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sábado, 31 de maio de 2008

Submerged IDAS Missile Firing is Milestone for Undersea Warfare

A German navy submarine has achieved a major milestone in undersea warfare by successfully test firing a fiber-optically-guided IDAS (Interactive Defense and Attack system for Submarines) missile from a submerged position yesterday.

The test was performed by the U33, the third of Germany's ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems-built U 212 class of air-independent propulsion submarines, in the western part of the Baltic Sea May 29.

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Artist's impression of IDAS launch from a submarine. Image: Diehl

IDAS, developed by a consortium of Diehl Defence [the missile], TKMS (HDW) [submarine integration] and Norwegian company Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace [U 212 command & control system integration], showed a "convincing performance" during all phases of the flight, a statement from Diehl says.

"After updating the missile´s inertial system by the submarine's navigation system, the missile was ejected from the torpedo tube. Under water it spread its wings and rudders and started its engine to break through the water surface a few seconds later, ascending to a pre-planned altitude to move into a controlled flight stage," the statement says.

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The IDAS missile is about the same size as the ubiquitous AIM-9L Sidewinder from Raytheon (built under license by Diehl BGT Defence) and Diehl's IRIS-T missile (aft). Seen here on display at ILA 2008 in Berlin. Photo: Joris Janssen Lok

Differing from an operational scenario, the test was ended in a controlled glide flight. During the entire flight, data and images of a video camera were transmitted to the submarine via the fiber-optical wire.

According to Diehl, the test firing proves that IDAS can be employed from a submerged submarine. "All mechanical interfaces proved reliable while data transmission via optical wave guide functioned smoothly," the company says.

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Engineers at TKMS-owned Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) slide an IDAS test round into the launch container, which in turn fits inside a standard torpedo tube. Photo: HDW

High-ranking Navy officers from several interested countries witnessed the event as observers on an accompanying vessel.

With the test firing from a submerged submarine, the IDAS consortium, in a joint effort with the German Navy as well as the German defense procurement agency BWB, passed a further milestone in this program – nine months earlier than foreseen in the contract, Diehl says.

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Photo: Joris Janssen Lok

The next steps in the IDAS project consist of "drawing up outstanding phase documents and initializing the international development program."

IDAS is designed to allow a submerged submarine to attack an anti-submarine warfare helicopter (which is particularly vulnerable when it is deployed in a hover operating its active dipping sonar), or slow-flying maritime patrol aircraft.

The missile, launched from standard torpedo tubes, is also suited to perform a precision attack against a pinpoint position on a surface ship (such as the bridge or a helicopter on deck) or against a target ashore.

ATLASUR A toda máquina

A toda máquina

 La Armada Argentina en Sudáfrica. Luego de tres días de coordinaciones, conferencias de planeamiento y actividades recreativas, comenzó la ejercitación Atlasur VII.

SUDÁFRICA – El miércoles pasado, en condiciones de viento fuerte y lluvia, los buques de las Armadas de Argentina, Sudáfrica, Brasil y Uruguay comenzaron la fase uno de la ejercitación multinacional Atlasur VII.

La bahía Falsa fue el escenario del encuentro inicial de las embarcaciones. A medida que zarpaban, las unidades fueron adoptando una formación en columna: SAS “Amatola”, SAS “Isandlwana”, BNS “Defensora”, BNS “Independencia”, ARA “Rosales”, ARA “Robinson”, AROU “Uruguay”, SAS “Galeshewe” y SAS “Isaac Dyoba” se fueron perdiendo en el horizonte hacia el sur.

Las operaciones de esta fase incluyeron ejercitaciones antisubmarinas y antisuperficie, prácticas de aterrizaje y despegue de helicópteros, pasajes al habla y ejercicios de comunicaciones visuales, entre otros.

Helicópteros Alouette, Linx y Esquilo realizaron demostraciones aéreas el viernes pasado

Jueves intenso

El jueves, la Fuerza de Tareas 19 incorporó al buque logístico SAS “Drakensberg” que volvía de una larga navegación en la que acompañó a dos submarinos de la clase 209 en su viaje inaugural desde Alemania. Luego, las ejercitaciones se orientaron hacia su protección en un “ambiente multiamenaza”.

“Las comunicaciones se hicieron fluidas, mejoraron las maniobras y poco a poco las tripulaciones fueron integrando su accionar en un excelente nivel de interoperabilidad”, explicaron las autoridades que dirigieron el adiestramiento.

El mismo jueves por la tarde se efectuó una ejercitación de tiro naval contra blanco al garete materializado por un "tomato killer", boya reflectora radar de seis metros de diámetro. Las unidades encolumnadas tiraron en forma independiente. La performance de los buques argentinos fue notable y elogiada luego por el comandante de la Fuerza de Tareas 19, capitán de navío de la Armada de Sudáfrica Douglas Faure.

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Las últimas luces del día fueron el preludio de una ejercitación de tiro contra bengala. El grupo de tareas practicó técnicas de autodefensa colectiva antimisil. Las bengalas con paracaídas, lanzadas mediante cohetes por la fragata “Independencia”, iluminaron la noche simulando ser misiles en vuelo. La munición rasante de los buques convergió enérgicamente sobre cada bengala. Una vez más, el tiro de los buques de la Armada Argentina fue excelente y reconocido luego por los camaradas de las otras unidades participantes.

Durante la noche, la Fuerza de Tareas 19 fondeó en formación en una larga fila de frente de nueve buques a menos de dos millas de la costa. El espectáculo de sus luces flotando en la oscuridad atrajo la atención de los pobladores locales que, según pudo saberse luego, disfrutaron de la vista desde las muchas pasarelas, muelles, bares y restaurantes frente al mar que Simonstown posee.

Fase uno, concluida

La mañana del viernes fue dedicada a la difusión pública de la operación. En efecto, dos helicópteros Puma transportaron a una gran cantidad de periodistas a bordo del SAS “Drakensberg” que ingresó en la bahía Falsa como núcleo de la formación por divisiones en columna.

Los helicópteros Alouette III de la corbeta ARA "Robinson", Esquilo de la fragata “Independencia” y Super Linx de la fragata “Defensora”, luego de un pasaje rasante en formación, brindaron un espectáculo de habilidad aérea. Los fotógrafos se agolparon cuando los helicópteros se colgaron frente al buque logístico, girando, volando hacia atrás; y en el caso del Super Linx, ejecutando maniobras de acrobacia aérea.

Al atardecer, los buques terminaron de amarrar y las tripulaciones volvieron a poblar el tranquilo Simonstown. Las colas en los teléfonos públicos y las conexiones a internet se multiplicaron cuando los 800 marinos extranjeros renovaron su comunicación con sus seres queridos. Las distintas reuniones luego de las operaciones se prolongaron hasta la noche y las cenas en las cámaras se hicieron multinacionales.

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Terminó así la fase uno del Atlasur VII que continuará a partir de hoy con operaciones más complejas y que culminará el próximo viernes con la entrada a Ciudad del Cabo, antiguo enclave estratégico para el control del pasaje entre el Océano Indico y el Atlántico.

Fotos: enviada especial Silvina Rosello

26/05/08
GACETA MARINERA

sexta-feira, 30 de maio de 2008

UK Nuclear Submarines Understaffed


  1. Britain's nuclear deterrent submarines are starting to feel the manpower shortage that's affecting the UK's armed forces.

    One in six submarine jobs vacant
    One in six submarine jobs vacant

    Sky News has learned that the boats including those carrying the country's Trident missiles are putting to sea with as little as 85% of their intended crew complement.

    Forty years ago next month the Royal Navy took over the task of carrying the country's ultimate threat.

    At least one 17,000 tonne "Vanguard" class submarine is always somewhere at sea, ready to launch a devastating missile strike.

    Despite a recent pay bonus, making submariners Britain's highest-earning sailors, a manning shortage means that across the undersea fleet more than one job in six is vacant.


    There are not enough volunteers to fill the ranks, so seamen are drafted in from surface vessels to make up the minimum numbers.

    Sonar operators are having to cover two jobs, and time ashore and in training has been curtailed.

