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sexta-feira, 28 de dezembro de 2007

ARGENTINA NEGOCIAN LACOMPRA DE AVIONES DE COMBATE







Argentina

Negocian con los EE.UU. la compra de aviones de
combate

El Ministerio de Defensa está
muy interesado en los cazabombarderos F-16

(El primer desafío
para Cristina Kirchner
)


Los diplomáticos
argentinos definen que las relaciones con los Estados
Unidos pasan por un muy mal momento. El fantasma
de Guido Antonini Wilson se entromete en todo relato
local que apunta a Washington. Sin embargo, otra
agenda mantiene abiertos canales de interés
común. La Argentina negocia con los Estados
Unidos la compra de aviones de combate.


Importantes funcionarios
argentinos y norteamericanos tuvieron en los últimos
quince días reuniones para que nuestro país
adquiera cazabombarderos F-16.


Tanto del lado argentino
como del norteamericano confirmaron a LA NACION
la apertura de las conversaciones. Los representantes
de los Estados Unidos manifestaron su interés
en que pueda concretarse la operación, cuyo
valor no trascendió dado que Washington ofreció
usar el sistema de venta de armas a países
amigos, mecanismo que permite disminuir considerablemente
los costos.


En el Ministerio
de Defensa argentino tienen a los cazabombarderos
F-16 como prioridad en aviones de combate, por sobre
la oferta francesa de Mirage 2000. En ambos casos
se trata de aeronaves usadas.


Hace una semana,
un enviado del gobierno de Nicolas Sarkozy visitó
el Ministerio de Defensa para renovar la propuesta
que Francia había realizado durante la administración
de Jacques Chirac: 12 Mirage 2000 a un precio total
de 90 millones de euros. Se llevó la respuesta
de que hoy el ofrecimiento norteamericano de F-16
presentaba mejores condiciones económicas
para nuestro país. De todas maneras, la delegación
francesa no se fue ofendida porque su cartera de
propuestas era más amplia que el punto referido
a los aviones.


Dos meses atrás,
fueron los representantes de la industria militar
israelí los que presentaron una carpeta comercial
con F-16, momento en el que volvió a hablarse
de ese avión de combate multipropósito.
Entonces llegó la propuesta de los Estados
Unidos.


Los tiroteos diplomáticos
de los últimos días con los norteamericanos
no alcanzaron a impactar sobre las negociaciones
en marcha, más que nada porque la decisión
argentina se tomaría en el final del primer
semestre de 2008, tiempo de trabajo suficiente para
colocar bajo un paraguas técnico al trascendental
acuerdo militar. Aunque toda venta de sistemas de
armas de los Estados Unidos debe contar con el acuerdo
de los legisladores de ese país.


Un día antes
de que estallase el escándalo judicial de
Antonini Wilson en Miami, el Congreso norteamericano
había destrabado la prometida venta de helicópteros
de transporte Sea King para la Armada.


Necesidades


La Argentina busca
ahora aviones de combate para reemplazar a las distintas
versiones del sistema de armas Mirage, que opera
en el país desde los años 70. El 1°
de mayo último, uno de esos cazas se estrelló
durante un vuelo de exhibición en Tandil
y el piloto falleció. Esa situación
y el antecedente del siniestro del rompehielos Irízar
pusieron en evidencia la necesidad de modernizar
los medios militares argentinos.


La última
compra de aviones de combate se realizó a
mediados de los años 90, cuando los Estados
Unidos vendieron 36 cazabombarderos A4 para reemplazar
a los perdidos en la guerra en las islas Malvinas
en 1982. La falta de presupuesto no permitió
sostener esos aviones y hoy son muy pocos los que
están en capacidad de operar.


Uno de los intereses
compartidos por funcionarios argentinos y norteamericanos
tiene que ver con la posibilidad de homologar los
sistemas de armas en la subregión, ya que
el soporte de la defensa aérea de Chile lo
representan, justamente, los cazabombarderos F-16.


Para los Estados
Unidos se trata de un tema importante la unión
castrense que alcanzan la Argentina y Chile, al
punto que los jefes de la fuerza Cruz del Sur, el
batallón integrado por soldados argentinos
y chilenos, fueron invitados a dar una serie de
conferencias en el Pentágono para explicar
la forma en que dos ejércitos que estuvieron
a punto de entrar en guerra pudieron unir sus tropas
en señal de confianza mutua. Fuentes norteamericanas
aseguran que ese batallón será mostrado
como "un ejemplo para el mundo".


Con una relación
militar importante - aumentaron en los últimos
años los ejercicios conjuntos-, la agenda
positiva que maneja la diplomacia norteamericana
con nuestro país habilitó la posibilidad
de que se obtengan los F16. El paso inicial fue
dado, pese a Antonini Wilson y su valija.


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Argentina El primer desafío para Cristina Kirchner

El primer desafío para Cristina Kirchner
(El Ministerio de Defensa está muy interesado en los cazabombarderos F16)


Brasil se lanzó en forma decidida a tener un rol decisivo en la política militar de la región. El mes próximo, durante la reunión presidencial de la Unión Sudamericana de Naciones, el presidente Lula da Silva propondrá oficialmente la creación de una junta de defensa subcontinental. Esa posición la hizo pública horas después de participar de la asunción de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Y se lo había anticipado a la presidenta y a la ministra de Defensa, Nilda Garré, cuando visitaron Brasilia unos días antes.

Quienes conocen muy bien el pensamiento de Garré aseguran que a la funcionaria argentina le entusiasmó la iniciativa. Aunque también sabe que Brasil apunta con esa idea a fortalecer su aspiración de contar con un asiento permanente en el consejo de seguridad de la ONU. Para participar en el juego de los grandes países, el pago de admisión es tener una clara influencia militar en su vecindario. Y Brasil va por eso.

Lula dio finalmente luz verde el mes último a la construcción de un submarino a propulsión nuclear, un sistema de armas de ataque que desbalanceará el equilibrio militar subcontinental. La Armada Argentina compitió durante años con su par brasileña por ese proyecto de submarino, frenado hasta ahora por la diplomacia de ambos países.

Pero también Lula habilitó un ambicioso plan de rearme de sus fuerzas armadas, en una incipiente carrera armamentista en la cual la Argentina ni siquiera puede aspirar a entrar sin exponerse a una bacarrota. Sí, en cambio, los funcionarios de nuestro país esperan dar pasos para la modernización de los sistemas de armas, para que tengan la capacidad de interactuar con sus socios regionales.

************************************************************** * *
Durante su discurso de presentación en el Colegio Militar, la presidenta Kirchner evitó cualquier referencia concreta a la política militar. Pero un día antes, Garré reafirmó ante mandos castrenses que será prioritario el acercamiento a los países de la subregión. También pidió que los militares tomasen como "gestos" los aumentos presupuestarios para operaciones y compras de material, porque en esa línea se continuará en la medida que la economía nacional lo permita.

