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terça-feira, 25 de dezembro de 2007

SPS Blas de Lezo (F103) Returns

Monday, December 17, 2007

SPS Blas de Lezo (F103) Returnshttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjN3iFhd0bAlcmE3dDxspdH5tgQLqH1N9grlckfnX_n7dKMRu8l8kJ6MM-Jwyew0lKTVUAu5fqnYcO5ay2GR7k1pjjxUhSw0X6SYc4dLHBtMtzKwka9RdiHHFFTk_692M6KVaWkeez5O7M/s320/SPS+Blas+de+Lezo+%28F103%29.jpg

Earlier this year, the Spanish frigate SPS Blas de Lezo (F103) ran aground during its participation in the Neptune Warrior 07 exercise off Scotland. Last week it was reported she has almost completed repairs.

There is still no report regarding what happened, and the official cost of repairs has also not been released.

She is expected to return to full duty in January.

Originally SPS Blas de Lezo (F103) was planned to take over as flagship of SNMG1 replacing the USS Bainbridge (DDG 96), but clearly that did not happen. The availability of SPS Blas de Lezo (F103) for 2008 will give Spain three deployable F100 frigates in 2008, including SPS Alvaro de Bazan (F101) and Almirante Juan de Borbon (F102)


Saturday, September 29, 2007

SPS Blas de Lezo (F103) Listing, Returning to Port Sunday

https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEge2EU2V_lY0duWaa3S-LqdS7RIqNYsvOijCW_CDbgswsYhqCxWgtXt3HHWuSeU2nE0FeLHzKEbXA6l6B6SlpSYr6y144w6Cwl9EYbSn4ljgwuU_1b6Vsk3QRD7zTWJkPCQxJfVmS-RaPwQ/s320/SPS+Blas+de+Lezo+%28F103%29.jpgThere is some news coming from Neptune Warrior 07 regarding the Spanish frigate SPS Blas de Lezo (F103). Apparently the frigate ran aground off Scotland, and has been limping back to Spain, with a slight list and in rough seas at 6-8 knots. GoGibraltarsite has the latest news.

Following last weeks "Slight Grounding" of the SPS Blas de Lezo (F103) during its participation in the "Neptune Warrior" exercise off Scotland the news followed that things were a bit more serious than first thought. A couple of days ago it was reported in the Spanish press that the ship was making very slow progress back to Ferrol (where it will arrive 30/09/07 through rough seas at approximately 6 to 8-knots with a 'slight' list. Now reports from the same sources suggest that the damage sustained during the incident will cost in the region of €7-8m to repair but the bad news is that the new parts that are required will take nearly 34-weeks to manufacture!

This now throws into doubt the Flagship status of SNMG1 which the SPS Blas de Lezo was due to assume in November taking over from the USS Bainbridge (DDG 96). Now with the SPS Alvaro de Bazan (F101) engaged on qualification trials at Rota, but the logical replacement, the SPS Almirante Juan de Borbon (F102) in Ferrol on maintenance and the SPS Mendez Nunez (F104) not fully operational it puts the Spanish authorities in a bit of a position.

Oops! American missile to replace Trident is too big for Britain’s ... - Sunday Herald


Oops! American missile to replace Trident is too big for Britain’s ...
Sunday Herald - Dec 22, 2007
By Rob Edwards, Environment Editor THE US nuclear-armed missile that the Westminster government is hoping will replace Trident may not actually fit into British submarines, creating a "major headache" for UK weapons designers.

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Sailors under pressure - The Australian



The Australian
Sailors under pressure
The Australian - Dec 5, 2007
Around him a flock of officers from the Italian, Canadian and South Korean navies shake hands and take souvenir photographs.

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South Korea: A Military-Industrial Powerhouse



A potential deal for Russian defense technology could further advance South Korea’s technological base, which already is undergoing a dramatic indigenous military modernization. Such a boost to its military-industrial base could have profound regional repercussions.

Analysis

Seoul is in the process of negotiating a deal with Moscow to offset Russian debt with Russian defense expertise. South Korea already has a strong military-industrial base, which it is moving to expand. But Russian technology could prove a significant boon.

South Korea only joined the United Nations in 1991, which it achieved only by overcoming the Soviet bloc with a bribe. Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev needed money, and Seoul wanted U.N. membership. Some of that bribe was made in the form of loans; loans South Korea would be perfectly happy to have repaid in defense technology. It remains to be seen just what terms (e.g., what sectors of technology) are struck, but this has the potential to be a good deal for both Moscow and Seoul. Moscow is interested in paying this debt back eventually, since Seoul never has raised ideological issues with either the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation.

The scale and pace of South Korean innovation repeatedly has surprised outside observers: ask any American automaker what they thought of Hyundai ten years ago. South Korean megafirms like Samsung, Daewoo and Kia have made huge advances in the North American marketplace. LG is now the premier white goods company in the United States. Every third ship manufactured in 2006 was made in South Korea; Hyundai Heavy Industries alone is the largest shipbuilder on the planet. Such an industrial base has profound implications for South Korea’s domestic defense sector; it has the kind of strong civilian-industrial base that makes for a strong military-industrial base. Foreign military cooperation and acquisition of key U.S. weapon systems already is propelling the South Korean military forward.

Next year, the South Korean navy will commission its first Aegis-equipped warship, known as the KDX III, which relies heavily on the Arleigh Burke Flight IIA design. South Korea’s air force is taking delivery of U.S.-built F-15K fighter jets.

South Korean XK-2 Black Panther Main Battle Tank

More interesting will be what South Korea does with the successor generation. The K-1 main battle tank (MBT), which dates back to the early 1980s, borrowed so heavily from the U.S. M1 Abrams design that it was dubbed by some the “Kabrams.” The new XK-2 Black Panther MBT is the first truly new MBT design to emerge since the Cold War (its autoloader may have significant roots in Russian MBT autoloaders), and though it has yet to be tested or proven in combat, by all measures it appears to be a significant achievement. Between work on the KDX-III and on successive generations of German submarine designs (the Type 209 and now the Type 214), the South Koreans are in a strong position to pull off similar indigenous design leaps in the follow-on generation.

The synthesis of different design heritages may be where South Korea’s defense industry could truly shine. The South Koreans have extensive experience with, and are still learning more about, U.S. defense technology. Combine that with the potential for understanding Russian design experience — which in many cases will be the late Soviet-era work — and Seoul has the basic ingredients for merging the two principal competing design paths of the 20th century: those of the United States and the Soviet Union.

This potential is not limited to U.S. and Russian technology. When Washington stonewalled Seoul and refused to let up on defense agreements prohibiting a South Korean missile program, Seoul turned to the French for help with their space program. South Korea’s experience building licensed copies of German Type 214 submarines (Germany has a deep and profound understanding of submarine engineering) has already given the South Koreans a German-influenced perspective of their own. Additional Russian design only will refine their work.

Submarine batteries are one area that looks likely to be included in any Russian-South Korean deal. Probably more interesting to Seoul is rocketry, missile guidance, aircraft engineering, avionics and radar, all areas in which the South Koreans are looking to expand their knowledge base. Some of these appear to be on the table.

In the long run, South Korea is moving inexorably towards those technologies, specifically ones that reduce manpower needs. These include robotics, increased-range and standoff systems, and spaced-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Like the United States facing down the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, South Korea stands at a demographic disadvantage to both China and North Korea. Deal or no deal, in a decade South Korea will be a defense exporter to reckon with. This new deal raises the prospect that the pace could be accelerated, giving South Korea a better understanding of a broader range of hard-to-master technologies.

segunda-feira, 24 de dezembro de 2007

Russian naval air exercises in Atlantic disrupting civilian ... - International Herald Tribune


Russian naval air exercises in Atlantic disrupting civilian ...
International Herald Tribune - Dec 21, 2007
AP BRUSSELS, Belgium: Air operations by a Russian naval task force sailing from the North Atlantic to the Mediterranean represent a potential threat to the safety of civilian flights in the area, an international pilots' group warned Friday.