    Sky News's defence correspondent Geoff Meade has been aboard HMS Trenchant, a nuclear-powered patrol boat where student captains were briefed that manpower levels were the main concern.

    Some staff have to cover two jobs
    Some staff have to cover two jobs

    It's particular acute among nuclear watch keepers who monitor the performance of the boat's reactor. In the engine room, supervised trainees were being used to cover for qualified technicians.

    The revival of Britain's civil atom power programme is expected to worsen the scarcity as experienced operators are tempted by higher salaries and regular home life of jobs ashore.

    In the week that it emerged that a British submarine had been forced to surface after colliding with a rock outcrop under the Red Sea, the Navy insists the shortages have not reached a level where they compromise operational safety.

    Not enough volunteers to fill jobs
    Not enough volunteers to fill jobs

    The Australian and Norwegian navies have solved their manning crisis by opening up submarine service to women.

    Whilst female recruiting fills the ranks of the Royal Navy's surface fleet, submarines, for now, remain single-sex.

    In only one area there is no shortage of volunteers.

    Twice a year the service's best officers compete in arguably the toughest test anywhere of military leadership.

    Over four months they are subjected to intense pressure, culminating in four weeks at sea when they command a boat in realistic war games.

    The ultimate prize for those who qualify is the captaincy of a submarine.

    Failure means an abrupt end to an undersea career. The 40% on average who do not make the grade are instantly put ashore. They will never again serve aboard submarines.

    No wonder the Navy calls it "The Perished".

Une série de patrouilleurs marocains pour les chantiers de Lorient

Une série de patrouilleurs marocains pour les chantiers de Lorient

Vue du futur OPV 70 de la marine marocaine
crédits : RAIDCO MARINE


30/05/2008

Selon nos informations, Raidco Marine a confié à Aker Yards Lorient la réalisation d'un patrouilleur de 70 mètres que lui a commandé la marine royale marocaine. La construction de ce bateau doit débuter à Lanester l'an prochain pour une livraison à l'automne 2010. Ce patrouilleur, du type OPV 70, est destiné aux missions de surveillance maritime et de contrôle de pêches. Il s'agit du premier navire d'un projet prévoyant en tout quatre unités, dont la mise en service doit intervenir à raison d'un patrouilleur par an. Conçue aux normes civiles, cette nouvelle série constitue pour le site lorientais d'Aker Yards (ex-Alstom Leroux Naval) une nouvelle bouffée d'oxygène, après la commande l'an passé de trois ferries côtiers pour une compagnie norvégienne. « Ces OPV seront construits avec une tôle fine à haute résistance qui nécessite un savoir faire bien maîtrisé par le personnel d'Aker Yards, qui a déjà réalisé des patrouilleurs de ce genre pour la Mauritanie, la France et aussi le Maroc à la fin des années 90 », explique-t-on chez Raidco Marine.


Le chantier Aker Yards de Lorient (© : AKER YARDS)

Implantée à Lorient, la société est assez atypique dans le milieu de la construction navale, sans doute parce qu'elle ne se charge pas elle-même de la fabrication des bateaux. Assurant le marketing, les études, la mise en place du financement, la signature et le suivi des contrats, Raidco confie la construction à un réseau de partenaires, comme le site de Lanester, mais aussi CNB à L'Herbaudière. Le chantier vendéen a notamment travaillé sur le programme des 24 vedettes côtières de surveillance maritime (VCSM) de la Gendarmerie maritime.
La société reprend les navires à leur sortie de chantiers pour mener les essais en mer, la formation des équipages ou encore les convoyages jusqu'aux clients. Raidco, qui assure la fourniture de gros équipements, se chargera dans le cadre du contrat marocain de la mise en place de l'armement, qui ne sera pas du ressort d'Aker. Les OPV 70 seront dotés d'une tourelle de 76 mm et d'un canon de 40 mm.
On notera que les industriels lorientais travaillent depuis plus de 10 ans avec le Maroc. Ainsi, entre 1995 et 1997, le chantier de Lanester avait livré cinq patrouilleurs (OPV 64) pour le Maroc. DCNS, de son côté, va réaliser une frégate multi-missions pour ce pays. Enfin, depuis plusieurs années, Raidco Marine assure dans le cadre de ses prestations de maintenance les arrêts techniques d'unités de la flotte marocaine. C'est le cas actuellement du patrouilleur El Bachir, en carénage à Lorient jusqu'au mois de novembre.


Le patrouilleur El Majid en carénage à Lorient en 2007 (© : RAIDCO MARINE)


Le patrouilleur El Majid en carénage à Lorient en 2007 (© : RAIDCO MARINE)

quinta-feira, 29 de maio de 2008

The Very Small Surface Combatant (VSC-100)

May 29, 2008

The Very Small Surface Combatant (VSC-100)

I'm thinking the Green Water Navy discussion yesterday got off track a bit, but like champs a few commenter's laid down the wood and reset the discussion on the right track. Well done.

The 100 ft metric discussed in the ISN article discussed brought to mind a concept introduced in 2005 as part of the Congressionally mandated Analysis of Alternatives for Fleet Constitution mandated by Congress. Because we all know the Navy would demand a platform be built from scratch, that using an existing platform would simply not happen, we think perhaps this idea would scale very nicely into the technology set and desired requirements for a green water platform.

Admiral Cebrowski's Very Small Surface Combatant (VSC-100)

Small, fast, modular surface combatant craft
Carried to theater by large support ship
Payload capacity increased as less fuel carried
Full Load Displacement: 100 tons
Speed: 60 knots; Crew: 3
Limited capacity for fixed systems, carries one module at a time
Operated as a unit or in flights of two or more craft
Modules:
  • ASW-1: Variable depth sonar
  • ASW-2: Towed array, torpedoes, fire control system
  • Strike-1: 6-cell launcher, fire control system
  • Strike-2: 3 UAVs (for targeting)
  • Mine Warfare: 1 UUV, acoustic MCM system, mine neutralization system
  • SOF: 2 rigid-hull inflatable boats
  • USV: 2 unmanned surface vehicles
  • SUW-1: 8 Surface-to-surface missiles
  • SUW-2: Close-In Weapon System
  • AAW: Launcher, missiles, multifunction radar
  • UUV: 12 medium UUVs
Sensors: small sensors for acoustic detection
If the VSC-100 platform was designed to from a Global Fleet Stations host ship, we think this is exactly the type of thing that makes sense for addressing the green water requirements for peacetime operations. Keep in mind, the Navy finds itself in a period of fiscal competition, so any budget resources committed to a peacetime platform must find usefulness in a wartime scenario to justify investment. With weapon centric modular payloads as a core design factor, the Very Small Surface Combatant (VSC-100) does exactly that.

One other thought. We have linked that OFT report twice tonight. I've been thinking about some commentary regarding Admiral Cebrowski's ideas that highlights just how tuned in his concepts were to the time we were in. From Thomas Barnett:
Cebrowski pushed my work, to include the SysAdmin stuff, like crazy throughout the bureaucracy as early as 2002--eventually right up to Rumsfeld himself. I briefed all of Rummy's senior aides, as I describe in PNM, in the summer of 2002.

Tell me, how can Art be a champion of both NCW and SysAdmin stuff at the same time?
Dr. Barnett reminds us that the ideas that Streetfighter is associated with are far more complex than the criticism allowed. The Navy was very resistant to the version of change introduced by the ideas being floated in the late 90s, but that a two star Admiral is talking about building 100 ft ships for green water operations to support Global Fleet Stations today is a sign that change does happen, but at a snails pace.

Regardless, it is very difficult to read that OFT report and not recognize that those ideas in 2005 had evolved in line with the requirements of today. The revolt led by Admiral Cebrowski, Captain Hughes, Thomas Barnett, and many others continues to prove that the ideas really were todays solution. Ask yourself a question: Would the Navy be better off today had it built a bunch of Streetfighters instead of the LCS and DDG-1000s over the last few years? We think so, but we also ask ourselves this question.