Para la presidencia de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, el lanzamiento de Brasil como líder militar de la región será uno de los primeros desafíos concretos de su política internacional. Más aún porque Venezuela también aspira a convertirse en el gendarme regional y Chile prefiere acuerdos bilaterales antes que masivos, tal como siempre lo señaló su presidenta Michelle Bachelet.

Los diplomaticos brasileños y sus funcionarios de defensa recorren en estos días a sus países vecinos para instalar la idea de Lula. En los próximos días tendrán cita en la Argentina.

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China's Asymmetrical Strategy

China's Asymmetrical Strategy
By Eric Sayers
The Weekly Standard | Friday, December 28, 2007

THE IMPRESSIVE CONVENTIONAL military strength post-industrial states have procured in the past half-century has helped to determine the shape and nature of modern warfare. In a geostrategic environment where conflict continues to persist between advanced militaries and their substandard adversaries--either rogue states or terror cells--the latter have been forced to develop asymmetric ways of challenging the superior with the inferior.

The extent of America's sweeping success during the Persian Gulf War had the unintended consequence of convincing would-be adversaries that they must reconstitute new strategies in order to compete with and challenge U.S. power. In essence, American military predominance had become so extensive that it has altered the face of the battlefield by forcing others to adapt--to prevent America from playing the game but its rules.

This is evident in both Iraq and Afghanistan where the U.S. continues its struggle to contain disconnected networks of al-Qaeda militants and Shia militias armed with AK-47s and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). As much as the United States had hoped it could defeat extremist elements using sophisticated weapons and other advanced technologies, the supposed superiority of network-centric warfare proved insufficient against Islamist tactics. Similarly, Venezuela and its despotic leader Hugo Chavez, who frequently warns of a pending invasion by the United States, has placed asymmetric warfare at the center of his countries national defense doctrine. Former Venezuelan General Alberto Mueller has argued in favor of the doctrine, "because conventional war is ceasing to exist."

Although it is terrorism--and in the case of Venezuela, "guerilla war"--that is so often discussed in the realm of asymmetric warfare, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has also embraced the precepts of this strategy to counter American superiority. As Robert Kaplan has explained, terrorists and their crude tactics fall on the low end of asymmetric strategy. For America, the even greater challenge will be those states like China that are able to confront the United States at the high-tech end of the unconventional sphere.

While in the coming decades China anticipates that the continued success of its economic expansion will allow it to take a much more assertive geopolitical posture--projecting force far beyond its coastal waters--in the near-term the issue of Taiwan will remain the primary focus for Chinese policymakers. While ensuring Taiwan does not entertain ambitions of secession from the mainland, PLA military planners will also be forced to concern themselves with defeating a U.S. military that remains committed to the defense of Taiwan.

Just how does the PLA believe it can achieve this? Chinese strategists are not naive. They recognize that their military is only a decade or two removed from operational obscurity. And a Chinese conventional force able to challenge the United States is at least another decade away by the estimates of the most generous analysts. In summary, Chinese leaders face a strategic quandary where their interests in Taiwan are at risk, yet for the foreseeable future they cannot obtain the traditional military capabilities to secure those interest.

Should either a political or military event threaten the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. will respond by diverting a Carrier Strike Group to the region. Chinese analysts understand that if this is allowed to happen, the United States will almost certainly achieve its objectives, emerging victorious should hostilities commence.

To deal with this dilemma the PLA has chosen to put its trust in an asymmetric strategy aimed at battlespace denial, or anti-access as it is more commonly known. Rather than confront the United States directly, the PLA believes it can acquire the capabilities to deter an American entrance into the Taiwan Strait, or, should this fail, delay U.S. forces the freedom to operate within the theatre.

Some observers have concluded that China's development of anti-access capabilities neither undermines U.S. sea control nor contributes to a war-wining capability. Such assertions may have been accurate as recently as earlier this decade, but at present, and increasingly in the next several years, this conclusion will appear to be guided more by an overconfidence in American capabilities than by pragmatic realism.

Consistent with the teachings of ancient Chinese warfare, anti-access is comprised of both military and political elements. The Chinese theoretician Sun Tzu wrote that, "supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting." This would appear to be the primary aim of anti-access: successful diplomatic coercion through expanded asymmetric capabilities.

In attempting to defeat a technologically superior adversary such as the United States, China does not need to control the sea or achieve ultimate military victory. A truly efficient implementation of anti-access doctrine would use the weapons systems at China's disposal in a manner that translates into a bloodless political victory.

Over the last decade China has committed itself to a deliberate and focused expansion of the PLA's capabilities, aimed primarily at acquiring the necessary platforms to serve this area-denial strategy.

Due to the importance of U.S. Carrier Strike Groups, the PLA has chosen to focus much of their attention on deterring and, if need be, delaying the entry of these floating sea bases into the Taiwan theatre. At the center of this effort is the PLA submarine fleet, which is growing at a rapid rate and, with the increased sophistication of its submarine classes, could pose a significant threat to American carriers. In the past decade China has commissioned 31 submarines. The majority of these are of the Song- and Yuan-class, which are outfitted with the 'air-independent propulsion" system that permits them to operate underwater for up to 40 days. In addition to enabling conventional submarines to avoid the costs of nuclear technology, the system allows the submarine to remain virtually undetectable to U.S. anti-submarine surveillance efforts. The sophistication of these new submarines became evident in October 2006 when a Chinese Song-class submarine was able to surface within torpedo range of the USS Kitty Hawk off the coast of Okinawa.

China also has three new nuclear-powered submarine designs and construction programs. The Type-093 Shang-class nuclear attack boat and the Type-094 Jin-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine, represent the basis of the nuclear submarine programs. The Type-095, a larger version of the Shang/Jin-classes, is also under construction. These numerous programs represent a submarine development campaign that is unprecedented in peacetime.

The development of maneuverability reentry vehicle (MaRVs) technology, capable of allowing ballistic missiles to destroy moving targets, will also contribute to expanding and overlapping the layers of the PLA anti-access strategy. These missiles, in coordination with a maritime surveillance and targeting system, could pose a direct threat to U.S. carriers patrolling in the Asia-Pacific. According to Pentagon estimates, Chinese missiles armed with MaRV technology could be deployed as early as 2015. China has also purchased Russian-built SS-N-22 Sunburn and SS-N-27 Sizzler anti-ship cruise missiles, designed specifically for targeting U.S. carrier strike groups and defeating the Aegis anti-missile system.

Chinese strategists, including PLA Major General Dia Qingmin, have written extensively on battlespace-denial, arguing that the true dominance of the U.S. military is in fact the result of its impressive integrated network of command, control, and communications systems. America's C4ISR network provides everything from target detection and identification to navigational information.