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Brazil May Work With France on Nuclear Submarine (Update1) - Bloomberg


Brazil May Work With France on Nuclear Submarine (Update1)
Bloomberg - Dec 21, 2007
France is the most likely candidate to help Brazil develop military ship-building techniques to create submarines that can be fitted with a Brazilian-designed naval nuclear reactor, Jobim told reporters at the Angra dos Reis nuclear power station ...

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domingo, 23 de dezembro de 2007

SSBN Home Ports In Imagery

SSBN Home Ports In Imagery



Some of the most guarded military facilities in the world are the homes to nuclear missile submarines. These bastions of nuclear warfighting power represent the homes of the most powerful weapon systems ever conceived. It should be noted that only operational bases will be discussed herein; support facilities, construction yards, and other facilities are outside the scope of this article.

THE SSBN

An SSBN is a nuclear-powered submarine designed to carry and launch a number of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. SSBNs act as the seagoing component of their operators nuclear deterrent force. The advantage of an SSBN lies in its inherent survivability through stealth. SSBNs are notoriously hard to locate when in their patrol areas and are the perfect counterforce weapon in a nuclear conflict. The mere presence of an SSBN at sea may be enough of a deterrent to ward off a nuclear exchange, as a retaliatory strike is all but guaranteed. A modern SSBN using depressed-trajectory weapons can also provide a legitimate first-strike capability, bestowing little or no warning on a targeted nation and increasing the odds that a crippling, decisive first strike can be a successful nuclear warfighting option. It should come as no suprise that the five nations employing SSBN fleets are also the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

UNITED STATES

The United States operates two SSBN facilities, one serving each coast. The Pacific coast facility is located at Bangor, Washington, with the Atlantic coast facility being located at Kings Bay, Georgia.

Bangor

The Bangor, Washington SSBN facility consists of five main dockside areas. The southernmost facility, the KB docks, are only used to service and house support craft which service the SSBNs. SSBNs themselves tie up pierside at either the Delta Refit Pier, or the Marginal Wharf. Weapons loading is carried out at a dedicated covered dock, and a degaussing facility is also present.

The following annotated image depicts the locations of the relevant facilities at the Bangor SSBN base:


The following image depicts the Delta Refit Pier, where three Ohio-class SSBNs can be seen:


The following image depicts an Ohio-class SSBN returning to the Bangor facility via the Juan De Fuca Strait:


Kings Bay

The Kings Bay SSBN facility consists of four main dockside areas. There is a primary pier for supporting submarines in port, a drydock facility, and a degaussing facility. There are also two weapons loading facilities, in contrast to the Bangor SSBN base, which only has one.

The following annotated image depicts the Kings Bay SSBN facility:


UNITED KINGDOM

The United Kingdom's SSBN force, consisting of four Vanguard class SSBNs, is based at HMS Neptune in the northwestern part of the nation. The facility is referred to as HMS Neptune due to the Royal Navy's practice of commisioning shore facilities as vessels in Her Majesty's Navy. Outside of military circles, however, the facility is more commonly known as Faslane.

The following image depicts the Royal Navy's SSBN facility at HMS Neptune, with two of the Vanguard class SSBNs visible pierside:


FRANCE

France's Force Oceanique Strategique controls French SSBNs, which are based at I'lle Longue, near the port of Brest. The M4 L'Inflexible class SSBNs have given way to the new SNLE-NG Le Triomphant class SSBNs, with three of the latter having been commissioned as of the end of 2007, with a fourth due in 2008.

The following image depicts the French SSBN facility, with one of the old L'Inflexible class SSBNs visible in port:


RUSSIA

Russia's SSBN force has shrank considerably since the end of the Cold War. The recent withdrawl from service of Delta I and Typhoon class SSBNs leaves only the Delta III and Delta IV still serving until the new Borey class vessels are ready for duty. One Typhoon is still active in support of the Bulava SLBM test program out of Severodvinsk, but is no longer on active duty with the Northern Fleet. The withdrawl of the Typhoons means that Litsa Guba is no longer an active SSBN facility, leaving the Russian SSBN force with two operating locations: Gadzhiyevo in the Northern Fleet, and Rybachiy in the Pacific Fleet.

Gadzhiyevo

Gadzhiyevo, located on the Kola Peninsula, is the home to the Russian Northern Fleet's SSBN force. Both Delta III and Delta IV class SSBNs are operated.

The following image depicts the Gadzhiyevo submarine base, with two SSBNs annotated:


A second Delta IV can be seen at nearby Olenya Bay, a facility which has been associated with the Gadzhiyevo SSBN fleet in some circles:


Rybachiy

Rybachiy, located near Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula, is the home to the remainder of Russia's operational Delta III SSBN fleet. Rybachiy is divided into two main areas, a port facility where operational SSBNs and SSNs are docked, and a maintenance facility with a floating drydock for upkeep of the Pacific Fleet submarine force stationed there.

The following image depicts the Rybachiy submarine base; closer examination of the imagery will reveal two Delta III SSBNs in residence:


CHINA

There are three primary SSBN facilities serving the PLAN, Qingdao, Xiaopingdao, and Yulin. The Qingdao facility is located near the port city of the same name, while the Xiaopingdao facility is located near the port city of Dalian. Yulin is located much farther south, on Hainan island.

Qingdao

Qingdao was the first SSBN facility to be constructed in China. It currently serves as the homeport for China's sole Type 092 Xia-class SSBN, as well as a number of SSNs. The only currently identified structure known to service the Type 092 SSBN is a large drydock facility.

The following image depicts the Qingdao SSBN base:


The following image depicts the Type 092 in drydock at Qingdao:


Xiaopingdao

Xiaopingdao is a relatively new SSBN facility associated with the new Type 094 Jin-class SSBN currently being fielded. Jin-class SSBNs have been identified at this facility in the past, and Xiaopingdao is also home to the PLAN's sole Golf-class SSB. The Golf-class SSB is employed as an SLBM test vehicle, and is currently likely supporting JL-2 SLBM trials for the Type 094 fleet. The transitory nature of Jin-class SSBN presence at Xiaopingdao, as well as the Golf-class SSB's presence, suggests that Xiaopingdao may not be home to any operational SSBNs, but may instead be a trials base where new SSBNs and SLBMs are trialled before entering operational service.

The following image depicts the Xiaopingdao SSBN facility, where the Golf-class SSB can be seen along with a Type 093 Shang-class SSN:


The following image depicts a Jin-class SSBN pierside at Xiaopingdao, from October of this year:


Yulin

Yulin is the latest naval facility to be associated with the PLAN's SSBN force. In December of 2007 images appeard on the internet of a Jin-class SSBN pierside at the Yulin submarine facility. Until this point Yulin had never been visited by nor been the home port to a Chinese SSBN. While it is possible that this represents a port of call by a new Type 094 SSBN making a long-distance sortie in Chinese waters, it is also possible that the vessel sighted there will now call Yulin home, giving China two separate operational SSBN port facilities, with both the North Sea Fleet and the South Sea Fleet having an SSBN contingent.

The following image depicts the Yulin submarine base:


SOURCES

-All satellite imagery from Google Earth

sexta-feira, 21 de dezembro de 2007

Maulers Make Final Homecoming

Maulers Make Final Homecoming

By Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Brian Smarr, Fleet Public Affairs Center Det. Southeast



JACKSONVILLE, Fla. (NNS) -- The "Maulers" of Sea Control Squadron (VS) 32 ended their final deployment aboard USS Enterprise (CVN 65) by returning to Naval Air Station (NAS) Jacksonville, Fla., Dec. 15.

The arrival back to NAS Jacksonville marks the last deployment for an S-3 Viking squadron, as the aircraft will be phased out of service at the end of 2008.

VS-32 Commanding Officer, Cmdr. Doug Walker, was impressed with the squadron's performance during their deployment.