If the Navy builds a bunch of 100 ft green water boats instead of 5 DDG-1000s will we find ourselves wishing we had the 5 battleships a decade from now?

We think it depends, if 50 Very Small Surface Combatants (VSC-100) at $100 million per and with modules are produced instead (essentially 50 VSC-100s for the cost of two DDG-1000s), I think the Navy gains more with the numbers.

quarta-feira, 28 de maio de 2008

L'ex-porte-avions Clemenceau encore à Brest cet été ?

L'ex-porte-avions Clemenceau encore à Brest cet été ?

L'ex-Clemenceau de retour à Brest en mai 2006
crédits : Marine nationale


29/05/2008

Rendez-vous incontournable des vieux gréements, Brest 2008 pourrait bien se dérouler en présence de l'ex-porte-avions Clemenceau. Selon nos informations, la décision concernant le choix du lauréat de l'appel d'offres sur le démantèlement du Q 790 pourrait encore glisser, rendant possible, pour ne pas dire probable, le maintien du « Tigre » à Brest en juillet. Les dossiers présentés par plusieurs groupes français et européens feraient encore l'objet d'études approfondies, notamment sur le respect des législations auxquelles sont soumis les différents candidats. « C'est très bien parti mais il faut s'assurer minutieusement que le dossier sera juridiquement et administrativement inattaquable. Il faut toutes les garanties », indique-t-on au ministère de la Défense.
Lorsque le vieux Clem était rentré de son périple en Inde, au printemps 2006, l'Hôtel de Brienne s'était engagé - auprès des élus locaux notamment, à ce que la coque quitte Brest avant les festivités maritimes de juillet 2008. Ayant laissé sa place à Hervé Morin, Michèle Alliot-Marie n'aura pas à tenir cet engagement. Le nouveau ministre reste néanmoins, comme son prédécesseur, très attentif au bon déroulement de l'« Affaire Q790 ». Pour éviter d'essuyer un nouveau camouflet, le Mindef préfère jouer l'excès de prudence et vérifier que son dossier ne comporte aucune faille. Quant à la promesse de MAM pour Brest 2008 : « Est-ce que ça vaut le coup de se précipiter et de risquer de mettre en danger un dossier extrêmement complexe pour tenir une date qu'on s'était imposée à l'époque ? ».
Par conséquent, l'Etat souhaite prendre le temps qu'il faut, quitte à repousser légèrement le départ du bateau vers un chantier de déconstruction. Un éventuel retard parait, de plus, moins problématique aujourd'hui qu'il y a deux ans. Localement, on semble en effet s'être habitué à la silhouette de l'ancien porte-avions, construit par l'arsenal brestois en 1961 et fer de lance de l'escadre de l'Atlantique jusqu'à la fin des années 70. En somme, une page de l'histoire maritime de la ville.

Why No One Believes the Navy in DefenseNews

Why No One Believes the Navy

USN Leaders Have Growing Disconnect With Congress, Fleet

Published: 26 May 09:51 EDT (05:51 GMT)

When U.S. Navy officials tell Congress they have confidence in their shipbuilding cost projections, lawmakers don't believe them.

The condition of the cruiser Chosin, shown here May 2, may signal fleetwide problems. (MC1 James E. Foehl / U.S. Navy)

When flag officers say they've got enough money for maintenance, fleet sailors wonder why high-tech warships aren't combat ready.

When top admirals say they have a new maritime strategy, analysts struggle to match it with the shipbuilding plan.

When business strategies override operational needs, officers wonder if they're war fighters or executives.

Navy leaders are suffering from a credibility gap - with Congress, with industry and, increasingly, with the fleet.

In discussions with dozens of naval professionals over several months, few questioned the Navy's commitment to fielding an effective fighting force. But on a wide range of issues, the ability of Navy leaders to manage programs and explain service direction is being questioned, doubted and in some cases challenged outright.

"They need to take a hard look at themselves," one former senior officer said.

An element of denial is apparent in many service calculations, which are typically based on perfect-world scenarios to make everything come out right.

"They're constantly using optimistic cost and schedule assumptions," said Bob Work, a retired Marine Corps artillery colonel who is a top naval analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington. "This continual optimism, the continually rosy assumptions, the effort to go too fast" have so eroded the service's credibility in Congress, Work said, that House lawmakers have difficulty even listening to the Navy.

One congressional source said he can't, at times, rule out deliberate deception.

"It's more a feeling rather than specific things," the source said. "An accumulation of a lot of little things which in and of themselves are perfectly explainable, but when you add them up, it doesn't work."

Symptoms

Disagreement abounds on where the primary problem lies, when it began or what the key symptoms are.

Some cite the new Maritime Strategy, kicked off in spring 2006 by then-chief of naval operations (CNO) Adm. Michael Mullen and viewed by some as an indication of a naval identity crisis.

Others point to unrealistic expectations for overly ambitious shipbuilding programs. This covers both the ambitious Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, developed under Mullen's predecessor, Adm. Vern Clark and spurred on by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's transformation movement, and the decadelong effort to produce the advanced DDG 1000 destroyer. The Navy, which has had trouble defining that ship's purpose, says each DDG-1000 will cost about $3.3 billion; but independent estimates peg the costs at $5 billion or more.

A growing number of professionals also sense a leadership vacuum, particularly at the service's top levels. Some wonder whether Mullen's advancement to the nation's top military job - chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - has kept his successor as CNO, Adm. Gary Roughead, from more assertively taking the service's wheel.

There are reports of forceful behind-the-scenes discussions in OPNAV, the part of the Navy that reports directly to the CNO. But when Navy leaders speak in open forums, their support for programs and philosophies lacks conviction and a clear sense of purpose.

"They're not even fighting hard for their own shipbuilding plan anymore," a retired senior officer said.

Navy Secretary Donald Winter has led efforts to force shipbuilders to modernize and become more efficient, and the Hill has applauded the efforts. But Winter has made enemies among his supplier base. For the third straight year, he castigated shipbuilders at March's Navy League Sea-Air-Space Symposium in Washington for failing to control costs and boost quality.

This time, industry's groans were somewhat stifled when Northrop Grumman announced a month later that it would eat at least $320 million in charges to re-do poor work on a Navy assault ship it is building.

Navy leaders resist the notion that there are leadership issues and insist steady hands are at the wheel. But they declined requests to comment for this article.

Littoral Combat Ship

Early last year, LCS acquisition turned from problematic to fiasco, as an ambitious plan for concurrent design and construction, a tight building schedule and a cost cap of $220 million crashed headlong into the rocks of reality. Navy officials admitted the price was going to be far higher - and that they had no real idea how high it would go.

Winter tried to force competitors Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics to switch from cost-plus contracts to a fixed-price agreement for subsequent ships, shifting the financial risk to the contractors. But both companies declined, and the second ships were canceled for both. Costs for the initial LCS ships are now forecast at around a half billion dollars each, and the building schedule for subsequent ships, still planned to number 55, has been slowed.

But lost behind the acquisition debacle is the absence of cultural preparation to allow the fleet to help develop the LCS concept - something commanders, crews and shore establishments will need years to embrace.

The ship's new features include heavy dependence on networked data, extensive use of modular weapons and sensors, an abundance of off-board vehicles requiring doctrinal development and unique maintenance, and extensive development on concepts of operations. Command structures will need to be perfected for how the core 40-man crews interact with mission-specific detachments of 15 sailors. No navy operates ships like these today, and it will take years of development, testing and training to make the new concepts function smoothly.

"They're not going to get full capability out of that puppy for 20 years," said Robbin Laird, a Washington-based defense analyst.

Maintenance Woes

Recently, more thinkers are worrying how the small crews will keep the 2,800-ton ships in fighting trim, given the maintenance problems now vexing far larger crews. The 30-year fleet plan depends on keeping today's ships in service longer than originally envisioned. But recent material inspections of surface warships have revealed what some fear are fleetwide maintenance problems.

In March, a Ticonderoga-class cruiser and an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, among the world's most sophisticated ships and fitted with the Aegis combat system, were found by inspectors to be "unfit for sustained combat operations."

