jianshe Zhongguo tese zhanlue daodan budui” (Building a Strategic Missile Force with Chinese Characteristics).
19. Ibid.

2009 La Marine nationale va désarmer 8 bâtiments cette année

La Marine nationale va désarmer 8 bâtiments cette année

La Fougueuse sera la premier P400 à être retiré du service
crédits : © Marine Nationale


09/03/2009

Patrouilleurs, chasseurs de mines, bâtiments de soutien... En métropole et outre-mer, la Marine nationale a prévu de désarmer, selon nos sources, pas moins de 8 bâtiments cette année. Vont, ainsi, être retirés du service deux des treize chasseurs de mines tripartite (CMT). Il s'agit du Persée, lancé à Lorient en 1988, et du Verseau, l'un des trois CMT rachetés à la Belgique en 1997. Tous deux sont basés à Toulon. L'ex-Iris a été construit aux chantiers Béliard, à Ostende, et mis en service en 1988. La force de guerre des mines va aussi perdre le bâtiment de soutien mobile (BSM) Loire (1967), qui sera retiré après son ultime déploiement en océan Indien.
Du côté des patrouilleurs, la flotte française va débuter en 2009 le retrait des unités du type P400, déployés pour la plupart outre-mer. La Fougueuse, basée à Fort-de-France, dans les Antilles, sera le premier P400 à être retiré du service actif. Comme ses sisterships, il a été construit aux CMN, à Cherbourg, et est opérationnel depuis 1987.
Patrouilleur bien connu sur la côte atlantique, la Sterne va, elle aussi, tirer sa révérence. Construit à Lorient et mis en service il y a plus de 28 ans, le patrouilleur de service public (PSP) est dévolu à la police des pêches dans la zone économique exclusive.
Dans le domaine des unités logistiques, outre la Loire, le bâtiment atelier polyvalent (BAP) Jules Verne (1976) a réalisé sa dernière sortie en mer le mois dernier, avant de revenir à quai à Toulon, où il sera prochainement désarmé.
Toujours dans le Var, la marine a aussi prévu de désarmer cette année le bâtiment de soutien (BSR) de région Chevreuil, mis en service en 1977.
Enfin, à Lanvéoc, la Chimère, l'un des deux bâtiments d'instruction à la manoeuvre de l'Ecole navale, sera mise en retraite. Deux nouveaux BIM seront commandés dans les prochaines semaines pour remplacer la Chimère et le Farfadet. En revanche, aucun remplaçant n'est encore programmé pour les autres navires.


Le CMT Verseau (© : MARINE NATIONALE)


Le PSP Sterne (© : MARINE NATIONALE)


La Loire (© : MARINE NATIONALE)


Le Jules Verne (© : JEAN-LOUIS VENNE)


Le Chevreuil (© : JEAN-LOUIS VENNE)


La Chimère (© : MARINE NATIONALE)