"For us it meant a lot to be able to be that last deployer," he said. "We were proud to go out there and do the missions that Vikings do everyday."

While VS-32 conducted their sunset cruise embarked on Enterprise as a component of Carrier Air Wing (CVW) One, they supported ground forces in Afghanistan and Iraq by conducting maritime security operations.

During the deployment, the squadron made several career milestones. They flew 960 sorties, which totaled more than 2,200 flight hours with more than 950 carrier landings and were at sea for 180 days with only 13 days in port.

Russian Navy Returns to the High seas

December 18, 2007

Russian Navy Returns to the High seas

Seas http://mnweekly.rian.ru/news/20071206/55295359.html


Russia's navy has resumed military presence in the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov reported at a Wednesday meeting with President Vladimir Putin.

The minister, quoted by the RIA-Novosti press agency, reported that a naval fleet was heading to the northeast Atlantic and the Mediterra­nean Sea, where they will remain till early February of next year. The expedition is aimed at bolstering Russia's naval presence and increasing the security of Russian navigation.

The minister said an aircraft-carrying heavy cruiser, two anti-submarine ships and a tanker departed for the Mediterranean on Wednesday, where they will be joined by a Black Sea Fleet missile cruiser and a tanker.

Serdyukov said a total of four warships and seven other vessels of Russia's Northern, Black Sea and Baltic fleets, as well as 47 planes and 10 helicopters, have been dispatched for the mission. Three exercises, involving the vessels and aircraft, are being planned.

Earlier this year, naval chief Admiral Vladimir Masorin called for restoring a permanent Russian presence in the Mediterranean, saying it was a vital zone for the Black Sea Fleet.

In the Soviet era, navy ships were based at Syria's Mediterranean port of Tartus, and Russia still maintains a technical base there.

The naval expedition represents the latest effort by Putin - bolstered by a torrent of oil revenues pouring into government coffers - to breathe new life into Russia's armed forces.

Earlier this year, he ordered the military to resume regular long-range flights of strategic bombers. In recent years, Russia's bombers have resumed flights to areas off Norway and Iceland, as well as Russia's northeast corner, across the Bering Strait from Alaska several years ago.

Still, it was unclear how much of a presence the Russian ships would have, either in the Mediterranean or elsewhere. Like other branches of military, the navy, particularly its surface fleet, suffered in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, as a lack of funding resulted in ships and submarines rusting away in docks and berths.

In mid-August, Putin announced the resumption of strategic patrol flights, saying that although the country halted long-distance strategic flights to remote regions in 1992 with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing economic and political chaos, other nations had continued the practice, compromising Russian national security.

Russia's strategic bombers have since carried out over 70 patrol flights over the Pacific, Atlantic, and Arctic oceans, as well as the Black Sea, a senior Air Force official said Tuesday, adding that NATO interceptor aircraft had escorted Russian bombers during all their patrols.

Combined report - Ria Novosti, AP

segunda-feira, 17 de dezembro de 2007

La marine britannique étudie l'adoption d'un canon de 155mm

La marine britannique étudie l'adoption d'un canon de 155mm

BAE Systems travaille déjà sur l'AGS américain
crédits : BAE SYSTEMS


18/12/2007

BAE Systems a été chargé d'étudier la possibilité pour la Royal Navy d'embarquer une artillerie de 155 mm, contre un calibre maximum de 127 mm actuellement utilisé. La marine britannique pourrait, notamment, profiter des développements déjà menés sur l'artillerie terrestre de ce calibre, ainsi que sur les canons de 155 mm conçus pour les futurs destroyers américains de la classe Zumwalt, programme dans lequel BAE Systems est impliqué. Sur ces bâtiments, une nouvelle munition, associée à l'Advanced Gun System (AGS), devrait permettre aux destroyers US d'atteindre des objectifs terrestres situés à plus de 180 kilomètres.
Très lourde, la pièce de 155 mm ne pourrait être embarquée que sur de grosses unités, comme les destroyers lance-missiles du type 45.
En Europe, l'Allemagne avait envisagé, un temps, de doter ses nouvelles frégates du type 125 de tels canons. Le projet a, néanmoins, été abandonné, tout comme, visiblement, celui d'installer sur les FREMM françaises une version navalisée du 155 mm de GIAT.

A Navantia Design To Contend As a Collins Replacement

A Navantia Design To Contend As a Collins Replacement

Navantia released a press statement last week that they had begun work on both S-81 and S-82, the first two submarines of the S-80 class. Both submarines are being built for the Spanish Navy.


Spanish Navy Admiral Sanjurjo Jul, Director of Naval Constructions, and Juan Pedro Gómez Jaén, CEO of Navantia, have presided on 13th. December, the ceremony of the cut of the first steel for the second S-80 submarine (S-82), and afterwards, the ceremony of the keel laying of the first unit (S-81).

The S-80 submarine, 100% Navantia design, is in these moments the most technologically advanced conventional submarine in the world. Navantia becomes, thanks to this programme, a pioneer company in submarines construction and system integration, as it happened before in the surface ships.

These submarines, equipped with an AIP system, will be delivered to the Spanish Navy in 2013, 2014 and 2015.

It also listed the expected "official" statistics.

Main particulars:
- Length overall: 71.05 m.
- Hull length: 51.76 m.
- Hull diameter: 7.30 m.
- Displacement Submerged: 2,426 t.
- Displacement Surface: 2,198 t
- Floatability: 9.5%
- Power (MEP): 3,500 Kw
- Number of Battery Elements: 360
- Generators Power: 3,600 Kw
- Crew: 32 p (+8)
- Speed: 20 knots
- Endurance: 50 days

I haven't been paying as close attention as I should to the S-80, because I didn't realize how big it is. At 2,426 tons submerged displacement the S-80 class is the largest AIP submarine in the world. What is also interesting about the S-80 class is these are not coastal submarines like what we are seeing exported from Germany, these are fleet submarines like what we are seeing exported from Russia.

Consider a few things. It has been reported in the media lately that discussions on the Collins class submarine replacement have begun in Australia. The Collins class is a fleet submarine, and it's replacement will have to be a fleet submarine as well. Australia recently picked Navantia to build amphibious ships and surface combatants. Australia is almost certainly not going to work with the Swedes again on the Collins replacement, and will look for a new partner. Whatever submarine they build will need to be compatible with American submarine systems, from the Combat center to just about every other piece of equipment that might be deployed on a submarine. Most importantly, it is almost a certainty the new Collins class replacement will leverage fuel cell technology.

Given the shipyards in Spain are working at peak capacity for the next several years, and this is before additional export orders, it seems very likely that Navantia would agree to licensing terms to allow a modified S-80 be built in Australia. While it is not very likely that Australia has approached Navantia at this early stage, I wouldn't be surprised if they have mentioned it in passing, or implied the possibility. Of all the submarines on the market, while not as large as the Collins class, the S-80 represents the most likely design to be used as a basis for the Collins replacement to date, and as the Collins submarine replacement discussions get started it will be interesting to see if Navantia is mentioned as a partner in the discussion.

The first step of coarse is to get the S-80 on time and on budget, and for that we will have to wait and se

Coup In Bolivia: Military on alert

Coup In Bolivia: Military on alert

Coup In Bolivia: Military on alert

boliviamap.gif

Bolivia’s military is on alert as four provinces prepare to formally declare their autonomy Saturday.Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni and Pando, relatively wealthy states in the eastern lowlands, have announced they intend to create largely independent regional governments.

Authorities have sent 400 police officers to Santa Cruz to ensure security during the challenge to the Bolivian government.

The provinces object to President Evo Morales’s moves to overhaul the constitution to boost presidential powers and increase the rights of Bolivia’s indigenous majority. Indigenous Bolivians live mainly in the more impoverished western highlands and form the core of Mr. Morales’s support.