The Navy tied their condition to recent deployments, but the five-year-old Fleet Response Plan requires ships to remain deployable for some months after a cruise. Moreover, service leaders have long insisted that ships kept steaming after the end of a deployment would be in better condition than if they were laid up for rest and repairs.

But that's not proven true. In a message to the fleet April 18, Navy Surface Forces chief Vice Adm. D.C. Curtis said "course corrections" might be necessary to fix maintenance shortcomings.

One problem some believe needs attention: the limited hands-on training sailors now get before arriving aboard ships. Sailors in many technical ratings are learning their trade with computer-based simulations.

"There is absolutely no substitute for a wrench in a young sailor's hand," thundered the former senior officer. "You can't learn that on a computer. We are losing technical skills rapidly in the junior ranks."

313-Ship Plan

Before moving on to become chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then-CNO Mullen succeeded in one of his top priorities: setting a definitive number of ships for the future fleet.

The 313-ship, 30-year fleet plan - which is revised each year - emerged in February 2006, designed to quiet critics who decried the practice of Clark and previous Navy Secretary Gordon England of advocating not a specific number, but a range.

The Navy admitted the plan was not perfect. Among other problems, in order to make the number of surface combat ships add up, they had to extend the ships' planned life-spans. Arleigh Burke-class DDG 51 destroyers, for example, are now slated to sail for 40 years rather than 35. Real-life experience, however, indicates that could be costlier and more difficult than this rosy projection allows. The 14-year-old Stout, the destroyer found unfit for combat, is considered by maintenance officers to be an old ship, yet it is barely one-third of the way through its 40-year career. The other ship, the cruiser Chosin, is 17 years old and needs to remain operational for 18 more years.

"The maintenance strategy is absolutely critical to being able to execute the 313-ship, 30-year fleet plan," said the congressional source.

The service has little, if any, credibility in Congress when predicting the budget necessary to buy its future fleet. The Navy did not help its case by insisting for two years that this plan would cost an average of $15 billion a year, despite critics who said the real price would be at least $20 billion. This year the service quietly revised its estimate to $20 billion per year.

"But they never discussed that in testimony, they never offered any explanation," the congressional source declared. "That isn't incompetence; that isn't a mistake. That's sort of a willful and deliberate omission. It's not lying, but it's leaving out an evident truth."

Work said the Navy really wants many more ships - many officers still wistfully dream of the Reagan-era "600-Ship Navy" - and the unaffordability of its plan creates a culture of unrealistic optimism.

"Roughead said 313 is a 'floor' number," Work said. "The Navy wants a bigger fleet, but they're stuck with a budget of no more than about 300 ships, and the Navy has had to be extremely creative in its plan, using optimistic assumptions, ships in the out-years that never come about. Unable to convince people they need the resources to build this fleet, they're constantly using optimistic cost and schedule assumptions."

The Maritime Strategy

The fleet plan was meant to furnish stability, a response to shipbuilders who complained they couldn't plan if the Navy kept changing its mind each year about the number of ships it would build.

Ironically, however, the Navy completed work on its new Maritime Strategy some two years after it settled on the fleet size, reversing the logical order in which a strategy would dictate the tools needed to carry it out.

There were high hopes for the strategy when planning began in April 2006, but for the next 16 months, discussion was limited by a rigid adherence to how the strategy was being developed rather than the issues at hand, squelching open exchanges. The effort deteriorated into what some called a search for a raison d'être.

Finally unveiled last October, the completed strategy incorporated Mullen's oft-stated visions of a thousand-ship international cooperative effort, humanitarian missions and stationing of more U.S. Navy ships in foreign lands. But it added little to the debate over the Navy's roles and was criticized for avoiding discussion of what kind of fleet the Navy needs.

"It is not compelling, not tied to a force structure," said a second retired senior officer, now in industry. "So what?"

Aviation, Enterprise Approach

Aviation is not immune to these and related problems.

Navy leaders talk about a "fighter gap" beginning around 2016, but many listeners view this as a scare tactic, rather than a realistic prediction. Critics argue the Navy just wants to adjust its plans and buy more aircraft, or that the claim reflects internal disputes over whether to buy more F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets or the more expensive, but more modern F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

"The 'gap' is a bean-counter approach that is not putting you at the heart of strategic relevance," said Laird, a JSF advocate. "The F-18 is yesterday's aircraft."

Another issue stretching the Navy's credibility is the effort to reduce the number of helicopter models in the fleet to the MH-60 S and R models. The approach makes business sense, but the absence of medium- and heavy-lift capabilities means that many missions must be split into more individual sorties - which will wear out aircraft and air crews at a faster rate - and that cargoes that can't be broken down into smaller pieces simply can't be handled.

The Navy last year exacerbated the issue when it all but ignored congressional inquiries into the helicopter plan, annoying lawmakers who might be itching to order the service to purchase or develop heavy-lift helos.

The continued emphasis on applying business practices to fleet problems disturbs many naval professionals.

"We're not a business organization. We're war fighters," the first former senior officer said. "We're not here to waste money, but we're not here to make a profit."

Clark epitomized the MBA-admiral, the former officer said, with discussions of human capital management and other business-speak.

"All the flag officers have these titles that mirror a corporate board structure. I just want to throw up. They spend so much time trying to look and act like a board of directors," the former senior officer said. "Where's the warrior culture? We're not a board of directors, it's the Navy. It should be about standards and accomplishing the mission."

The second retired senior officer lamented today's risk-averse naval culture, and bemoaned the lack of a strong Navy leader. That should be the CNO, he said.

"But what does he think? What does he believe? Usually there's a champion, someone who picks people up from the malaise. Where's the champion?" ■

terça-feira, 27 de maio de 2008

HMS Superb nuclear submarine damaged in Red Sea crash

HMS Superb nuclear submarine damaged in Red Sea crash

HMS Superb hit an underwater rock on Monday and damaged its sonar equipment, forcing it to surface. None of the crew was hurt and the submarine is watertight, an MoD spokesman said. Superb, a Swiftsure-class attack submarine with a crew of 112, hit an underwater pinnacle 80 miles south of Suez. The 272-foot vessel had passed through the canal and was in the northern Red Sea when she grounded. No other vessel was involved. An MoD spokesman said the submarine's nuclear reactor was "completely unaffected" and there was "no environmental impact" from the collision. "There were no casualties and the submarine remains watertight, is safe on the surface and able to operate under her own power," he said. The vessel is in international waters but unable to dive because of the damage to sonar equipment. The Royal Navy is examining how to return the vessel to port and a full investigation is under way, with a Board of Inquiry to follow. The crew's next of kin are being informed, the MoD said. Last Friday the Telegraph reported on an official MoD inquiry which found that another nuclear submarine suffered £5 million damage after it crashed into the seabed because officers used tracing paper to plot her course. Travelling at 14 knots (about 16mph), the 5,000-ton Trafalgar submarine crashed 165ft below the surface in waters off the Isle of Skye, Scotland, in 2002. Its nuclear reactor was undamaged. Three crewmen were injured when the hunter-killer submarine turned into rocks because trainee commanders could not see vital symbols which had been covered by the paper. Senior officers supervising the course were criticised for serious lapses after the tracing paper was put over charts to prevent pen marks damaging the maps. The paper hid ocean bed contours and symbols which showed underwater current strengths. The boat's satellite navigating system had been turned off to increase the stress on the trainee captain during the examination nicknamed "Pressure Cooker''. Post-It notes were also placed over other vital systems to simulate battle damage. The submarine required an 18-month refit when it finally limped back into the Faslane submarine base.

Source:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/2039528/HMS-Superb-nuclear-submarine-damaged-in-Red-Sea-crash.html?service=print

The Tactical Node and the Strategic Network ,a "Batalha Decisiva"t

Tuesday, May 27, 2008

The Tactical Node and the Strategic Network

Milan Vego continues to offer hard hitting pieces in the Armed Forces Journal.