But just as this capability is its greatest asset, in the realm of asymmetry, it is also its greatest vulnerability. For this reason, the PLA has concluded that attacking information systems could offset U.S. capabilities much more efficiently than attacking traditional combat systems. In the event of a pending conflict in the Taiwan Strait, destroying a series of U.S. satellites--the central node of U.S. networks--could effectively paralyze U.S. combat capabilities, denying them the initiative on the battlefield and leveling the operational playing field. China's January 2007 anti-satellite test, which displayed the ability of the PLA to target and destroy satellites in orbit, represents a significant achievement for PLA anti-access capabilities.

The capability to severely disrupt America's C4ISR network, coupled with the deployment of advanced submarines and anti-ship missiles, presents a new form of strategic deterrence that is only recently receiving the attention it deserves. In a scenario where it is suspected China may play a belligerent role, the United States would be faced with a difficult decision concerning its commitments to Taiwan's defense. Acting too aggressively could trigger a Chinese preemptive attack on American satellite and communication systems, potentially disrupting the U.S. military's war-making ability in the Taiwan Strait and seriously jeopardizing ongoing operations around the globe. Alternatively, too weak of a response by the United States may only invite a more offensively inclined approach by the PLA, further increasing the potential danger facing the island democracy. The inevitable hesitation on the part of America may provide Beijing the time and space it needs to secure its objectives.

Should it come to war, Chinese strategists have determined that they need only inflict sufficient costs to force the United States to lose its willingness to continue the conflict. Chinese analysts Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, among others, have concluded that "smashing the adversary's will to resist" is now more important then defeating its military forces--a maxim that resonates across the entire asymmetric sphere.

Both the civilian and military leadership in the United States begrudgingly recognize the opportunity cost phenomenon that affects democratic societies at war. If the PLA were to preemptively invade Taiwan, while conducting simultaneous battlespace-denial operations against the United States, how would American leaders respond after several weeks of costly engagements? When the United States eventually breaks through, would it then look to liberate Taiwan, or, more likely, conclude that risking a wider war with China over the small island democracy falls far outside its calculated national interest?

PLA officer Jiang Lei analyzed the opportunity cost scenario further in his doctoral dissertation: "it is possible for the side with inferior equipment to strive to gain the initiative on the battlefield [ ] and compel the superior enemy to pull out of the conflict. Because the superpower must cope with the influence of its other fundamental strategic interest, the level of its intervention is limited; moreover, it will seek to win victory in the war at minimum cost." Successful area-denial operations, therefore, would enable Beijing to achieve its primary political objectives through a concerted effort to restrain America's will to fight an escalated war.

Clearly, a competitor armed with the ability to challenge America at the high-end of asymmetrical warfare poses a substantial dilemma. Is the United States prepared? Over the past decade anti-access has been accounted for and increasingly discussed in almost all high-level military documents. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review committed the U.S. military to countering "political anti-access and irregular warfare challenges." Indeed, the Navy's "Sea Shield" concept--part of its Seapower 21 vision--is solely intended to ensure continued freedom of access by countering enemy anti-access threats.

In addition to identifying the increased potential of area-denial strategies, the United States has invested itself in a number of political and military measures to ensure it remains adequately prepared in the coming years.

To help search out and destroy China's growing fleet of submarines, the United States has turned to the P-8A Poseidon, a modified Boeing 737-800 able to conduct area-wide anti-submarine warfare. The innovative capabilities of the Poseidon ensure it will be at the center of America's effort to counter China's area-denial efforts.

The Pentagon has also announced a $225 million upgrade for its Raytheon-built MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), a radar controlled gun designed to defend against low and high flying, maneuvering anti-ship missile threats. The Phalanx is also being sold to Australia as part of the deal, extending the anti-missile defensive capabilities of one of America's most important Pacific allies.

Finally, the U.S. and Australia have agreed to partner in the deployment of the Wideband Global Satellite Communications system (WGS). The Wideband satellite constellation, which will include six satellites by 2013, aims to provide advanced communications capabilities for U.S. and Australian warfighters. By jointly operating and owning the WGS system, the United States will not only increase its interoperability with a steadfast ally, but it will also create a geostrategic dilemma for China by forcing the PLA to target both U.S. and Australian military satellites in order to comprehensively paralyze American's command and control network. This implicit attempt to bind the space-based capabilities of both the United States and Australia is an example of the shrewd maneuvering the Pentagon must continue to make to stay ahead of the anti-access curve.

These measures represent only a variety of the steps being taken to deal with the anti-access threat. Because of the susceptibility of U.S. information networks, perhaps the greatest preparations the United States can make is to conduct military exercises without the use of continuous, high-bandwidth communications between units. This would enable the various military components (carriers, battleships, submarines and aircraft) to experience acting independently, or in a semi-autonomous state, more adequately preparing them to meet the requirements of a C4ISR-less environment.

While Washington continues to debate the potentiality of China becoming a "responsible stakeholder," the ways in which to successfully 'manage" its rise, and how best to increase PLA transparency, the PLA has remained committed to modernizing, expanding, and deploying an increasingly sophisticated military capable of seriously challenging American power. In the near term, instead of concerning themselves with the strengths of the U.S. military, PLA planners have diverted their attention to its weaknesses. In Iraq and Afghanistan, fighting an enemy that has deliberately exploited America's military and political weaknesses has proven to be an arduous task. Is America prepared to face the high-end asymmetric strategies being deployed by a Chinese state readying itself at all levels--political, military, and economic--to challenge U.S. predominance? The answer to this question will undoubtedly shape the geostrategic environment of the Asia-Pacific theater in the coming decades.


Eric Sayers is recent graduate of the Political Science M.A. program at The University of Western Ontario.

Untitled

DEVELOPMENT OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEM RFP FOR 126 MULTI-ROLE COMBAT AIRCRAFT JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF FIFTH GENERATION FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
 
  15:51 IST  
 
 

YEAR END REVIEW 2007

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

 

The successful launch of Interceptor Missile (AAD) towards developing a ballistic missile defence system, test flight of Agni-III (A3-02), user trial of Akash Missile by Army and Air Force, Handing over of first batch of land version of BrahMos missile systems to Army and successful conduct of 4th Military World Games were some of the significant events in the Ministry of Defence during the current year. The issue of Request for Proposal (RFP) for the purchase of 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft for Indian Air Force, the arrival of first batch of two Hawk Advanced Jet Trainers from UK, Signing of the Agreement with Russia on the Joint Development of 5th Generation Fighter Aircraft, First meeting of Indo-German High Defence Committee, Meeting of the Indo-French High Committee Meeting and approval of Parliament to the Armed Forces Tribunal Bill were some other major events during the year.