Mr. Morales, Bolivia’s first indigenous president, wants to break up the large landholdings of the eastern farmers, many of whom are of European descent, and redistribute the property among indigenous groups.

He also wants to redistribute the nation’s oil and gas wealth, which is centered in the east.

The four provinces are seeking to keep much of the tax revenues they generate. They say they do not want independence, but to retain control of their wealth.

Leaders in the region object to a Morales-backed constitution, approved Sunday in a vote boycotted by opposition lawmakers. The constitution would be put to a referendum next year.

The United States has urged Americans to defer travel to Bolivia.

http://ionglobaltrends.blogspot.com/2007/12/bolivia-military-on-alert.html



Bolivia tense amid autonomy push Several of Bolivia’s nine regions want more autonomy
Security forces are on alert in Bolivia, ahead of rallies planned in four of the country’s richest regions.
The four provinces are set to declare autonomy at the demonstrations, after the wealthiest province, Santa Cruz, passed a key tax reform measure.
The regions are angry at a new draft national constitution that includes greater state control of the economy.

But the president has warned against taking steps towards autonomy and extra police and soldiers have been deployed.

The draft constitution has already been the trigger of violence, with at least three people killed in the central city of Sucre in clashes in November.

Natural resources

The Santa Cruz assembly backed a statute under which the region would keep two-thirds of its tax revenues on Thursday.

Will Bolivia’s splits widen?

Three other regions - Tarija, Beni and Pando - are planning similar declarations at rallies on Saturday. Once the autonomy charters are declared, they will be put to the local populations for approval.Four hundred extra police have been sent to Santa Cruz, and the army has been told to prepare to protect public buildings.

The moves towards autonomy come after an assembly dominated by supporters of President Evo Morales adopted the new national charter article by article last weekend.

It must still be put to a national referendum.

Mr Morales made rewriting the constitution a key part of his reform agenda to give the indigenous majority greater political power, but the issue has deepened regional and ethnic divisions in the country.

Indigenous rights

Low-lying Santa Cruz is the most prosperous part of South America’s poorest country, having major agricultural businesses and much of Bolivia’s oil and gas wealth.

Pro-autonomy supporters object to the new constitution, which would allow consecutive five-year presidential terms, increase indigenous rights and redistribute wealth to the poorer highland areas of Bolivia.

On Thursday, Mr Morales called for dialogue, but warned that the unity of Bolivia was inviolable.

“The unity of the country is untouchable, it is not up for discussion. There is no referendum to be held on the country’s unity,” Mr Morales said.

There were frequent demonstrations - both for and against - during the debate over constitutional reforms, with protests sometimes turning violent.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7144447.stm



Four Bolivian regions declare autonomy from government
The natural-gas-rich districts seek to distance themselves from Bolivia’s constitutionConstitution calls for heavier taxes on the regions to help finance social programs

AP: “We won’t permit Bolivia to be divided,” President Evo Morales warns

Pro-Morales groups: Richer regions want to control Bolivia’s natural resources

(CNN) — Tensions were rising in Bolivia on Saturday as members of the country’s four highest natural gas-producing regions declared autonomy from the central government.Ruben Costas, center, governor of Santa Cruz, celebrates as the Bolivian region declares autonomy Saturday.
1 of 2 Thousands waved the Santa Cruz region’s green-and-white flags in the streets as council members of the Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni and Pando districts made the public announcement.

The officials displayed a green-bound document containing a set of statutes paving the way to a permanent separation from the Bolivian government.

Council representatives vowed to legitimize the so-called autonomy statutes through a referendum that would legally separate the natural-gas rich districts from President Evo Morales’ government.

The move also aims to separate the states from Bolivia’s new constitution, which calls for, among other things, a heavier taxation on the four regions to help finance more social programs.

“The statutes will be ratified,” said Oscar Ortiz, Santa Cruz senator. “With a public referendum, the people of our region will legitimize their will.”

About 35 percent of Bolivia’s 9.5 million people live in the four states, according to The Associated Press.

South America launches own bank
In the meantime, Bolivian network ATV showed what appeared to be armed, pro-government protesters creating blockades around the town of Yapacani, on the outskirts of Santa Cruz.

Some indigenous pro-Morales groups claim Bolivia’s richer, white-ruled Eastern regions want to control the country’s natural resources. Bolivia has South America’s second-largest natural gas reserves, behind Venezuela. Most of it is produced in the Eastern regions. Watch Bolivian leader speak out »

In the capital city La Paz on Saturday, Morales addressed thousands of flag-waving supporters in the Plaza Murillo, defending the new constitution and lashing out against what he called the racist policies of Bolivia’s elite.

“They must give back the money they took from us,” he told a cheering crowd, which included members of the Quechua and Aymara tribes. “We will retroactively investigate all the big fortunes, and the corrupt are now trembling with fear.”

Morales also cautioned those who he said want a “a division, a coup d’etat,” the AP reported.

“We won’t permit Bolivia to be divided,” he warned.

Morales — who belongs to the Aymara indigenous group — nationalized the country’s oil and natural gas reserves when he took power in 2006, creating what became known as the “gas wars.”

Running on a platform of redistribution of wealth among Bolivia’s poor, Morales has defied countries such as Brazil and the United States for the exploration of Bolivia’s natural reserves.

He has also protested the country’s racial divide.

“Bolivia is a nation among nations,” he said Saturday, referring to the diversity of Indian nations whose traditions date back centuries.

“We are not a country of blue-eyed, green-eyed folks only. It’s a plurinational country made of dark-skinned and white-skinned. This new constitution will unite us.” E-mail to a friend

http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/americas/12/15/bolivia.unrest/?iref=mpstoryview

sexta-feira, 14 de dezembro de 2007

Dificuldades para os submarinos S-80

Do Site: http://sistemadearmas.sites.uol.com.br/

Espanha: Dificuldades para os submarinos S-80
Rumores de cancelamento, por entre atrasos do programa

02.03.2007

A imprensa espanhola, embora com alguma timidez, tem vindo a referir com cada vez mais insistência os problemas com o desenvolvimento do submarino espanhol conhecido como projecto S-80.

O S-80, nasceu da cooperação entre a indústria francesa DCN e a industria espanhola (Izar / Navantia). O nome do projecto conjunto chamou-se Scorpéne.
O projecto Scorpéne implicava a construção de metade de cada submarino na França e outra metade na Espanha, embora o consórcio fosse 67% francês e 33% espanhol.

A Espanha no entanto, que inicialmente previa apenas pequenas modificações locais ao submarino, cedo começou a projectar modificações mais complexas.
A maior alteração ao projecto, ocorreu quando se confirmou que a Espanha optaria por um sistema de combate (conjunto de hardware e de software que coordena e gere as armas a bordo do navio) de fabrico americano, preterindo o sistema francês «Subtics».

O desagrado francês não deixou de se notar, e à medida que a DCN e a Navantia se afastavam, mais alterações se incorporavam ao navio espanhol, que passou a ser conhecido como um projecto diferente do próprio Scorpéne.

As notícias sobre as más relações entre a francesa DCN e a espanhola Navantia, que foram noticiadas pelo areamilitar em Setembro, foram sendo confirmadas por várias publicações especializadas, quer nos meios de comunicação impressos quer nos digitais.

No final de 2006, os franceses, irritados com o facto de os espanhóis terem aproveitado um submarino essencialmente francês, para substituírem todo o seu interior com produtos de outras origens, não estiveram com meias medidas, e apresentaram um submarino «novo», que não é mais que um submarino Scorpéne com outro nome, a que juntaram modificações pontuais. O novo «Marlin», pode assim ser apresentado pelos franceses no mercado internacional, sem que os espanhóis participem no processo, e a Espanha, se quiser tentar vender o Scorpéne, tem que contratar pelo menos 50% da sua construção aos franceses, os quais acabam ganhando de uma maneira ou de outra.

Mas as dores de cabeça espanholas são mais complicadas que os arrufos e a irritação dos franceses.