The Navy today is overly focused on the tactical employment of its combat forces, in its doctrine and practice. This might not be a problem in case of a conflict with numerically and technologically inferior forces. However, the Navy would have a much greater problem and possibly suffer a major defeat in a war with a relatively strong opponent that better balances the employment of his forces at the tactical and operational levels of war. The Navy’s superior technology and tactics would not be sufficient to overcome its lack of operational thinking.

The Navy’s over-reliance on technology is also one of the main reasons for its focus on the tactics of employment of platforms, weapons/sensors and combat arms. Moreover, the Navy grossly neglects tactics for employing several naval combat arms or combined arms tactics. Among numerous naval tactical publications, there is not a single one that explains the employment of surface forces, submarines, naval aircraft and combat arms of other services in combination. Another serious problem is that the Navy still lacks a doctrine for the operational level of war at sea. This lack of a broader operational framework greatly complicates writing subordinate tactical doctrinal publications.

Most of the Navy’s attention is given to strike warfare, while so-called “defensive warfare” areas, such as antisubmarine warfare, defense and protection of maritime trade, and mine warfare, are given a short shrift. The fate of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) in World War II shows what can happen when the focus is almost exclusively on tactics and offensive employment of one’s combat forces. The Japanese were fixated on the single so-called decisive battle. That preoccupation guided the IJN’s tactical doctrine and ship designs resulting in a powerful surface force that was one-dimensional and brittle. Perhaps there is nothing worse than confusing tactics with strategy, and strategy with the conduct of war, as the IJN did in the interwar years.
The article is an excellent read in full. We find several of the points quite interesting, and while we don't agree on all points we do observe there are a number of examples where tactical thinking is emphasized and where strategy is lacking. In particular we really like how Milan Vego has set up the debate for Strike Warfare.

The Navy’s over-reliance on tactics has become even more pronounced with its adoption of network-centric warfare, now commonly referred to as network-centric operations (NCO). The Navy also became one of the strongest proponents of the so-called effects-based approach to operations (EBAO). Despite claims to the contrary, NCO and EBAO use tactical techniques and procedures to accomplish the objectives across the levels of war. Yet purely tactical actions such as strikes cannot replace, major operations as the main method of accomplishing operational objectives, at least not yet

NCO also provides, through the FORCEnet network architecture, the key component for the execution of the Navy’s vision for the 21st century, Sea Power 21. Except for some elements of Sea Shield and Sea Basing, Sea Power 21 is not focused on the operational level of war. For example, one of the major components of Sea Power 21, Sea Strike, is essentially a tactical concept. Among other things, it envisages that “netted fires and automated decision aids will accelerate the launching of precision attacks on critical targets in order to create appropriate effects.”

The Navy’s narrow and tactical focus is highlighted in almost all its official statements regarding the employment of major tactical forces — the carrier strike groups, expeditionary strike groups, strike or theater ballistic missile surface action groups, and maritime prepositioning groups — as the principal forces subordinate to joint force commander. The numbered and theater fleets, such as the 7th Fleet and the Pacific Fleet, are rarely mentioned. Yet only theater forces have the capabilities to accomplish operational and strategic objectives in war at sea.

When reading this article our discussions trended towards a focus on the node vs a focus on the network, and what each piece has come to represent. A node can be described as a tactical application of technology for "effects" while a network is a strategic application of theater forces for influence. Milan Vego didn't quite carry it that far, but we will.

We think there is a good argument that the nodel approach to naval warfare describes the Navy's own resource priorities. The tactical mindset would immediately explain why a system like the Cyclone class Patrol Ship would be dismissed by the "effects-based approach" and given up to the Coast Guard, only now to realize how effective these platforms are as part of the strategic theater network.

We really like that Milon Vego links "effects-based approach" to a tactical view of "network-centric operations" because truth is evident in his astute observation. The early controversies that surrounded discussions of network-centric warfare in the Navy were specific to network nodes, not the network itself, specifically most of the criticism of Admiral Cebrowski's Streetfighter focused on the small platforms that lacked capability for "effects" at the unit level, and in this tactical view individual platforms were seen as "expendable". The irony is that an "expendable" label requires a tactical view of an individual platform while the strategic equivalent would be "attrition" due to operations at the theater level of war. The tactical view won that argument, an early sign of trouble.

Aside from the obvious tactical view taken in the means the Navy is developing for executing strategy, the tactical ways observed from Milan Vego are interesting to note. Sea Basing is an interesting example, a 2 battalion metric for offensive operations laid down as a requirement by the Marines is a good example of a tactical requirement for Sea Basing replacing a strategic operational concept of Sea Basing. We wonder what the strategic view of Sea Basing would be if the metric of measurement was slightly different, for example a metric that required support for one Army Stryker BCT, two MEUs, and the integration of three Air Force Wings with naval forces for strategic influence of a host nation. Note the difference, the Marine scenario of the 2 MEB requirement is a tactical maneuver and tactical objective requirement, where the second scenario is a strategic requirement for developing, integrating, and supporting a network towards influence of a strategic objective. We believe that depending upon the view, the nodes would be quite different.

We believe influence at the operational level of war can be assessed based on network metrics rather than node metrics, and network strength can be a measurement for strategic influence just like models that assess tactical influence that individual nodes contribute. We believe that with such an approach the value of strategic speed vs tactical speed would become more obvious as a metric, and any measured value of just-in-time logistics would immediately become subordinate to the value of a strategic reserve. It will not be the tactical node's, rather the strategic networks (either connected or disconnected) that will ultimately influence the operational level of war through improving the human decision process. If it was truly the other way around, one node in Washington DC could make all decisions, a theory long proven a fallacy of network-centric operations.

We believe the tactical view of individual network node's at the operational level of war has allowed the metrics that are used to access success in doctrinal planning to be skewed towards the tactical strengths, resulting in several problems when taking a strategic view of the Navy. Only by taking the strategic view of the network will metric realignment take place towards greater understanding of requirements for warfighting under network-centric operations models at the operational level of war from sea in the modern era.

It is easy enough to prove if either Milan Vega or our own observations are correct in these assertions, simply turn off the network connections between theater forces during exercises. If doctrine is right theater forces will perform responsibilities towards theater strategic objectives without the guidance from central nodes. If doctrine is wrong, one will observe a mesh of tactical moves with no strategic ends.

Porte-avions ou frégates ?

Porte-avions ou frégates ? « La marine ne peut pas choisir, il lui faut les deux »

Vue du futur porte-avions de la Marine nationale
crédits : DCN - Thales


27/05/2008

Dans une interview accordée à Var matin, le vice-amiral d'escadre Philippe Sautter revient sur les menaces éventuelles qui pèsent sur les programmes destinés à assurer le renouvellement de la Marine nationale. Face aux restrictions budgétaires, certaines voix préconisent notamment une réduction du programme FREMM, qui porte sur la réalisation de 17 frégates multi-missions. Ces bâtiments, réalisés par DCNS, sont destinées à remplacer les 18 frégates anti-sous-marines et avisos actuellement en service. Ils s'ajouteront aux quatre navires antiaériens et aux cinq frégates légères (La Fayette) opérationnels ou en cours d'achèvement. Or, compte tenu de l'importance croissante des missions dévolues à la marine, l'amiral commandant la Force d'Action Navale (ALFAN) estime que ces effectifs sont loin d'être pléthoriques. Des Antilles à l'océan Indien, de la mer du Nord à l'Atlantique en passant par la Méditerranée, l'Asie et le Pacifique, alors que le Mistral a été récemment dépêché au large de la Birmanie, « les opérations au Liban en 2006 ou encore en Afrique de l'Ouest avaient déjà révélé l'intérêt de disposer en permanence d'une force à la mer », estime l'amiral Sautter dans les colonnes du quotidien varois. Selon le patron de la flotte de surface : « Si l'on ajoute à cela les missions de lutte contre les trafics de drogue ou contre le terrorisme, le nombre de frégates - vingt-six, avisos compris - dont dispose actuellement la Marine est juste. Un exemple : quand le président Sarkozy a annoncé qu'il mettait une frégate pour accompagner les cargos du PAM le long des côtes somaliennes, il me restait un seul aviso ! » Dissuasion, interventions militaires, protection des approches maritimes, sécurisation des approvisionnements du pays, évacuations de ressortisants, opérations humanitaires, lutte contre le terrorisme et la piraterie, narcotrafic, immigration clandestine, sauvetage en mer, renseignement... Autant dire qu'avec moins de moyens, pour reprendre les propos d'un autre amiral français, « il faudra faire des choix ».