INTERCEPTOR MISSILE

            The country took a significant step towards Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and joined the elite club of USA, Russia and Israel when an interceptor missile successfully targeted the ‘hostile’ missile off the Orissa coast twice in early December. The Endo-Atmospheric AAD Interceptor missile test fired from Wheeler Island intercepted the target missile at an altitude of 15 km from launch surface at supersonic speed.

AGNI - III

            The Agni – III was successfully launched on April 12, 2007 from the Wheeler Island, off the coast of Orissa.  The 16 meter long missile weighing 48 tonnes, lifted off successfully from its Rail Mobile Launcher System leaving a trail of orange and yellow smoke. The missile which has a range of more than 3000 kms is capable of carrying a pay load of 1.5 Tonnes.

AKASH MISSILE

            Mobility trials as part of user’s trial for Army were conducted at Pokharan during 11 to 29 Jun, 2007 followed by Flyover Trials of Akash Weapon system as part of Air Force User Trials at Pokharan during 15 to 17 Nov 2007. The User’s Trials were also successfully conducted by ITR, Chandipur during 13 to 19 Dec 2007.

BRAHMOS MISSILE SYSTEM

            First batch of land version of BrahMos missile systems was handed over to the Army.  Installation of multi-missile vertical launcher was also completed on board naval ship INS Ranvir. The missile, capable of firing from underwater, is ready for evaluation test so that future submarines will have BrahMos missiles. Development of air version and its interface with different types of aircraft is in progress.

LIGHT COMBAT AIRCRAFT - Tejas

            Till Dec 2007 Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) has completed 785 flights.  The program achieved the most significant milestone, when it successfully test fired the Close Combat Missile R-73.  This historic event marked the beginning of weaponisation of Tejas. In September, LCA Tejas PV-1 created another milestone as it made a successful first flight with two 800 Ltrs drop tanks under the wing stations. On December 10, the Tejas LCA programme received yet another major fillip with the first successful flight test on PV-2 using Lightening Laser ranging and Laser spot seeking Pod, which can provide the pilot with day and night picture of terrain.

MILITARY WORLD GAMES

            The 4th CISM Military World Games was successfully organized from October 14 to 21, 07 at Hyderabad and Mumbai wherein over 5000 soldier-athletes from 101 countries participated. The Games held outside Europe for the first time had 13 disciplines. Three new world records were set up during the games in swimming, parachuting and sailing. Out of 101 participating countries, 49 countries won medals in one event or the other. India’s performance in the Games was the all time best as it secured 10 medals (2-Gold, 1-Silver and 7-Bronze)

ACQUISITION OF INS JALASHWA

            Landing Platform Dock INS JALASHWA was commissioned in the Navy in June this year. This is the first ever procurement of a ship by the Indian Navy from the United States Navy under the Excess Defence Article Programme and through the Foreign Military Sales route of the US Defence Forces. It is capable of carrying over 900 fully armed troops along with thirty vehicles, four landing craft and six helicopters.

JOINT EXERCISES

            Indian Army held joint exercises with the Armies of China, UK, Maldives, Russia and Singapore. It was for the first time when the Armies of India and China held joint exercise at Kunming in Yunan province of China. 80 soldiers each from India and China attended this five-day long joint exercise on anti-terrorist operations. The Indian Air Force carried out Joint exercises with the Air Forces of France and Russia.  Indian Navy carried out joint exercises with the Navies of USA, Russia, Japan, Oman, Australia, France, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore

FIRST BATCH OF AJT

            The first batch of Two Hawk Mk 132 Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) aircraft from UK reached India on 12 Nov 07. The Hawk trainers will impart stage-III training to the newly commissioned fighter pilots of the IAF at Bidar in Karnataka from June, next.

FRIGATES FROM RUSSIA

            A contract for the acquisition of three follow-on stealth frigates of P1135.6 class has been concluded with Russia on Jul 14, 2006, with the planned delivery of the first ship scheduled in Apr 2011. All three ships are being built at Yantar Shipyard, Kaliningrad. The three follow-on frigates would be fitted with indigenous BrahMos missile system instead of the earlier Club-N missile system

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quinta-feira, 27 de dezembro de 2007

The Submarine Design That Always "Might" Happen

Tuesday, December 18, 2007

The Submarine Design That Always "Might" Happen

Could it really be happening, this time for real, or is this another maybe not. As design projects go, I'd fall asleep trying to write the history behind this big "maybe" to take place this week.

A major committee of the Taiwan legislature this week approved a $62 million spending package for submarine design that could lead to a windfall for Electric Boat in Groton.

It also could lead to the precedent-setting situation of a U.S. company's building submarines for a foreign navy.

Rupert Hammond-Chambers, president of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, said Friday that "the odds are pretty high" that the money will survive a pending vote of the overall legislature. Taiwan's Legislative Yuan has final say over the country's spending, and it might release more money for submarine work in 2008.

There is always a catch. This one has several, but this is my favorite.

The estimated cost for design: $226 million. Although the $62 million approved this week is far short of that, Simmons said Friday, "You can buy a lot of design work with that. That is not a trivial amount."

Although several U.S. defense contractors could be in a position to bid on parts or all of the contract, Simmons said that Electric Boat is "the best." And he supports the idea of it getting into the business of building these smaller submarines powered by diesel and batteries, which Simmons thinks the U.S. Navy should start ordering for itself.

Rob Simmons is a state business advocate, also known as lobbyist, so of coarse he wants whatever brings Electric Boat in the $$$.

I gave up long ago trying to figure out the relationship between Taiwan and the US under this administration. Anyone who assumes anything, assumes too much in my opinion. Honestly, Bush made the Kitty Hawk incident go away and basically told the Navy to shut its mouth, while at the same time he seems to have no problems selling military equipment to any buyer, see India and Taiwan for examples. I'm thinking the US will take the cash and damn the consequences, but that is because I think Bush plus this Congress represents the biggest whore for the defense lobby our nation has ever had and puts the lobby above the troops every time they have the chance. Hey, you saw the earmarks, it is what it is.

$62 million of $226 million is about a quarter of the total requirement. While this might be good news to some, I see it as a tiny part of a much bigger issue. The election next year in Taiwan is turning into an Us vs Them cage match between those who want independence and those who want China.

That means the results of the election can lead to a number of unexpected consequences, most of which lead to the design of a new conventional submarine for Taiwan being too little too late.

You never know though, some think China will act rationally. I'd say the chances of that are about as good as Taiwan fully funding the design contract over the next few years.

US Nuclear Weapons Policy

US Nuclear Weapons Policy

A_bomb2 Cheryl Rofer at WhirledView has started a collaborative effort to discuss the US nuclear weapons policy – what it is, what it should be, why the administration has had such a difficult time articulating one. I was fortunate enough to be contacted by her to contribute to this worthy effort.