Inicialmente foram feitos estudos em Espanha, para desenvolver um sistema AIP, juntamente com a alemã MTU, mas os resultados não foram aceitáveis e a opção da industria espanhola, foi bater à porta da UTC-Power, do grupo United Technologies, que nos Estados Unidos desenvolve estudos e pesquisa na área das células de combustível, tornando o processo mais dependente da industria americana.[1]

5 anos para desenvolver um sistema:

Para piorar as coisas, e embora não tenha sido dado grande relevo à notícia, o tempo previsto para o desenvolvimento de um sistema viável de células de combustível AIP para os submarinos espanhóis seria segundo a própria United Technologies de cinco anos [2], o que leva a concluir que tal sistema só esteja pronto em 2011, atrasando inevitavelmente o prazo de entrega previsto para o primeiro submarino, pelo menos para 2012/2013 e o último para 2016/2017.
Somando a isto, o submarino Scorpéne, em cuja estrutura se baseia o S.80, foi pensado para o sistema MESMA de propulsão independente do ar, que queima Oxigénio e Etanol cuja reacção faz mover uma turbina a vapor.
A troca do MESMA por um sistema de células de combustível, coloca os projectistas espanhóis (que foram apenas responsáveis por uma parte do projecto) com problemas de solução relativamente complexa.

O diagrama mostra as diferênças na colocação dos principais componentes dos sistemas AIP MESMA e do sistema de células de combustível


Ao contrário do MESMA, um sistema MPP (Membrana de Permuta de Protões) de células de combustível, funciona juntando Oxigénio e Hidrogénio, e para isso é necessário transportar quantidades consideráveis destes dois reagentes.

A industria espanhola, tem vindo a tentar desenvolver um sistema que permita aproveitar o facto de o Scorpéne incluir tanques de Etanol (utilizado para o sistema MESMA) para a partir do Etanol produzir Hidrogénio, evitando assim a complexidade associada ao transporte daquele tipo de combustível.

Mas os atrasos no desenvolvimento de um sistema capaz de efectuar a produção local de Hidrogénio, pode levar a que se tenha que recorrer ao transporte do Hidrogénio em tanques. O problema é que é necessário ter cuidados especiais com a localização do Hidrogénio, e o Scorpéne, foi inicialmente desenhado para incluir tanques de Oxigénio e de Etanol, mas não para transportar tanques de Hidrogénio, que nos submarinos alemães, por exemplo, é transportado em tanques colocados entre o casco pressurizado e o casco exterior (tecnicamente da parte de fora do submarino).

Como o sistema MESMA, foi desenhado para conter todos ou praticamente todos os seus componentes num módulo cilíndrico, que se pode mesmo instalar depois de o submarino ter sido construído, cortando o submarino e colocando a nova secção com o AIP, ele não considerou a necessidade da colocação de pesado tanques para transportar um combustível volátil como o Hidrogénio.

Como os técnicos espanhóis não conseguiram desenvolver o seu próprio sistema AIP de células de combustível e tiveram que encomendar o seu estudo e desenvolvimento aos americanos, neste momento eles não têm como saber que sistema vai sair do período de desenvolvimento, nem tão pouco sabem como será que vai funcionar o sistema de produção de Hidrogénio de alto grau de pureza (se o conseguirem inventar) e onde vão colocar os sistemas, os tanques, as válvulas, e toda a parafernália necessária para fazer mover o submarino com o AIP ligado.

Juntando aos inevitáveis atrasos, parecem aumentar as críticas ao facto de o S-80 não dar aos espanhóis praticamente nada em termos de desenvolvimento de sistemas, porque o sistema de propulsão será americano, o sistema de combate também, os torpedos e tubos de torpedos deverão ser alemães, os mastros e sistemas telescópicos serão igualmente de proveniência americana, embora em principio fabricados na Itália, e os famosos mísseis Tomahawk que a Espanha pretende comprar também virão da América.

O S-80, ficará assim em parte refém da politica externa dos Estados Unidos, que podem a qualquer altura proibir a exportação do submarino se os espanhóis estiverem interessados em vende-lo para algum cliente que desagrade a Washington.

Todo o projecto está envolvido em demasiadas incógnitas, e o provável aumento de custos, resultado dos atrasos, pode acabar por transformar o S-80 no mais caro submarino convencional europeu.

Existem rumores de opiniões favoráveis ao cancelamento do projecto S-80 e à sua substituição por qualquer coisa mais simples, já desenvolvida, e que permita à industria espanhola um desenvolvimento mais sustentado, embora mais vagaroso.

Para já, parecem ganhar contornos os projectos de modernização dos submarinos Agosta, aos quais se poderá acrescentar também o sistema AIP. Porém não se sabe que tipo de sistema AIP poderá ser considerado.



[1] Os números avançados pelo futuro fabricante do sistema AIP, a United Technologies, apontam para células de combustível do tipo PEM, idênticas às utilizadas pelos submarinos U212 e U214 alemães, embora pelos dados conhecidos o S-80 seja um submarino 25% maior que os submarinos alemães. Neste caso, a potência menor, reduzirá a velocidade máxima de operação, ou então o período máximo de navegação em modo AIP.

[2] A indústria alemã, chegou a estudar sistemas AIP nos anos 70, mas concluiu que a tecnologia não estava suficientemente apurada. No final dos anos 80, continuavam os trabalhos e apenas e 1996, foi finalmente produzido um módulo viável para utilização num submarino.

Les pilotes de l'aéronavale vont aller s'entraîner sur un porte-avions américain

Les pilotes de l'aéronavale vont aller s'entraîner sur un porte-avions américain

Rafale5L'Aéronavale française va embarquer pour la première fois sur un porte-avions américain. Faute d'un second porte-avions, alors que le Charles-de-Gaulle est immobilisé pour entretien pendant dix-huit mois, les pilotes de Rafale et de Hawkeye vont aller s'entraîner en juillet 2008 à bord de l'USS Roosevelt au large de Norfolk, dans l'Atlantique. "Nous sommes entrain de monter cette opération avec la Marine américaine" indique-t-on rue Royale. Une dizaine d'avions devraient embarquer sur le Roosevelt: six à huit Rafale de la flotille 12 F et deux Hawkeye de la flotille 4F.

Pour le Marine, il s'agit d'un simple "échange technique". Jusqu'à présent, les appareils de l'aéronavale ne pouvaient pas se poser sur les portes-avions américains. Mais depuis juillet dernier, comme nous l'annoncions alors sur ce blog (phot ci-contre), les rafale F2 ont la capacité de le faire après avoir valider leur système d'alignement. Il y a peu d'obstacles mécaniques, puisque le Charles-de-Gaulle est équipé de catapultes et de brins d'arrêts de fabrication américaine. Depuis les années 90, les pilotes de l'aéronavale sont d'ailleurs formés aux Etats-Unis, faute d'un avion d'entraînement biplace pour l'apprentissage des techniques d'appontage.

La lettre d'information TTU, qui révèle l'information cette semaine, voit dans cette affaire la "preuve du réchauffement dans les relations franco-américaines et la volonté du président Nicolas Sarkozy de faire en sorte que la France retrouve toute sa place dans l'Otan". TTU précise que cette "initiative est vivement encouragée par Craig Stapleton, l'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis en France". L'embarquement d'une dizaine d'avions français à bord d'un PA américain est en effet du jamais-vu.

Cette opération "technique" risque de se retourner contre les intérêts de la Marine. Elle donne des arguments aux adversaires de la construction d'un second porte-avions (PA2), nombreux dans la haute héirarchie militaire. Si des flotilles françaises peuvent opérer à partir des gros porte-avions américains en cas de crise internationale et d'insdisponibilité du Charles-de-Gaulle, la France peut peut-être faire l'économie de trois milliards d'euros, le coût du PA2. Quant à l'indépendance nationale...