De même, le VAE Sautter considère que le second porte-avions ne peut être sacrifié au profit des frégates, et inversement. « Aux députés qui me le demandaient, j'ai répondu : la Marine ne peut pas choisir, il lui faut les deux. Les frégates multi-missions et le second porte-avions. On m'oppose le prix : 2,5 milliards d'euros. Sur cinq ans, ça ne fait que 500 millions d'euros par an. Ce n'est pas hors de portée. Tout est question de choix politique. Quand le général de Gaulle a lancé le programme français de dissuasion nucléaire, c'était sans commune mesure avec le prix du second porte-avions. Le second porte-avions n'est pas le joujou des marins. C'est un outil de puissance. Et la Marine ne cherche pas du tout à imposer ses choix au détriment des autres armées ».
__________________________________________________

- Voir l'intégralité de l'interview publiée dans Var Matin


Le VAE Philippe Sautter (© : MER ET MARINE - VINCENT GROIZELEAU)

NH90 : Le sonar FLASH bientôt qualifié

NH90 : Le sonar FLASH bientôt qualifié


crédits : MER ET MARINE - VINCENT GROIZELEAU


27/05/2008

Le sonar actif basse fréquence FLASH destiné à l'hélicoptère NH90 mène actuellement ses dernières campagnes d'essais avant sa qualification, qui devrait intervenir prochainement. Après des essais menés en février sur un bâtiment allemand, le nouvel hélicoptère et son sonar trempé devraient être embarqués fin juin sur une frégate française du type La Fayette. Le Folding Light Acoustic System for Helicopters « Sonics » est développé par Thales et équipe déjà les SH-60 Seahawk de l'US Navy et les EH-101 Merlin de la Royal Navy. Egalement impliqué dans le programme NH90, l'Italie a, en revanche, opté pour le sonar italo-américain HELRAS.
Produit à Brest, le FLASH sera, quant à lui, mis en oeuvre sur les 14 NH90 de la Marine nationale destinés à la lutte anti-sous-marine. Ces appareils seront embarqués sur les frégates multi-missions (FREMM) de la classe Aquitaine. Treize autres NH90 doivent être livrés à la flotte française pour assurer des missions de transport et, notamment, remplacer les Super Frelon.
La qualification prochaine du sonar FLASH ne signifie pas, pour autant, que le nouvel hélicoptère arrivera bientôt dans les flottilles françaises. D'autres essais restent à mener, notamment sur le radar. Confrontée comme ses partenaires européens à un important retard sur le programme NH90, la France doit toucher ses premiers appareils "marinisés" en novembre 2009. Reste maintenant à voir si cette échéance sera tenue.


NH90 sur la base d'aéronautique navale de Hyères (© : MER ET MARINE)


NH90 sur la base d'aéronautique navale de Hyères (© : MER ET MARINE)


NH90 sur la base d'aéronautique navale de Hyères (© : MER ET MARINE)


NH90 sur la base d'aéronautique navale de Hyères (© : MER ET MARINE)

domingo, 25 de maio de 2008

Nuclear sub crashes after 'tracing paper blunder'

LONDON (AFP) — A British nuclear submarine crashed into the seabed after tracing paper was used to help plot its course during a training exercise, obscuring vital symbols from student commanders, reports said Friday.

The hunter-killer sub HMS Trafalgar needed five million pounds' worth of repairs after the incident, which occurred off the coast of western Scotland.

Three crewmen were injured after the 5,200-tonne submarine steered into the seabed at a depth of 165 feet (50 metres) off the Isle of Skye in 2002, according to a Ministry of Defence inquiry report cited by press reports.

The trainee officers were undergoing a test called "Pressure Cooker," to simulate a real-life situation. As well as tracing paper, Post-It notes were also stuck on maps while the sub's satellite navigation system was turned off.

The speed of tidal water flow was also miscalculated. "The chart became increasingly untidy... and elementary mistakes were made with the generation of the estimated position," said the report, cited by the Telegraph and Times.

One and a half minutes before the impact, someone in the sub's command room was quoted as saying: "We're going to have to change course. This is too dangerous."

But it was too late, and the vessel crashed into the increasingly shallow seabed at a speed of 16 miles per hour (26 kilometres per hour).

"On impact, the ship's head was forced to starboard and there was a rapid deceleration, forcing most people to lose their balance and causing at least three minor injuries," said the report.

According to the Times, immediately after the collision the vessel's commander, Robert Fancy, ordered the sub to surface to check there was no damage to the hull or the nuclear reactor.

The vessel was safe, but extensive repairs were needed. In addition the ministry report noted that: "Nuclear submarines should only conduct training of this nature if the arrangements for navigational safety are infallible."

HMS Trafalgar is one of seven Trafalgar-class submarines in the Royal Navy. Some 85 metres (279 feet) long and able to carry 130 crew, they are armed with Spearfish torpedoes and Tomahawk missiles.

Submarine's £5m repair bill blamed on tracing paper



















Submarine's £5m repair bill blamed on tracing paper


























HMS Trafalgar

Royal
Navy nuclear submarine HMS Trafalgar is escorted back into Faslane
naval base after running aground near the Isle of Skye. Photograph: Ben
Curtis/PA




A nuclear-powered Royal Navy
submarine needed £5m worth of repairs after it struck the seabed
because a piece of tracing paper covered its navigational chart,
investigators have found.

The tracing paper had been used on the chart to protect it from being written on, obscuring vital information.

HMS
Trafalgar was grounded near the Isle of Skye in October 2002 because of
basic navigational errors during a training exercise for students,
according to the official board of inquiry report, which has been
released under a freedom of information request.

According to the
report, just 90 seconds before the boat hit the seabed, a crew member
realised what was about to happen and was recorded as saying: "We're
going to have to change course. This is too dangerous."

The
warning came too late. Naval investigators noted: "At 0757, the
submarine grounded, striking the bottom heavily on the port side
forward. Speed 14.7 knots.

"On impact, the ship's head was forced
to starboard and there was a rapid deceleration, forcing most people to
lose their balance and causing at least three minor injuries."

Once
his balance had been regained, HMS Trafalgar's commanding officer,
Robert Fancy, ordered the submarine to surface to check the pressure
hull had not been breached and the nuclear reactor had not been
damaged.

The reactor plant was unaffected, but £5m of repairs
were needed on the hull, a complex structure made of thick
high-strength steel.

The involvement of unsupervised student
submariners in the navigation procedures and the use of tracing paper
on the chart were criticised heavily by the board.

The three
students, who were taking part in a submarine command course during the
exercise, codenamed Cockfight, had prepared a navigation plan that
assumed transit would be at periscope depth and "with frequent visual
fixes".

Senior officers decided to test one of the trainees, Lieutenant Commander Tim Green, and changed the plan.

The
students had not anticipated that HMS Trafalgar would go deep and at
speed. "Consequently, it [the plan] was inadequate," the report said.

The
report said tracing paper had been a contributory factor in previous
groundings and recommended its use should be strongly discouraged.
It noted that the navigation plan had been "flawed both in concept and execution" and the chartwork supervision was inadequate.

"The
commanding officer did not appreciate the inaccuracy in tidal stream
calculations, nor the importance it was to assume after going deep,"
the board concluded.

The spring tidal rate was not properly taken
into account when charting the course approaching a rocky islet,
Fladdachuain, near the Isle of Skye.

The speed of the submarine
was overestimated and "no account was taken of the time needed to
accelerate from four to eight knots. Untidy and inaccurate chartwork
made calculations difficult," it said.

HMS Trafalgar grounded "because of human error".

"Nuclear
submarines should only conduct training of this nature if the
arrangements for navigational safety are infallible," the board said.