I have heard some of the top nuclear weapons policy advocates talk on this subject, and if it is one thing that they all agree on, it’s that the US government lacks a modern, post-Cold War strategy for justifying the current nuclear stockpile. This has directly led to the unresolved debates over the need for a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), the development of non-nuclear strike capabilities, and the DoE infrastructure supporting the nuclear stockpile.

The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review caused a direction to drop the number of active nuclear weapons and the development of the new “triad” strategy. This strategy changed from the old “triad” of land-based ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and ballistic missile submarines to a new “triad” of nuclear and non-nuclear offensive strike systems, active/passive defenses, and a “revitalized defense infrastructure” as the basis for a strategic posture. This was a positive measure, in that it changed the dialogue from a Cold War “mutually-assured destruction” mindset to a more comprehensive and flexible strategy addressing the roles of air/missile defense and the DoE labs as well as decreasing the reliance on nuclear weapons as a global strike tool.

The strategy did not offer an explanation as to why the goal of 1700-2200 active nuclear warheads was the right number, why a new warhead design might be needed, or under what circumstances would a nuclear weapons employment be exercised. Naturally, discussions on these matters might be classified, but the fact remained that, absent a public discussion on US nuclear strategy, it becomes difficult to support resolution on the key issues identified above. In fact, one former DepSecDef suggested that we ought to zero out the inventory and justify every weapon system added to the US stockpile, if we are to have that honest debate.

I am not going to have a long discussion on the proper role of nuclear weapons. If you want that understanding, go read Thomas Schelling’s “Arms and Influence.” I do want to outline the broad brush strokes of a progressive nuclear weapons policy that has a few main points of departure: 1) the US government will always need nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent against other countries that have nuclear weapons; 2) the US government needs to minimize the possibility of a future nuclear conflict between other nations as well as between the United States and another major power; and 3) there is no such thing as a tactical nuke.

To go back to Schelling, one purpose of national strategy is to be able to communicate with and influence other nations on particular issues such as war and peace. There is no mistaking an intercontinental ballistic missile for its message – an intention to threaten another country’s infrastructure with massive destruction. As long as Russia and China have these weapons, we will need equivalent capability to ensure freedom of maneuver and freedom of the marketplace across the world. We probably need a number of nuclear weapons to counter current regional powers such as India, Pakistan, and Israel, as well as future nuclear powers such as Iran and North Korea.

This does not mean that “The more nuclear weapons the US has, the saver[sic] the world is.” This is ridiculous, as is the statement that “the US would not have won the Cold War if it didn’t have nuclear weapons.” The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) does not say that Russia and the United States must completely disarm their nuclear stockpiles; rather, it states that nuclear-owning nations need to “pursue negotiations in good faith” toward that end-state. It may be that we will never see a nuclear-free global community, but it is not a bad vision to pursue. Visions are important motivators because of their long-term and idealistic nature. As long as we’re negotiating, it’s progress. “It is better to jaw-jaw than to war-war.”

US policy makers need to stop the practice of “deliberate ambiguity” as a diplomatic threat against other nations who are doing something the US government doesn’t like. We ought not threaten non-nuclear nation-states with nuclear weapons, as we did against Iraq in 1991 and 2003. Retaliating against chemical-biological weapons with nuclear weapons is not justifiable; this counters basic Cold War (Schelling) logic of rational deterrence. The message needs to be clear and simple: If you have nuclear weapons, you are now a target on our Single Integrated Operational Plan.

As for the second point, the US government needs to continue to pursue a strong nonproliferation strategy with both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. Part of this strategy must include acknowledgement that Israel has nuclear weapons, and that they are a part of the problem within the Middle East. I fail to understand the coy game played by US and Israeli politicians on this point. Until open discussions begin, how can we expect Iran, Syria, Egypt, or Saudi Arabia to discard the ambition of becoming a nuclear power? It’s basic deterrence theory again. I’m not suggesting that Israel give up its nukes; far from it, I want Israel to openly declare that they have nukes and will use them as part of its national strategy. This tact hasn’t hurt relations between the US government and India or Pakistan so far.

The other part of nonproliferation is a strategy to address the concern over a “cascade” of proliferating states as the result of Iran, Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Japan, or Venezuela becoming a nuclear state. I am not steeped in the subtleties of diplomacy, but I would suggest that a successful strategy is possible through agreements of protection under the US nuclear “umbrella”, sponsorship of regional military/economic agreements, and expansion of programs such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction effort beyond the former Soviet Union. All of this requires the US government engage both allies and potential adversaries on an international, not unilateral, stage.

I will make just a few comments about non-nuclear strike capabilities, air/missile defense, and the DoE lab infrastructure. Non-nuclear strike capabilities are definitely worth investment, as they both reduce the need for nuclear weapons and retain an ability to place adversarial nation-state interests at risk. The push for US missile defense platforms in Poland and the Czech Republic is a foolish, transparent attempt to protect US global interests at the cost of alienating friends and further aggravating adversaries. And certainly the DoE labs need investment, but the RRW is not the answer to their deep-seated challenges.

To summarize: The current “new triad” strategy articulates a correct approach to retaining a strategic deterrence capability against adversaries armed with nuclear weapons. The number of nuclear weapons should be adequate to 1) influence Russia, China, and two regional actors from considering first-strikes against US interests; and 2) protect US allies from nuclear attack. Plans ought to be realistic and avoid excessive multiple targeting of single sites to ensure success (standard AF target planning). This number will be classified, but the methodology needs to be articulated clearly.

We should invest in non-nuclear strike capabilities to the fullest extent possible, and maintain a minimal R&D effort in nuclear warhead reliability, safety, and efficacy (i.e., no RRW until it’s clear when current warheads will become unreliable). The DoE labs are an important resource that ought to be utilized to research both nuclear and non-nuclear global strike and defense capabilities. We ought to pull back on the idea of a global missile defense capability (specifically, plans for sites in Europe) and instead invest those funds into increased regional military/economic security discussions.

The US government should redouble its diplomatic efforts in nonproliferation and regional engagement. The NPT remains a noble vision toward which the US government ought to pursue, in that it will continue negotiations with nuclear states on reducing stockpiles and opening communications to reduce the chance of an aggressive action. Any ambiguity as to the US employment of nuclear weapons ought to be removed, to include articulating that non-nuclear states that attack US interests or allies with chemical or biological weapons will be engaged with non-nuclear strike weapons. Last, the US government must engage Israel, Pakistan, and India as seriously as Iran and North Korea on the issues of reducing their nuclear weapons stockpiles and reducing the chance of a nuclear exchange.