Navy Searching For New Metrics in the Force


Links to a defense news article on the latest series of force changes that details some of the specifics of all three proposals. As we examine the details more closely, they tell an interesting story regarding what the Navy leadership is thinking. We will observe the details one at a time.

Major combat operations. A force of 263 ships, smaller than the 313-ship fleet that Roughead has said he wants, tailored for battle against a peer competitor. This fleet would be composed of 12 aircraft carriers, 13 big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers, 26 amphibious ships, 81 cruisers and destroyers, 54 corvettes, 21 auxiliaries and 56 submarines including attack, ballistic and cruise missiles boats.

If you compare this to the 313-ship plan, it is basically the same fleet with 1 more aircraft carrier, with 54 LCS instead of 55, and with 5 amphibious ships beyond the current 10 LPD-17s and 12 LSDs programmed (we assume 4 HSVs and one new LHA/LHD). The big loss here is the 7 DDG-1000s, 10 submarines, and 9 auxiliaries. When you think about it, with so little deviation from the current 313-ship plan, it basically describes the current 313-ship plan as a plan to build a fleet for Major Combat Operations.

Shaping force. A fleet of 534 ships, mostly corvettes and patrol boats better suited to littoral, maritime security and partnership operations. This force would be composed of six aircraft carriers, 24 big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers, 48 amphibious ships, 48 cruisers and destroyers, 161 corvettes, 200 patrol craft, 30 riverine squadrons, 15 auxiliaries, and 32 submarines of all classes.

The first thing that sticks out about this plan is it represents what it would take to insert an entire Marine Division in forcible entry operations, even though it is supposed to be about MSO and Partnership. Despite the obvious flaws of only 32 submarines, which if you do the math after say 12 SSBNs is only 20 SSNs, is that with so few submarines and aircraft carriers it eliminates deterrence against China. My favorite comment about this plan so far is that "it looks like something Thomas Jefferson would advocate for to stop the British in 1810." In other words, the idea that the US Navy can emphasize partnership operations is not realistic, but as we have indicated in the past, the Navy does need a subsection of the fleet dedicated to partnership operations. This clearly would represent overkill to those ends.

Balanced force. A fleet of 474 ships able to conduct operations from high-end battle to low-end counterterrorism and maritime security. This force would be composed of nine aircraft carriers, 23 big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers, 46 amphibious ships, 57 cruisers and destroyers, 132 corvettes, 160 patrol craft, 20 riverine squadrons, 15 auxiliaries and 32 submarines of all classes.

This plan is interesting. Several have indicated that of the three, this is the one they liked the most. The first thing we like about this plan is the willingness to reduce the CVN fleet to 9. We actually like the number 10 better, but that the Navy is signaling 9 is OK is not a small thing. Another thing that stands out to us is this plan leaves 19 Cruisers and 38 Destroyers. That is a future reduction of 24 AEGIS warships. At the expense of submarines and logistics, the Navy changes the current force by adding 11 LHA/LHDs and 24 Amphibious Ships to create a "balanced force" even before producing 132 corvettes and 160 patrol craft.

While all of these plans are well and good, we wonder how serious the Navy truly is in making a force structure adjustment. If you think about it, the "Major Combat Operations" plan is simply the 313-ship plan with acceptance of a few cuts along the way, mostly to submarines and logistics. In fact, the focus of cuts to submarines and logistics, and the desire for more Amphibious Ships, specifically LHAs and LHDs raises a lot of questions regarding future existing plans, in particular the Sea Base. It leaves us curious, are these major increases in amphibious numbers in the "Shaping Force" and "Balanced Force" really nothing but MPF(F) squadrons and JHSVs?

With the emphasis on Amphibious Warfare, which can be fairly questioned considering the major competitors at this time are China, Iran, and North Korea (3 places unlikely to to be invaded by Marines), we note the desire for more amphibious ship capabilities. This tends to imply the regional deployments over the last 20 or so months by the Saipan, Ashland, Carter Hall, Whidbey Island, Peral Harbor, Fort McHenry, Peleliu, and Wasp have all been very successful. By that we note an apparent desire for more of these capabilities.

The emphasis of amphibious ships, absent any credible need for forcible entry operations, tends to imply a desire for specific metrics that are currently specific to amphibious ships, which is why we immediately jumped yesterday to discuss the concept of a mothership. One of the common themes, and the source for such a call must be forward commanders for it to make its way into each proposal, is for increased aviation capability for aviation capabilities other than fixed wing, as reflected by each plan increasing the number of LHAs and LHDs.

If this is indeed the case, it bring us back to the entire set of arguments between the big carrier vs small carrier crowds who had a major debate over CVN-21. We sided with the Navy that big deck carriers offer more to the Navy than small deck carriers, but in doing so we would side with critics who should now call upon the Navy to prove it.

The USS Enterprise (CVN-65) is returning home from its deployment, and should make it home on or around December 23rd. The Enterprise is completing the second of 2 major deployments back to back, the first being from May 2006 until November 2006, then again from July 2007 to December 2007. That is basically 14 months of deployment over a 20 month period, and between November 2006 and July 2007 the Enterprise conducted several training cruises off the east coast. The Enterprise will enter the yard next year and basically be out of action for all of 2008, and won't make another deployment until mid to late 2009.

When she returns, the Enterprise will have about 5 years of life left in her at the current rate of deployment, which clearly (and particularly when you factor in she was in the Pacific for exercises in 2006) these deployments beat on an old ship like the Enterprise.

The Navy is sending the signal that a reduction of aircraft carriers below the current 11 threshold is possible, but if doing so the desire to increase Marine Aviation capabilities is necessary. When you also account for the confusion and frustration regarding the aviation aspect of the Sea Base concept, we would encourage the Navy to evaluate how to proceed with the USS Enterprise with its upcoming yard work.

Instead of returning her to sea as the 11th CVN, we encourage the Navy to spend some money and convert her into as much of the aviation solution as possible for the Sea Base concept, specifically converting her to support as many of the 192 required CH-46 equivalents required for the ACE element of a MEB. By removing the two catapults on the angled deck, but retaining the two up front, the Navy would then be in a better position to evaluate virtually every scenario discussed regarding Sea Basing, forward deployed aviation capabilities, and establish a true set of requirements for aviation at sea in the 21st century beyond the big deck fixed wing carriers.

The Enterprise life can be extended by removing it from the forward deployment cycle and utilizing the ship as a technology demonstrator for Sea Basing, including important discussed but often discarded possibilities like support for lighter than air aviation, BUT also supporting C-130 operations at sea and the evaluation of requirements to deploy air assault elements of the 101st Airborne.

This is a proposal for evolution, as opposed to revolution in the fleet force structure changes, and evaluation of requirements and metrics required to meet emerging expectations. The Navy has already expressed desire to meet the new Maritime Strategy with an improved force structure better suited to the requirements of the 21st century, Joint requirements btw which not only includes the Coast Guard and Marines, but Army and Air Force as well. This reduction of a single aircraft carrier not only illustrates the flexibility of the large deck aircraft carrier, but reinforces the Navy's desire to all services to be a Joint Force for supporting the national interest. During a period where funding is a competitive sport in Congress, demonstrating joint force multiplying capabilities and sacrificing major platforms like an aircraft carrier for the purpose of testing and evaluation of concepts to be funded reinforces the Navies case for more funding, an aspect of this proposal not to be undersold when the time comes.