Fancy,
who was in charge of navigation, and Commander Ian McGhie, who was
responsible for the training course, were court martialled and
reprimanded for negligence.



quinta-feira, 22 de maio de 2008

[USA] NEW YORK CITY-Are All Our Warships Welcome Here?

Are All Our Warships Welcome Here?

A Ban on Nuclear Warships Dampens Spirit of Fleet Week

By BENJAMIN SARLIN, Special to the Sun
May 22, 2008

Lawmakers are seeking to overturn a Dinkins-era ban on nuclear-powered Navy ships entering New York Harbor. Some are attributing to the ban the record-low ship count for this year's Fleet Week, which started yesterday, and with the Navy switching most of its fleet to nuclear-powered ships, Fleet Week may be smaller for years to come.

RELATED: A Sailor's Life for All: A Fleet Week Slideshow.

"We put our young American servicemen and servicewomen in submarines and aircraft carriers, and we put them out to sea for eight or nine months at a time," state Senator William Larkin, a veteran of World War II and the Korean War, said yesterday in an interview. "Why would we be putting our members on board these ships and then say it's not safe? I wouldn't have any problem with it."

The last non-nuclear aircraft carrier in the Navy fleet, the USS Kitty Hawk, is expected to be decommissioned by 2009, and the conventionally powered USS John F. Kennedy, which docked in the city during past Fleet Weeks, was decommissioned just last year. Their phasing-out means that new aircraft carriers, such as the USS George H.W. Bush, christened in 2006, will be unable to dock in the city. Port cities such as Seattle and San Diego routinely host nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers.

The unwritten ban on nuclear-powered ships dates back to a dispute over a plan in the early 1980s by President Reagan's Navy secretary, John Lehman, to create a series of "strategic home ports" that would spread America's fleet around the country. One of the locations selected to house a new home port was Stapleton, on Staten Island. While Mayor Koch and Governor Cuomo supported the idea, the Staten Island site sparked fears that mayhem could result if nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered ships had an accident in one of America's most densely populated areas.

These arguments swayed Mayor Dinkins, who announced after taking office in 1990 said he would oppose the presence of any ships armed with nuclear weapons, because they constituted a risk to New Yorkers' health and safety. Mr. Dinkins and a group of New York congressional representatives asked Vice President Cheney, who was then secretary of defense, to halt construction on the Staten Island port, which was never completed. The Navy took the flap to mean that nuclear reactors and weapons are not welcome in New York's harbors.

Mr. Dinkins could not be reached for comment yesterday.

Nearly 20 years later, the unwritten ban has never been lifted. According to a spokeswoman for the Navy, "nuclear propulsion, by itself, does not prohibit visiting New York Harbor." Nuclear-powered ships have nonetheless honored the unofficial arrangement and avoided the city, as Naval officers assume that these ships are not welcome without an explicit invitation from the city's mayor.

Some security experts believe that the policy has outlived its usefulness. While some might point to post-9/11 security threats as a cause to maintain the ban, a partner at security consulting firm PJ Sage Inc., Tim Connors, said yesterday that such concerns are likely overblown.

"When Fleet Week happens there's going to be a lot of security involved," Mr. Connors said in an interview. "I don't lose sleep thinking, 'Gee, somebody's going to be able to penetrate the security measures put in place and attack an aircraft carrier.'"

The director of GlobalSecurity.org, John Pike, said the Navy boasts an "impeccable record" when it comes to safety on its nuclear vessels.

The president of the Institute of Energy and Environmental Research, Arjun Makhijani, an opponent of nuclear power, said terrorism concerns were a legitimate concern.

"I think nuclear and New York City, especially after 9/11, should not be mixing," Mr. Makhijani said in an interview.

He suggested that if the Navy eventually brought nuclear-powered vessels into the city, it should first inform local officials of the potential consequences of a worst-case scenario accident so a response can be planned.

The only Navy vessel ever named after the city was a nuclear submarine, the USS New York City, which was decommissioned in 1997 before ever visiting New York waters. A battleship named after the state, the USS New York, participated in the first hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll, and became so radioactive that the Navy sunk it for target practice shortly afterwards.

The Navy recently completed another USS New York, which was forged using steel from the former World Trade Center site. Because the San Antonio class of amphibious transport ship is diesel-powered, it is free to visit New York City.




105 Chambers Street, New

Russia Outlines Navy's Return to Sea

Thursday, May 22, 2008

Russia Outlines Navy's Return to Sea

The Russian Navy will soon follow the path of their Air Force, and begin regular patrols and deployments.

Russia's Northern Fleet will dispatch ships and submarines on tours of duty to various regions of the world's oceans in 2008, the fleet's commander said on Tuesday.

"There will be tours of duty this year, involving surface ships, submarines and aircraft," Vice-Admiral Nikolai Maksimov said. "We will visit the Atlantic, the Indian and the Pacific oceans, and the Mediterranean."

The cold war is over, and since the end of the cold war the number of deployments by the Russian Navy has been remarkably few. If we were to look for trend lines, we would observe that most Russian deployments with one major exception have involved exercises with NATO or Asian Navies. There have been no indications yet what purpose Russia intends to deploy ships for, except perhaps to show the flag.

The strategic choices for Russia in how it uses forward deployed naval forces will be interesting to observe. Russia can enter the maritime domain as a contributor to safety and security of the global maritime commons, and would be welcomed into the fold by the international community. This approach would include contribution to the international security forces that currently operate in the Mediterranean Sea and off the Horn of Africa. In both cases Russia brings unique capabilities to contribute to international forces, including political clout through existing relationships with nations in those regions.

An alternative approach for Russia would be to be present at these locations, but intentionally remain disconnected from regional international forces seeking a nationalistic policy towards specific regional goals to Russia. This would be a return to the competitor position Russia enjoyed during the cold war, which held sway over many whose interests conflicted with the West.

We believe Russia will ultimately choose the first option, and participate in regional international frameworks to sustain forward presence. We believe this offers the best political options to Russia as a reemerging super power. Should that happen, it will be a positive development for the US Navy, but may not be popular among those who frame policy.

As an outsider, Russia would not sit at the table and would not be in a position to influence the larger international community in the same way they will if they sit at the same table. As a participant, Russia becomes an involved partner, while at the same time an alternative to United States policy in the broader international discussion towards managing challenges to the global system. Such an arrangement would allow Russia to emerge as both a participant with and alternative to the United States as the Russian Navy grows, and this arrangement would be particularly influential with Europe who does not always agree with US policy.

It will be interesting to observe what approach Russia takes with its fleet. The choices made will be an early sign regarding the type of relationship the US and Russia will have during the rebuilding phase of the Russian Fleet soon to begin.

quarta-feira, 21 de maio de 2008

Descoberta de Nova Acumulação de Óleo

21/05/2008 18:05
Descoberta de Nova Acumulação de Óleo no Pré-Sal da Bacia de Santos

Descoberta de Nova Acumulação de Óleo no Pré-Sal da Bacia de Santos

(Rio de Janeiro, 21 de maio de 2008). – PETRÓLEO BRASILEIRO S/A - PETROBRAS, uma companhia brasileira de energia com atuação internacional, comunica que o consórcio formado pela Petrobras (66%), operadora do Consórcio do bloco BM-S-8, com participação da Shell (20%) e Galp Energia (14%), em águas ultra profundas da Bacia de Santos, comprovou a presença de óleo nos reservatórios do pré-sal, através do poço 1-BRSA-532A-SPS (1-SPS-52A). Análises preliminares indicam que a densidade do óleo está entre 25 e 28 ºAPI, comparável ao dos outros óleos do pré-sal da Bacia de Santos.

O poço pioneiro está localizado a cerca de 250 km da costa do Estado de São Paulo, em lâmina d’água de 2.139 metros (figura abaixo), tendo sido concluído em 18/05/08, na profundidade de 6.773 metros.

A descoberta foi comprovada pela análise de amostras de óleo por teste de formação em reservatórios situados a cerca de 6.000 metros de profundidade.