DCNS lance la construction des SNA du type Barracuda

Cherbourg : DCNS lance la construction des SNA du type Barracuda


19/12/2007

Après de longues années d'attente et plusieurs reports de la notification du programme, DCNS débute, aujourd'hui, la phase de construction des sous-marins nucléaires d'attaque du type Barracuda. La première tôle de la tête de série, le Suffren, sera découpée sur le site de Cherbourg. Après 120 mois de construction, le bâtiment sera livré à la Marine nationale, qui prévoit son entrée en service en 2017. Il sera alors grand temps de remplacer les SNA de la classe Rubis, dont le désarmement devait initialement intervenir à partir de 2008. En attendant la relève, ces derniers devront jouer les prolongations pour atteindre 34 ans de service, du jamais vu pour un bâtiment français propulsion nucléaire. DCNS, comme la marine, assurent toutefois que ces navires sont robustes et qu'ils peuvent se permettre quelques années d'activité supplémentaires.
D'un coût global de 7.89 milliards d'euros, Barracuda est le plus important programme de renouvellement des forces navales françaises après les sous-marins stratégiques (*). Il porte sur la réalisation de six bâtiments dont la livraison doit s'échelonner jusqu'en 2029.
Chargés d'assurer la protection des sous-marins nucléaires lanceurs d'engins (SNLE) et des groupes aéronavals, les Suffren pourront également opérer seuls pour des missions de lutte antinavire et anti-sous-marine. Plus grands et silencieux que leurs aînés, ils disposeront, par ailleurs, de nouvelles capacités en matière de renseignement et d'opérations spéciales. Enfin, les nouveaux SNA seront les premiers sous-marins français à être dotés d'un missile de croisière, le Scalp Naval, capable d'atteindre des cibles terrestres à plus de 1000 kilomètres. Ce type d'armes, qui fait cruellement défaut aux armées françaises depuis une quinzaine d'années, a déjà été largement utilisé par les marines américaines et britanniques.
Côté industriel, ce programme doit assurer l'essentiel de la charge de travail des sites DCNS de Cherbourg (construction) et Nantes-Indret (propulsion), tout en assurant une importante activité aux établissements de Ruelle (tubes lance-torpilles, lignes d'arbres, systèmes de navigation), Lorient (matériaux composites) et Toulon Le Mourillon (système de combat). A noter que 10% du contrat reviendra à Areva, co-maître d'oeuvre de la chaufferie nucléaire.

quarta-feira, 26 de dezembro de 2007

FOUR PATROL VESSELS FOR ROYAL NETHERLANDS NAVY

SCHELDE NAVAL SHIPBUILDING AWARDED WITH THE CONTRACT FOR FOUR PATROL VESSELS FOR ROYAL NETHERLANDS NAVY


On 20 December 2007, the Netherlands' Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) and Schelde Naval Shipbuilding signed a contract for the supply of four Patrol Vessels. The contract has a value of 240 million euros.
The four Patrol Vessels will be built for the Royal Netherlands Navy, and are to be delivered in a time-frame between November 2010 and November 2012.

The Patrol Vessels fulfil the operational requirements of the Royal Netherlands Navy for a robust platform with a limited weapon outfit, specifically designed for coastal patrol missions and maritime defence tasks in the territorial waters and EEZ of The Netherlands, The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.

The first two vessels will be built at Schelde's premises in Vlissingen, whereas the construction of the third and fourth vessel will largely take place at Damen Shipyard Galatz under supervision of Schelde Naval Shipbuilding.

The contract marks the ongoing, intensive relation between the Royal Netherlands Navy and Schelde Naval Shipbuilding over many decades. It also highlights the outstanding reputation of Schelde Naval Shipbuilding as a major naval shipbuilder of patrol vessels, fast-attack craft and corvettes.

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About the Patrol Vessel

The Patrol Vessel as designed for the Royal Netherlands Navy measures 108 meter in length and 16 meter in breadth. Total displacement is 3750 tonnes.

The vessel accommodates 50 crew and up to 40 non-listed persons, such as helicopter crew and medical teams. Further some 100 evacuees can be boarded. The ship's speed is approx 22 knots. To optimize the seakeeping behaviour of the vessel the hull has been stretched, and the bridge and superstructure are located relatively aftwards.

The propulsion plant consists of 2 main diesel engines of approx 5400 kW each. Alternatively electric propulsion can be chosen for low speed operations.
To support interception operations, 2 large RHIB's and one NH-90 helicopter are boarded. The stern RHIB will be launched and recovered via a slipway in the stern.

The weapon suit consists of one 76 mm gun, one 27 mm automatic gun and two automatic medium calibre gun systems.
In order to reduce the vulnerability, the vessel will be outfitted with ballistic features, blast resistant constructions, redundant and decentralized systems, a gas citadel, extensive fire fighting systems and additional measures to reduce the effects of flooding.

Automation level for this vessel is high, and includes a shore support system, a shore management system, a calamity system, a warning system, an overview system and extensive subsystem automation.
Also the communication and networks are state of the art, so as to support and direct all authorities involved.

The Patrol Vessels will be the first vessels of the Royal Netherlands Navy equipped with the Thales Integrated Sensor & Communication Systems (ISCS), an integrated mast module which integrates practically all RF systems, radars as well as communication and optical sensors on board of the ship in one housing
Together with this Integrated Sensor & Communication Systems (ISCS) these four advanced Patrol Vessels can face the threats and missions of today and tomorrow.

Source: Royal Schelde Group

Video of Thales integrated sensor mast:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8sMgEsHC1Lc

Aviationweek blog Ares
Dutch Release Details of Their New OPVs

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DSEi -- Dutch OPV Order Could be Signed in November

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Dutch OPVs have new stern launch and recovery slipway

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terça-feira, 25 de dezembro de 2007

SPS Blas de Lezo (F103) Returns

Monday, December 17, 2007

SPS Blas de Lezo (F103) Returnshttp://4.bp.blogspot.com/_cys2T5FgJdo/R2bvQz_04cI/AAAAAAAABM4/qUydJiaStsM/s320/SPS+Blas+de+Lezo+%28F103%29.jpg

Earlier this year, the Spanish frigate SPS Blas de Lezo (F103) ran aground during its participation in the Neptune Warrior 07 exercise off Scotland. Last week it was reported she has almost completed repairs.

There is still no report regarding what happened, and the official cost of repairs has also not been released.

She is expected to return to full duty in January.

Originally SPS Blas de Lezo (F103) was planned to take over as flagship of SNMG1 replacing the USS Bainbridge (DDG 96), but clearly that did not happen. The availability of SPS Blas de Lezo (F103) for 2008 will give Spain three deployable F100 frigates in 2008, including SPS Alvaro de Bazan (F101) and Almirante Juan de Borbon (F102)


Saturday, September 29, 2007

SPS Blas de Lezo (F103) Listing, Returning to Port Sunday

http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_cys2T5FgJdo/Rv8oqdVQqvI/AAAAAAAAAuY/CcCeZ1NaBCY/s320/SPS+Blas+de+Lezo+%28F103%29.jpgThere is some news coming from Neptune Warrior 07 regarding the Spanish frigate SPS Blas de Lezo (F103). Apparently the frigate ran aground off Scotland, and has been limping back to Spain, with a slight list and in rough seas at 6-8 knots. GoGibraltarsite has the latest news.