If we have learned anything from the new proposals, it would appear the Navy is in search for a new set of metrics in a future fleet. While aviation is still desired, the type of aviation is different than in the past. We are not seeing an emphasis of long range missile ships, rather a desire for well decks. We are not seeing a desire for more AEGIS, rather more smaller, faster vessels. Although with all proposals demonstrating a remarkable lack of logistics and submarines, maybe its fair to question the Navy proposals completely and disregard them all, accepting the possibility we really haven't learned anything at all regarding the thinking in the Navy.

quinta-feira, 13 de dezembro de 2007

le nouveau sous-marin de DCNS pour le marché export

Andrasta,

Vue du SMX-23 Andrasta, sous-marin conçu par DCNS
crédits : DCN


12/12/2007

Après les Scorpène, Marlin et Barracuda, DCNS abandonne les noms de poissons exotiques pour sa nouvelle gamme de sous-marin. Le nom d'Andrasta, déesse celte de la guerre, a été retenu pour le SMX-23, ce petit sous-marin côtier destiné au marché export. D'un déplacement de 855 tonnes en surface, ce navire, présenté au dernier salon Euronaval, peut embarquer six armes. Le bâtiment a vocation à équiper les marines ne disposant pas de sous-marinade où n'ayant pas les moyens de s'offrir des unités comme le Scorpène. Utilisant des technologies éprouvées et peu complexes, l'Andrasta est, environ, deux fois moins cher qu'un sous-marin d'attaque de la dernière génération. « Ce bateau est avant tout dissuasif, sa seule présence devant dissuader un agresseur de s'approcher des côtes. Il est robuste, simple d'utilisation et de maintenance, n'avance qu'à 15 noeuds et ne plonge qu'à 200 mètres, ce qui est un bon compromis pour naviguer par petit fond et patrouiller le long des côtes », explique un architecte de DCNS.
Le SMX-23 Andrasta sera capable d'atteindre 1850 milles à 8 noeuds et 3000 milles à 4 noeuds. A cette vitesse, il pourra rester en plongée, sur batteries, pendant 60 heures, son autonomie pouvant atteindre 15 jours. Côté armement, le sous-marin sera doté de six tubes, sans recharge. Il pourra aussi bien embarquer des torpilles que des missiles à changement de milieu ou des mines, dont la pose au large des côtes est beaucoup plus aisée avec un navire 800 tonnes qu'une unité de 2000 ou 4000 tonnes. Armé par un équipage de 19 hommes, le SMX-23 est enfin conçu pour les opérations spéciales et la mise en oeuvre de commandos.
Pour la petite histoire, Andrasta est la même divinité qu'Andarta la gauloise. Sa protection avait notamment été invoquée par la reine bretonne Bouddica, lors de l'invasion de la Grande-Bretagne (alors appelée Bretagne) par les armées romaines, en 61 avant Jésus Christ.

terça-feira, 11 de dezembro de 2007

L'achat de frégates belges n'enterre pas le projet des corvettes Gowind

Bulgarie. L'achat de frégates belges n'enterre pas le projet des corvettes Gowind

Vue d'une corvette du type Gowind
crédits : DCNS


11/12/2007

Selon DCNS, la décision de la Bulgarie d'acheter deux frégates d'occasion à la Belgique n'enterre pas le projet d'acquisition de Gowind. « Les navires belges vont assurer la jonction avec les nouvelles corvettes mais il ne remet pas en cause l'accord franco-bulgare », indique-t-on chez l'industriel. Cette réaction fait suite aux déclarations du ministre bulgare de la Défense, Veselin Bliznakov. Evoquant des problèmes budgétaires pour financer les corvettes françaises, ce dernier a confirmé le transfert des bâtiments belges, à l'étude depuis plusieurs années. Le 4 octobre, lors d'une visite du président Sarkozy à Sofia, un accord portant sur la réalisation de quatre corvettes du type Gowind avait été annoncé. Depuis, un groupe de travail a été mis en place pour étudier le projet et rendre une offre. « Ce groupe est aujourd'hui constitué, a travaillé et a commencé à rendre ses premiers résultats », souligne-t-on chez DCNS, où l'on reconnait, néanmoins ne pas « maîtriser le calendrier ». L'objectif initial de signer un contrat avant la fin de l'année ne sera, d'ailleurs, vraisemblablement pas tenu. Si elle n'est pas rédibitoire, l'acquisition de bâtiments belges peut, dans le même temps, retarder le projet. Bien que trentenaires, les Wielingen et Westdiep ont, en effet, bénéficié de plusieurs rénovations ces dernières années, notamment au niveau de la propulsion. Elles rejoindront une troisième unité du même type, le Wandelaar, déjà vendu à la Bulgarie en 2005.
Le coût du contrat Gowind est estimé à plus de 700 millions d'euros. Spécialement conçue pour le marché export par DCNS, ce type de navire n'a pas encore trouvé acquéreur.

sábado, 8 de dezembro de 2007

ary rongel the first

quinta-feira, 6 de dezembro de 2007

Sir Galahad Joins Brazilian Navy

Sir Galahad Joins Brazilian Navy


Thursday, December 06, 2007

Source: MoD




Brazil formally has welcomed the former Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) landing ship Sir Galahad into her Navy at Portsmouth Naval Base yesterday.

The Sir Galahad, which in 1988 replaced the ship of the same name lost in the Falklands War, was commissioned into the Brazilian Navy as the Garcia D'Avila - the name of a distinguished captain and Brazilian war hero who served from 1913 until 1945.

Representing the British Armed Forces at the commissioning ceremony was Portsmouth Naval Base Commander, Commodore David Steel:

"Sir Galahad has seen long and distinguished service with the RFA," he said. "While it is always sad to bid farewell to one of our ships, all of us in the Naval Service are delighted and heartened that Sir Galahad, as the Garcia D'Avila, will be a valued and very capable addition to the Brazilian fleet."

Sir Galahad (8,750 tonnes) and her five sister ships began entering service from the mid-1960s, but from 2001 were replaced by four much larger and more capable vessels of 16,000 tonnes - RFAs Largs Bay, Lyme Bay, Mounts Bay and Cardigan Bay - each of which are equipped with landing craft and can accommodate 356 troops and up to 150 trucks or 24 Challenger battle tanks.

The present Sir Galahad was built by Swan Hunter at Tyne and Wear and has served in both Iraq wars. She is unique in the RFA having won two Wilkinson Swords of Peace for humanitarian aid - to Angola in 1995 and Iraq in 2003.

In July last year she made her last journey under the RFA flag when she sailed from Marchwood port, the Armed Forces' Sea Mounting Centre on Southampton Water, to Portsmouth, where she has been refitted for Brazilian service.

segunda-feira, 3 de dezembro de 2007

INDIA Questões monetárias podem cancelar o negócio.


Porta-aviões Admiral Gorshkov continua em dúvida

03.12.2007

A venda do porta-aviões Admiral Gorskkov por parte da Rússia à União Indiana continua envolta em duvidas no memo de declarações por parte de responsáveis oficiais da marinha indiana.

Em 2004 a Rússia vendeu por um valor simbólico à Índia o mais recente dos seus quatro porta-aviões da classe Kiev, o Admiral Gorshkov, de 44.000 toneladas com a condição de a modernização do navio ser feita em estaleiros russos. A modernização implicava alterações estruturais de grande porte, que devem transformar aquilo que era segundo os russos um cruzador porta-aviões, cuja proa era a de um cruzador lança-mísseis, num porta-aviões puro, com a parte da proa do navio convertida para acomodar uma coberta de voo muito maior.
Com o porta-aviões a Índia comprou à Rússia um total de 30 aeronaves do tipo MiG-29K, juntamente com vários helicópteros.

Segundo os planos delineados entre russos e indianos o Gorshkov, entretanto rebaptizado Vikramaditya deveria ser entregue em 2008, o que neste momento é certo que a entrega não vai ocorrer nesse ano, como também já não é certo que ocorra em 2009 como ainda há alguns meses previa o ministro da defesa indiano.

À medida que vão sendo divulgados dados e que se vão tornando públicos os compromissos assumidos entre russos e indianos, a contabilidade do negócio torna-se mais «límpida». Assim, o aumento do preço combinado de 974 milhões de dólares americanos parece ser o principal problema, pois segundo as últimas noticias, ao custo inicialmente previsto, os russos estão agora a somar mais 1.200 milhões de dólares pelo navio , o que representa um aumento de 123% relativamente ao preço originalmente combinado. A somar aos 974 milhões, há ainda um total de 526 milhões para os equipamentos adicionais.