O Consórcio está preparando um Plano de Avaliação de Descoberta a ser encaminhado a ANP, conforme previsto no Contrato de Concessão, dando continuidade às atividades e investimentos no bloco BM-S-8.


Information Dissemination: Russian Roulette With Indian Aircraft Carriers

Information Dissemination: Russian Roulette With Indian Aircraft Carriers


Tuesday, May 20,

2008Russian Roulette With Indian Aircraft CarriersIf you believe the issue of the Admiral Gorshkov has been settled, think again. Despite the rumors, the negotiations with Russia have not been successful to date, and both countries are still further apart on the final price than not. There are strong pressures still pushing this deal towards a sour conclusion, namely the Russians and Indians themselves.For reasons unstated, Russian Navy Commander Vladimir Vysotskii continues to preach a desire for aircraft carriers for Russia. He has become a broken record on the subject, insistent that the Russians will begin building 6 new aircraft carriers beginning in 2012. The irony is, this type of rhetoric is beginning to annoy military observers in Russia, who do not believe this is a project capable of being accomplished. The problem isn't money, Russia is rolling in oil income and the shipbuilding industry, despite a bit of inflation, is in a healthy position although modernization is looming as a necessity. We still observe a few reminders that rather than building a new carrier in 2012, Russia should upgrade its shipyards in that time frame, and field the Admiral Gorshkov as a second aircraft carrier instead.India is clearly following this rhetoric, because rather than paying for work to begin again on the Admiral Gorshkov, India has asked Russia to pay the shipyard to get the project back on track. India has asked Russia to make Information Dissemination: Russian Roulette With Indian Aircraft Carriersan advance payment of $250 million to the Sevmash shipyard in Arctic Russia for refurbishing the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, which will be adjusted later when final settlement is done between the two countries. “We have asked Russia to make an advance payment to the cash-crunched Sevmash shipyard, where Admiral Gorshkov is docked for refitting. The amount will be adjusted in the final amount (to be paid to Russia),” Defence Secretary Vijay Singh told IANS.This is a very smart move by India, because the negotiations set to begin on May 26th are far from certain. By having Russia pay for getting the project back on track, the lack of a deal doesn't hurt India, and Russia can't afford to hold a grudge over a failed deal with India now that China has dried up as a major purchasing customer of defense equipment. India has been screwed over by the Russians in this deal, not only will the delivery be far too late to work within their intended schedule, but they are investing an enormous amount of money in a platform that doesn't have a good track record. India is getting what they paid for though, although even that comes with a twist. The first four ship-borne Russian-made MiG 29 K/KUB fighter jets, purchased by India for the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, will be delivered to the Indian Navy in September, a navy official said Tuesday. “The first four of the 16 MiG 29 K/KUB will arrive in the country in September and the pilot training has been completed for these aircraft,” the official said.India is getting 12 MiG 29K single-seater aircraft and four MiG 29KUB double-seater trainer aircraft as part of the $740 million contract signed in January 2004 for Admiral Gorshkov. However, like we said, there is a twist... those pilots who have completed training, they weren't trained in Russia or India, rather they were trained in the United States.While training in the United States, one might imagine those Indian naval aviators had the opportunity to see up close and personal the Super Hornet, and they were probably impressed. Whether it was them, or someone in India, someone is very impressed with the Super Hornet, because the question is being asked that gets our attention: Can you fly a Super Hornet off a Russian aircraft carrier? It Is now sufficiently clear that the Indian Navy wants to be able to use the air force’s assets of war. In a revelation so far kept under wraps, the Navy has asked Boeing a contender for India's $10-billion tender for 126 air force fighters if the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet can operate off the INS Vikramaditya, the rechristened Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov currently being refurbished in Russia for the Indian Navy. None of the fighters in the IAF’s existing fleet have the capability to operate from the deck of an aircraft carrier.What do you think Boeing said? What do you think... Of coarse you can, at least according to Boeing. There is a catch though, the F/A-18E/F is a catapult launched aircraft, while the MiG-29K doesn't require a catapult, it uses a ski jump. Apparently, Boeing has models that say that doesn't matter. The significance of Boeing’s finding lies in the fact that the Super Hornet – which by default is launched using a steam-powered catapult on American super-carriers – has never before been known to be able to take off from an angled ski-jump – the launch mechanism on India’s sole aircraft carrier INS Virat, as well as the Gorshkov and the under-construction indigenous aircraft carrier. Rietz told reporters at Lemoore, which holds half of the US Navy’s striking power in the Pacific, “In our simulation, we discovered that not only could the Super Hornet take-off from a ski-jump, but could do so with a significant weapons load.” Landing the Super Hornet on the Gorshkov would pose no problem since the warship comes equipped with an arrester cable.The Indians love Boeing, they can't wait to get the P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft, hell the US Navy can't wait to get it either.Consider how aircraft carrier issues are coming together leading into the 2012 time frame. The US Navy needs a replacement for the USS Enterprise (CVN 63) for 2012-2015, but Congress has said they don't want to pay the money to extend the nuclear carriers life after 2012. Instead Congress has instructed the Navy to study the possibility of maintaining the Kitty Hawk and John F Kennedy to insure carrier availability. India needs an aircraft carrier replacement as soon as it can get one, preferably by 2010, but that appears to be impossible right now. The French both want and recognize the need for a new aircraft carrier, but indications are they will not build one. The MoD mixes green lights with red lights almost daily with the CVF project, claiming today the CVF will go forward, but not yet because first design maturity needs to be studies more closely. We already discussed the Russians, who themselves are looking at 2012 as the magic year. Don't get me started on China, who could potentially be building an aircraft carrier today and no one would know it for years.What a strange time for the aircraft carrier. Are there any solutions somewhere in this mess? Difficult to tell, but if I was putting together the Congressional study regarding the Kitty Hawk and John F Kennedy, I'd find out how far $1.2 billion goes in each platform, and if that money goes as far as I think, I would 'accidentally' leak the results to the media to insure Indians are aware.After all, the choice for India is striking, they can either invest heavily in an aircraft carrier built by a nation that has only been able to deploy their own aircraft carrier once in the last decade, or spend the same amount to refurbish an American aircraft carrier of which the design can be studied to advance the indigenous aircraft carrier shipbuilding capacity India is developing. With the big American defense contractors setting up shop in India, seems to me both the strategic and economic advantages of the American option favors Indian interest.However, choosing the US over Russia for an aircraft carrier will conflict with the always interesting politics in India. India should be able to leverage the US advances in the Indian defense industry to get a favorable price from Russia regarding the Admiral Gorshkov, although with so much turmoil surrounding the aircraft carrier industry specifically, it is hard to tell if Russia will move on the price.Posted by Galrahn at 8:30 PM
Information Dissemination: Russian Roulette With Indian Aircraft Carriers
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India To Join the Expeditionary Era

India To Join the Expeditionary Era

The rhetoric regarding the possible sale of the USS Nashville (LPD 13) to India has all but disappeared over the last few months. We observe this bit of news might explain why.

Having cleared the decks for the manufacture of large aircraft carriers indigenously, the navy is now proposing to venture into building huge ship landing docks to give it the capability to carry heavily armed troops and armaments over oceans.

The Naval Design Bureau has now finalised plans to manufacture over 20,000 tonne displacement landing ship docks patterned on INS Jalashva, which it recently acquired from the US Navy.
The report did not include information regarding the desired size of this future amphibious force, but it did drop a few names regarding who the contenders are.
In order to build the country's first ever blue water troop carrier, the navy is looking at a number of designs, including American and French.
Interesting. The press may not be accurate in reporting "patterned on INS Jalashva" at 20,000 tons, but it would depend on requirements. It is interesting this comes the day after a visit by South Korean navy chief Admiral Jung Ok-keun, who no doubt discussed his own developing blue water expeditionary capability. It is very possible the Dokdo class is part of the competition.

Northrop Grumman was showing off the LPD-17 in India earlier this year, and the Mistral was involved in exercises with India just prior being ordered to the Myanmar coast following the cyclone disaster. We look forward to observing which metrics a growing regional power like India finds most appealing for a future expeditionary force in this competition.

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