Following last weeks "Slight Grounding" of the SPS Blas de Lezo (F103) during its participation in the "Neptune Warrior" exercise off Scotland the news followed that things were a bit more serious than first thought. A couple of days ago it was reported in the Spanish press that the ship was making very slow progress back to Ferrol (where it will arrive 30/09/07 through rough seas at approximately 6 to 8-knots with a 'slight' list. Now reports from the same sources suggest that the damage sustained during the incident will cost in the region of €7-8m to repair but the bad news is that the new parts that are required will take nearly 34-weeks to manufacture!

This now throws into doubt the Flagship status of SNMG1 which the SPS Blas de Lezo was due to assume in November taking over from the USS Bainbridge (DDG 96). Now with the SPS Alvaro de Bazan (F101) engaged on qualification trials at Rota, but the logical replacement, the SPS Almirante Juan de Borbon (F102) in Ferrol on maintenance and the SPS Mendez Nunez (F104) not fully operational it puts the Spanish authorities in a bit of a position.

Oops! American missile to replace Trident is too big for Britain’s ... - Sunday Herald


Oops! American missile to replace Trident is too big for Britain’s ...
Sunday Herald - Dec 22, 2007
By Rob Edwards, Environment Editor THE US nuclear-armed missile that the Westminster government is hoping will replace Trident may not actually fit into British submarines, creating a "major headache" for UK weapons designers.

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Sailors under pressure - The Australian



The Australian
Sailors under pressure
The Australian - Dec 5, 2007
Around him a flock of officers from the Italian, Canadian and South Korean navies shake hands and take souvenir photographs.

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South Korea: A Military-Industrial Powerhouse



A potential deal for Russian defense technology could further advance South Korea’s technological base, which already is undergoing a dramatic indigenous military modernization. Such a boost to its military-industrial base could have profound regional repercussions.

Analysis

Seoul is in the process of negotiating a deal with Moscow to offset Russian debt with Russian defense expertise. South Korea already has a strong military-industrial base, which it is moving to expand. But Russian technology could prove a significant boon.

South Korea only joined the United Nations in 1991, which it achieved only by overcoming the Soviet bloc with a bribe. Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev needed money, and Seoul wanted U.N. membership. Some of that bribe was made in the form of loans; loans South Korea would be perfectly happy to have repaid in defense technology. It remains to be seen just what terms (e.g., what sectors of technology) are struck, but this has the potential to be a good deal for both Moscow and Seoul. Moscow is interested in paying this debt back eventually, since Seoul never has raised ideological issues with either the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation.

The scale and pace of South Korean innovation repeatedly has surprised outside observers: ask any American automaker what they thought of Hyundai ten years ago. South Korean megafirms like Samsung, Daewoo and Kia have made huge advances in the North American marketplace. LG is now the premier white goods company in the United States. Every third ship manufactured in 2006 was made in South Korea; Hyundai Heavy Industries alone is the largest shipbuilder on the planet. Such an industrial base has profound implications for South Korea’s domestic defense sector; it has the kind of strong civilian-industrial base that makes for a strong military-industrial base. Foreign military cooperation and acquisition of key U.S. weapon systems already is propelling the South Korean military forward.

Next year, the South Korean navy will commission its first Aegis-equipped warship, known as the KDX III, which relies heavily on the Arleigh Burke Flight IIA design. South Korea’s air force is taking delivery of U.S.-built F-15K fighter jets.

South Korean XK-2 Black Panther Main Battle Tank

More interesting will be what South Korea does with the successor generation. The K-1 main battle tank (MBT), which dates back to the early 1980s, borrowed so heavily from the U.S. M1 Abrams design that it was dubbed by some the “Kabrams.” The new XK-2 Black Panther MBT is the first truly new MBT design to emerge since the Cold War (its autoloader may have significant roots in Russian MBT autoloaders), and though it has yet to be tested or proven in combat, by all measures it appears to be a significant achievement. Between work on the KDX-III and on successive generations of German submarine designs (the Type 209 and now the Type 214), the South Koreans are in a strong position to pull off similar indigenous design leaps in the follow-on generation.

The synthesis of different design heritages may be where South Korea’s defense industry could truly shine. The South Koreans have extensive experience with, and are still learning more about, U.S. defense technology. Combine that with the potential for understanding Russian design experience — which in many cases will be the late Soviet-era work — and Seoul has the basic ingredients for merging the two principal competing design paths of the 20th century: those of the United States and the Soviet Union.

This potential is not limited to U.S. and Russian technology. When Washington stonewalled Seoul and refused to let up on defense agreements prohibiting a South Korean missile program, Seoul turned to the French for help with their space program. South Korea’s experience building licensed copies of German Type 214 submarines (Germany has a deep and profound understanding of submarine engineering) has already given the South Koreans a German-influenced perspective of their own. Additional Russian design only will refine their work.

Submarine batteries are one area that looks likely to be included in any Russian-South Korean deal. Probably more interesting to Seoul is rocketry, missile guidance, aircraft engineering, avionics and radar, all areas in which the South Koreans are looking to expand their knowledge base. Some of these appear to be on the table.

In the long run, South Korea is moving inexorably towards those technologies, specifically ones that reduce manpower needs. These include robotics, increased-range and standoff systems, and spaced-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Like the United States facing down the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, South Korea stands at a demographic disadvantage to both China and North Korea. Deal or no deal, in a decade South Korea will be a defense exporter to reckon with. This new deal raises the prospect that the pace could be accelerated, giving South Korea a better understanding of a broader range of hard-to-master technologies.

segunda-feira, 24 de dezembro de 2007

Russian naval air exercises in Atlantic disrupting civilian ... - International Herald Tribune


Russian naval air exercises in Atlantic disrupting civilian ...
International Herald Tribune - Dec 21, 2007
AP BRUSSELS, Belgium: Air operations by a Russian naval task force sailing from the North Atlantic to the Mediterranean represent a potential threat to the safety of civilian flights in the area, an international pilots' group warned Friday.

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Brazil May Work With France on Nuclear Submarine (Update1) - Bloomberg


Brazil May Work With France on Nuclear Submarine (Update1)
Bloomberg - Dec 21, 2007
France is the most likely candidate to help Brazil develop military ship-building techniques to create submarines that can be fitted with a Brazilian-designed naval nuclear reactor, Jobim told reporters at the Angra dos Reis nuclear power station ...