Almirante Surehsh Mehta: Não pagamos!
Segundo o comandante da marinha da Índia, almirante Surehsh Mehta o negócio foi feito entre os governos dos dois países e a Rússia tem a obrigação de fornecer à Índia o navio conforme estipulado nos contratos entre os dois países.
Em entrevista à imprensa indiana o almirante adiantou ainda que a Índia estará na disposição de aceitar um aumento do preço do navio, mas que poderá chegar até um valor de 500 milhões de Dólares, elevando o valor de $974 milhões de dólares para 1 474 milhões de dólares, mas que pagar mais 1 200 milhões pelo navio tornaria o projecto pura e simplesmente insustentável.

A imprensa indiana, também afirmou que, embora isso seja visto como uma forma de pressionar os russos, as autoridades militares indianas, que já pagaram aos esteleiros na Rússia um total de 460 milhões de dólares, poderão pura e simplesmente cancelar o projecto e não comprar o navio se a Rússia não se comprometer a entrega-lo conforme contratado.

A Índia possui presentemente apenas um porta-aviões, o ex Hermes britânico que combateu nas Malvinas, mas a título de precaução foi já adiantado que em vez de prever a sua retirada de serviço o Viirat deverá ser ainda submetido a uma nova modernização com o objectivo de o manter em operação durante mais alguns anos.

domingo, 2 de dezembro de 2007

da imprensa venezoelana :CIA Operation "Pliers" Uncovered

CIA Operation "Pliers" Uncovered in Venezuela

Last night CNN en Español aired the above image, which captions at the bottom "Who Killed him?" by "accident". The image of President Chavez with the caption about killing him below, which some could say subliminally incites to assassination, was a "production error" mistakenly made in the CNN en Español newsroom. The news anchor had been narrarating a story about the situation between Colombia and Venezuela and then switched to a story about an unsolved homicide but - oops - someone forgot to change the screen image and President Chavez was left with the killing statement below. Today they apologized and admitted it was a rather "unfortunate" and "regrettable" mistake. Yes, it was.

On a scarier note, an internal CIA memorandum has been obtained by Venezuelan counterintelligence from the US Embassy in Caracas that reveals a very sinister - almost fantastical, were it not true - plan to destabilize Venezuela during the coming days. The plan, titled "OPERATION PLIERS" was authored by CIA Officer Michael Middleton Steere and was addressed to CIA Director General Michael Hayden in Washington. Steere is stationed at the US Embassy in Caracas under the guise of a Regional Affairs Officer. The internal memorandum, dated November 20, 2007, references the "Advances of the Final Stage of Operation Pliers", and confirms that the operation is coordinated by the team of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) in Venezuela. The memo summarizes the different scenarios that the CIA has been working on in Venezuela for the upcoming referendum vote on December 2nd. The Electoral Scenario, as it's phrased, confirms that the voting tendencies will not change substantially before Sunday, December 2nd, and that the SI (YES) vote in favor of the constitutional reform has an advantage of about 10-13 points over the NO vote. The CIA estimates abstention around 60% and states in the memo that this voting tendency is irreversible before the elections.

Officer Steere emphasizes the importance and success of the public relations and propaganda campaign that the CIA has been funding with more than $8 million during the past month - funds that the CIA confirms are transfered through the USAID contracted company, Development Alternatives, Inc., which set up operations in June 2002 to run the USAID Office for Transition Initiatives that funds and advises opposition NGOs and political parties in Venezuela. The CIA memo specifically refers to these propaganda initiatives as "psychological operations" (PSYOPS), that include contracting polling companies to create fraudulent polls that show the NO vote with an advantage over the SI vote, which is false. The CIA also confirms in the memo that it is working with international press agencies to distort the data and information about the referendum, and that it coordinates in Venezuela with a team of journalists and media organized and directed by the President of Globovision, Alberto Federico Ravell.

CIA Officer Michael Steere recommends to General Michael Hayden two different strategies to work simultaneously: Impede the referendum and refuse to recognize the results once the SI vote wins. Though these strategies appear contradictory, Steere claims that they must be implemented together precisely to encourage activities that aim toward impeding the referendum and at the same time prepare the conditions for a rejection of the results.

How is this to be done?

In the memo, the CIA proposes the following tactics and actions:
  • Take the streets and protest with violent, disruptive actions across the nation
  • Generate a climate of ungovernability
  • Provoke a general uprising in a substantial part of the population
  • Engage in a "plan to implode" the voting centers on election day by encouraging opposition voters to "VOTE and REMAIN" in their centers to agitate others
  • Start to release data during the early hours of the afternoon on Sunday that favor the NO vote (in clear violation of election regulations)
  • Coordinate these activities with Ravell & Globovision and international press agencies
  • Coordinate with ex-militar officers and coupsters Pena Esclusa and Guyon Cellis - this will be done by the Military Attache for Defense and Army at the US Embassy in Caracas, Office of Defense, Attack and Operations (DAO)
To encourage rejection of the results, the CIA proposes:
  • Creating an acceptance in the public opinion that the NO vote will win for sure
  • Using polling companies contracted by the CIA
  • Criticize and discredit the National Elections Council
  • Generate a sensation of fraud
  • Use a team of experts from the universities that will talk about how the data from the Electoral Registry has been manipulated and will build distrust in the voting system
The CIA memo also talks about:
  • Isolating Chavez in the international community
  • Trying to achieve unity amongst the opposition
  • Seek an aliance between those abstentionists and those who will vote "NO"
  • Sustain firmly the propaganda against Chavez
  • Execute military actions to support the opposition mobilizations and propagandistic occupations
  • Finalize the operative preparations on the US military bases in Curacao and Colombia to provide support to actions in Venezuela
  • Control a part of the country during the next 72-120 hours
  • Encourage a military rebellion inside the National Guard forces and other components
Those involved in these actions as detailed in the CIA memo are:
  • The CIA Office in Venezuela - Office of Regional Affairs, and Officer Michael Steere
  • US Embassy in Venezuela, Ambassador Patrick Duddy
  • Office of Defense, Attack and Operations (DAO) at the US Embassy in Caracas and Military Attache Richard Nazario
Venezuelan Political Parties:
  • Comando Nacional de la Resistencia
  • Accion Democratica
  • Primero Justicia
  • Bandera Roja
Media:
  • Alberto Federico Ravell & Globovision
  • Interamerican Press Society (IAPA) or SIP in Spanish
  • International Press Agencies
Venezuelans:
  • Pena Esclusa
  • Guyon Cellis
  • Dean of the Simon Bolivar University, Rudolph Benjamin Podolski
  • Dean of the Andres Bello Catholic University, Ugalde
  • Students: Yon Goicochea, Juan Mejias, Ronel Gaglio, Gabriel Gallo, Ricardo Sanchez

Operation Tenaza has the objective of encouraging an armed insurrection in Venezuela against the government of President Chavez that will justify an intervention of US forces, stationed on the military bases nearby in Curacao and Colombia. The Operation mentions two countries in code: as Blue and Green. These refer to Curacao and Colombia, where the US has operative, active and equipped bases that have been reinforced over the past year and a half in anticipation of a conflict with Venezuela.

The document confirms that psychological operations are the CIA's best and most effective weapon to date against Venezuela, and it will continue its efforts to influence international public opinion regarding President Chavez and the situation in the country.

Operation Tenaza is a very alarming plan that aims to destabilize Venezuela and overthrow (again) its legitimate and democratic (and very popularly support) president. The plan will fail, primarily because it has been discovered, but it must be denounced around the world as an unacceptable violation of Venezuela's sovereignty.

The original document in English will be available in the public sphere soon for viewing and authenticating purposes. And it also contains more information than has been revealed here.

For the full text in Spanish, see: Operación Tenaza: Informe confidencial de la CIA devela plan de saboteo al referéndum del 2 de diciembre