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domingo, 23 de dezembro de 2007

SSBN Home Ports In Imagery

SSBN Home Ports In Imagery



Some of the most guarded military facilities in the world are the homes to nuclear missile submarines. These bastions of nuclear warfighting power represent the homes of the most powerful weapon systems ever conceived. It should be noted that only operational bases will be discussed herein; support facilities, construction yards, and other facilities are outside the scope of this article.

THE SSBN

An SSBN is a nuclear-powered submarine designed to carry and launch a number of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. SSBNs act as the seagoing component of their operators nuclear deterrent force. The advantage of an SSBN lies in its inherent survivability through stealth. SSBNs are notoriously hard to locate when in their patrol areas and are the perfect counterforce weapon in a nuclear conflict. The mere presence of an SSBN at sea may be enough of a deterrent to ward off a nuclear exchange, as a retaliatory strike is all but guaranteed. A modern SSBN using depressed-trajectory weapons can also provide a legitimate first-strike capability, bestowing little or no warning on a targeted nation and increasing the odds that a crippling, decisive first strike can be a successful nuclear warfighting option. It should come as no suprise that the five nations employing SSBN fleets are also the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

UNITED STATES

The United States operates two SSBN facilities, one serving each coast. The Pacific coast facility is located at Bangor, Washington, with the Atlantic coast facility being located at Kings Bay, Georgia.

Bangor

The Bangor, Washington SSBN facility consists of five main dockside areas. The southernmost facility, the KB docks, are only used to service and house support craft which service the SSBNs. SSBNs themselves tie up pierside at either the Delta Refit Pier, or the Marginal Wharf. Weapons loading is carried out at a dedicated covered dock, and a degaussing facility is also present.

The following annotated image depicts the locations of the relevant facilities at the Bangor SSBN base:


The following image depicts the Delta Refit Pier, where three Ohio-class SSBNs can be seen:


The following image depicts an Ohio-class SSBN returning to the Bangor facility via the Juan De Fuca Strait:


Kings Bay

The Kings Bay SSBN facility consists of four main dockside areas. There is a primary pier for supporting submarines in port, a drydock facility, and a degaussing facility. There are also two weapons loading facilities, in contrast to the Bangor SSBN base, which only has one.

The following annotated image depicts the Kings Bay SSBN facility:


UNITED KINGDOM

The United Kingdom's SSBN force, consisting of four Vanguard class SSBNs, is based at HMS Neptune in the northwestern part of the nation. The facility is referred to as HMS Neptune due to the Royal Navy's practice of commisioning shore facilities as vessels in Her Majesty's Navy. Outside of military circles, however, the facility is more commonly known as Faslane.

The following image depicts the Royal Navy's SSBN facility at HMS Neptune, with two of the Vanguard class SSBNs visible pierside:


FRANCE

France's Force Oceanique Strategique controls French SSBNs, which are based at I'lle Longue, near the port of Brest. The M4 L'Inflexible class SSBNs have given way to the new SNLE-NG Le Triomphant class SSBNs, with three of the latter having been commissioned as of the end of 2007, with a fourth due in 2008.

The following image depicts the French SSBN facility, with one of the old L'Inflexible class SSBNs visible in port:


RUSSIA

Russia's SSBN force has shrank considerably since the end of the Cold War. The recent withdrawl from service of Delta I and Typhoon class SSBNs leaves only the Delta III and Delta IV still serving until the new Borey class vessels are ready for duty. One Typhoon is still active in support of the Bulava SLBM test program out of Severodvinsk, but is no longer on active duty with the Northern Fleet. The withdrawl of the Typhoons means that Litsa Guba is no longer an active SSBN facility, leaving the Russian SSBN force with two operating locations: Gadzhiyevo in the Northern Fleet, and Rybachiy in the Pacific Fleet.

Gadzhiyevo

Gadzhiyevo, located on the Kola Peninsula, is the home to the Russian Northern Fleet's SSBN force. Both Delta III and Delta IV class SSBNs are operated.

The following image depicts the Gadzhiyevo submarine base, with two SSBNs annotated:


A second Delta IV can be seen at nearby Olenya Bay, a facility which has been associated with the Gadzhiyevo SSBN fleet in some circles:


Rybachiy

Rybachiy, located near Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula, is the home to the remainder of Russia's operational Delta III SSBN fleet. Rybachiy is divided into two main areas, a port facility where operational SSBNs and SSNs are docked, and a maintenance facility with a floating drydock for upkeep of the Pacific Fleet submarine force stationed there.

The following image depicts the Rybachiy submarine base; closer examination of the imagery will reveal two Delta III SSBNs in residence:


CHINA

There are three primary SSBN facilities serving the PLAN, Qingdao, Xiaopingdao, and Yulin. The Qingdao facility is located near the port city of the same name, while the Xiaopingdao facility is located near the port city of Dalian. Yulin is located much farther south, on Hainan island.

Qingdao

Qingdao was the first SSBN facility to be constructed in China. It currently serves as the homeport for China's sole Type 092 Xia-class SSBN, as well as a number of SSNs. The only currently identified structure known to service the Type 092 SSBN is a large drydock facility.

The following image depicts the Qingdao SSBN base:


The following image depicts the Type 092 in drydock at Qingdao:


Xiaopingdao

Xiaopingdao is a relatively new SSBN facility associated with the new Type 094 Jin-class SSBN currently being fielded. Jin-class SSBNs have been identified at this facility in the past, and Xiaopingdao is also home to the PLAN's sole Golf-class SSB. The Golf-class SSB is employed as an SLBM test vehicle, and is currently likely supporting JL-2 SLBM trials for the Type 094 fleet. The transitory nature of Jin-class SSBN presence at Xiaopingdao, as well as the Golf-class SSB's presence, suggests that Xiaopingdao may not be home to any operational SSBNs, but may instead be a trials base where new SSBNs and SLBMs are trialled before entering operational service.

The following image depicts the Xiaopingdao SSBN facility, where the Golf-class SSB can be seen along with a Type 093 Shang-class SSN:


The following image depicts a Jin-class SSBN pierside at Xiaopingdao, from October of this year:


Yulin

Yulin is the latest naval facility to be associated with the PLAN's SSBN force. In December of 2007 images appeard on the internet of a Jin-class SSBN pierside at the Yulin submarine facility. Until this point Yulin had never been visited by nor been the home port to a Chinese SSBN. While it is possible that this represents a port of call by a new Type 094 SSBN making a long-distance sortie in Chinese waters, it is also possible that the vessel sighted there will now call Yulin home, giving China two separate operational SSBN port facilities, with both the North Sea Fleet and the South Sea Fleet having an SSBN contingent.

The following image depicts the Yulin submarine base:


SOURCES

-All satellite imagery from Google Earth

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